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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE



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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

A CHALLENGE TO THE CHURCH

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BY

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To
THOSE OF MY STUDENTS
WHO HAVE ENTERED THE
FIELD OF CHRISTIAN WORK

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PREFACE

The lectures which constitute this volume were delivered before the Yale University Divinity School in November, 1922, upon the Gilbert L. Stark Foundation, under the title, "The Religious Implications of Sociological Principles." Only minor changes have been made in preparing the lectures for publication, and it is hoped that the lecture form which has been preserved will prove not unacceptable to the reader.

The lectures were an elaboration and development of certain positions and assumptions in the author's *The Reconstruction of Religion* which appeared to need more explicit formulation. This volume, then, will be found to be a sequel to *The Reconstruction of Religion*. In general, the lectures attempt to carry to their logical conclusion the positions taken in the earlier volume. Lectures II, III, IV, V, and VI will be found to develop the central thought of the series.

The author wishes to express his gratitude to the faculty of the Yale Divinity School, for giving him the opportunity to deliver this message to their students and for permission to publish the lectures without any restriction.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI,
April 16, 1923.

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"Through all the world grows the realization that there can be no securely happy individual life without a righteous general life. Through all the world spreads the suspicion that this scheme of things might be remade, and remade better, and that our present evils need not be. Our lives, we see with a growing certitude, are fretted and shadowed and spoilt because there is as yet no worldwide law, no certain justice. Yet there is nothing absolutely unattainable in world law and world justice. More men are capable of realizing this than was ever possible at any previous time. And to be aware of a need is to be half-way toward its satisfaction. We call this stir towards a new order, this refusal to drift on in the old directions, unrest, but rather is it hope which disturbs the world."—H. G. Wells, *Outline of History*, Vol. II, p. 574.

"The sum of the whole matter is this, that our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be re-deemed spiritually. It can be saved only by becoming permeated with the spirit of Christ and being made free and happy by the practices which spring out of that spirit. Only thus can discontent be driven out and all the shadows lifted from the road ahead."—Woodrow Wilson, in "The Road Away From Revolution," *The Atlantic Monthly Press*.

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

A CHALLENGE TO THE CHURCH

I

SOCIOLOGY AND RELIGION

A NEW hope has come into the world—that science may unite with religion in the work of redeeming mankind; that thus we of this generation may discover a new “synthesis of aspiration with knowledge” which will do for our world what the synthesis of medieval Christianity with Roman law and government, on the one hand, and with Greek philosophy, on the other, did for the later Middle Ages. To be sure, this hope is as yet largely confined to a few pioneering minds at work within the fields either of religion or of science. Yet it has begun to spread to many of those who are engaged in solving the practical problems of our world. Thus a school administrator, who has had some difficulties on account of the opposition to the teaching of the doctrine of evolution in the public schools, writes me, “I believe that when the churches shall welcome wholeheartedly the scientist as an ally, we shall experience a religious revival such as the world has never seen before.” That there is ground for this belief I shall endeavor to show, but also that the natural ally of religion is not physical science, but social science.

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THE RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

But no sooner is the hope of this new synthesis proposed than objections are heard within and without the church. We are told that science and religion are "unrelated activities of the human mind"; that science cannot be in any sense a basis for religion; that they deal with entirely different and unrelated realms of experience.¹ This, to be sure, is a position understandable for a physical scientist; but for the social scientist it is not a tenable position. The facts and conditions of human life with which he deals inevitably involve the values and attitudes which make religion. The metaphysical truth or falsity of religious beliefs, like all other metaphysical questions, he may of course leave to metaphysics. But from making some evaluation of religious beliefs and attitudes in terms of the social experience of mankind, he cannot escape. To social science, religion and science are no more "unrelated subjects" than are politics and science. Social science must evaluate science itself in terms of social experience; no less must it evaluate religion.²

Moreover, the social scientist discovers that religion on its human side deals with the same social facts and con-

¹The physical scientist quoted even goes so far as to speak of science as "inevitably atheistic." But surely this need not be so and can only be so, indeed, when a metaphysics is constructed upon the basis of physical science alone. Physical science is but one of the bases for that valuation of life and the universe which we call religion, and *the least important among its scientific bases*.

²For a fuller discussion of the relations of religion and modern science, see the author's *Reconstruction of Religion*, Chapter I, including the footnotes. For a very helpful recent discussion of the relation of religion to modern scientific views, see the article by Professor Edward Caldwell Moore, on "The Christian Doctrine of Nature," in *The Journal of Religion* for January, 1923. This article may be taken as representative of the best thought of religious thinkers.

ditions which he himself studies. To be sure, it deals with them differently. It aims not to understand them, but to control them. But as understanding must be the basis of wise control; and inasmuch as the social scientist knows that understanding is for the sake of control, he sees that the ultimate aim of both religion and science must be the same—to benefit man. If both come to aim at the same sort of control in the interest of the widest possible service of humanity, he sees no inconsistency in their coöperation. Indeed, he perceives that *just as there must be a synthesis of practical politics and social science, so there must be a synthesis of practical religion and social science*, if both are not to be sterile.

Again, we are told in the name of philosophy that religion is made “rational” when it is reduced to its own postulates; that harmony with scientific knowledge does not make religion rational, but harmony with religious and moral experience.³ But, as the editor of *The Journal of Religion* has pointed out,⁴ “the moment a fact is asserted, critical

³This is the position of Professor William H. Wood’s *The Religion of Science*, which, on the whole, must be characterized as a most reactionary book. While many of its criticisms of the dogmatic naturalism of some science are deserved, yet the general attitude of the book is most unfortunate, for it is an anti-science and anti-evolution attitude. While the book is representative of a certain trend in modern theological and religious thinking, yet it is fair to say that it is not representative of the most enlightened thought of the church.

⁴In its January, 1923, issue *The Journal of Religion* says: “We are witnessing something like a crusade against science on the ground that it is an enemy of the faith. The crusaders are partly right. Science is undermining a certain kind of faith. . . . Can religion ignore science? The present tendency in religious thinking is to attempt this very thing. . . . But the price to be paid for such a religion is heavy. A religion which defies science must be willing to lose its sway over the hosts who think and live in terms of scientific learning.”

science immediately assumes the right to ask if the alleged fact is really a fact. Thus science re-enters the field of religious discussion. It cannot be ignored." The truth is that the dualism which Kant proposed, to save religion and ethics from scientific criticism, no longer can be upheld.⁵ Science does not leave its own postulates unexamined; much less therefore will it leave those of religion and ethics. Science does not deal with one sort of truth, and religion with another. Though religion is and must remain in the realm of faith, true religion must be a faith thoroughly consistent with established knowledge. As I have said elsewhere, "A religion which will meet the needs of modern life must be in harmony, not merely remotely with science, but it must be directly indicated by science as a necessity for the development of ■ humanity adjusted to the requirements of its existence." Of course, the science which can indicate such ■ religion must be a science which takes into full account every phase of human life—it must be social science. Surely, if we are rational, we shall not want a religion out of harmony with such science. We cannot leave religion in a purely mystical realm, leaving practical problems to be dealt with by science; for vital religion and science are both working at the problem of human welfare. They can and should be made to work together, not separately, but as a living synthesis, as spirit works with flesh.⁶

*Those who deny the relevancy of modern science for religion usually are unaware of the recent advances in science and philosophy, and especially of the work of such thinkers as Professor L. T. Hobhouse. His *Development and Purpose* is a careful survey of the work of modern science, ending in the presentation of ethical theism as the only rational hypothesis. *The Rational Good*, another work by Hobhouse, does the same thing in a more popular way. Such works make the Kantian dualism untenable.

*Says Mr. Herbert Croly in a striking article on "Naturalism and Christianity" in *The New Republic* of February 28, 1923: "The

Only a more intelligent understanding by religious people of the methods and aims of social science is needed to bring this partnership about.

Science and the scientific spirit, however, are still supposed by many earnest religious people to be hostile to religion, because science refuses to regard man as separate from the rest of nature.⁷ Many religious people still object, when it comes to human affairs, if a natural and common-sense view is taken of things which they regard as supernatural and divine. Some even look upon social science as an intrusion of scientific method and spirit into a realm where they have no business.

It must be admitted that some of the adverse criticisms passed upon modern science are not without a basis of fact.⁸ It is true, for example, that some modern science

way to deal with this discrepancy between scientific and religious truth is not to ignore its existence or to compromise it, but to combine the two into an effective working union. . . . Science is the agency by which man adjusts himself to the world. Religion is the agency by which he envisages a modification of the world in the interest of his own fulfillment. Science can function vigorously without religion; but religion just because it seeks a synthesis between life and truth cannot function vigorously without the support of science."

⁷In the article above referred to, Professor Edward C. Moore says, "The salient thing in modern science is the ever-increasing degree in which we have tended to include man, with all of his possible relations within the complex of nature. In truth, we go on to a naturalism larger than was conceived. The new naturalism includes the supernatural, if you like that phrase." It is doubtless in this sense that Mr. Croly declares, "Naturalism prepares Christianity for the first time to become unscrupulously and wholeheartedly humanistic."

⁸For a brief criticism of modern science by the author, see *The Reconstruction of Religion*, pp. 5, 110-112. Much of the current criticism of science springs from the identification of all science

has maintained down to date a negative attitude toward what we may call the higher values of life; and this is as true of some social science as it is of some physical science. A British sociological writer has even charged⁹ "that the characteristic knowledge of the West which has been reduced to science is but the organized form of the doctrine of the supremacy of material force," and he calls attention to "the sociology of the schools moved to profound depths of scholarship over the significance of totemism or the rites associated with the age of puberty in the savage maiden, while remaining utterly unconscious of the significance of the psychic forces expressing themselves in the great systems of emotion and idealism." With some justice he calls such science "ignorant knowledge" and predicts the coming of a true science of civilization, which shall take account of the psychic forces too often neglected by the science of the past.

However, such criticisms of modern science are due to a partial view of its spirit and method. Anyone who has penetrated deeply into scientific spirit and method cannot take such criticisms very seriously. The very nature of science is such that it must in time correct its own mis-

with physical science—a confusion for which the physical scientists themselves are partly to blame. Again, it is assumed that science can have nothing to do with value-judgments, and hence that it necessarily ignores social values, and is dangerous to civilization. The social sciences, however, necessarily deal with social values and so become a necessary foundation for intelligent constructive social policies. Once we learn more generally to conceive of science broadly as "critically established knowledge," this will become evident.

⁹ Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, p. 101. Kidd's trenchant criticisms of the Social Darwinism of such writers as Galton, Pearson, and Bateson would be agreed to by most sociologists of scientific standing of the present time.

takes.¹⁰ While it is true that modern scientists have often endorsed surprising negations in the social and spiritual realm; and while it is also true that some scientists seem more interested in using science as an instrument for destructive criticism of the institutions and of the higher values of life, than for constructive work upon such institutions and values—yet it also remains true that science is the one most moving thing in our world, and presents the best hope of continuing human progress if it can be synthesized with our humanitarian aspirations.¹¹ At any rate we live in an age of science, and readjustments in every field of knowledge and of practical endeavor must be made to conform with the scientific spirit. Modern thought, whether or not it is an outcome of modern science, is rapidly shaping itself into conformity with the scientific spirit. The acid test of scientific method is being applied to every form of practical endeavor. Nothing can hope to escape the scrutiny of science. It is already making rapid headway in the very fields which have hitherto been occupied unshared by religion and ethics. Both religion and ethics should welcome the tests which the scientific spirit proposes to apply to them. If there is truth in the values which they have endorsed, surely such truth will in time be corroborated by the independent, dispassionate investigations of science.

Why the advance of scientific knowledge, if we can learn to use such knowledge rightly, presents the best hope for continuous human progress in the future should be clear.

¹⁰ The true scientific spirit, it is hardly necessary to say, is at bottom simply intellectual morality. It is intellectual honesty, sincerity, consistency, and open-mindedness. It is, therefore, alive to the truth, unbiased, accurate, and impersonal. It must, therefore, in time correct its own mistakes, and all assaults upon science, like all other assaults upon morality, are bound to fail.

¹¹ Compare Curtis, *Science and Human Affairs*, Chap. I.

It may not be true that science is the one field of human endeavor, which, from its very nature, looks forward rather than backward, since the forward and creative look is not alien to any of the great fields of effort of the human spirit. Yet it is true that science in its search for new knowledge, in its passion for understanding, encourages and maintains the open mind, and is leading mankind forward at the present time as perhaps nothing else in our world. Every sane man who has thought carefully about this matter, therefore, welcomes the work of science and is not afraid to apply the scientific spirit to any phase of human life or of civilization.

For what is science, and what is the scientific spirit? Surely science, as one of my colleagues has said, is simply the product of human reason applied to the phenomena of experience.¹² "It is therefore as old as rational thought. The straight-thinking man was always a scientist." "Science," says Professor James Harvey Robinson, "is but the most accurate information available about the world in which we live and the nature of ourselves and our fellow-men."¹³ In other words, science is but a name for the accurate knowledge which we secure when we think carefully and rationally. Being scientific is then essentially being truly rational. In practice, rationality for man consists in complying with the laws of his universe in so far as he is able to interpret them. Science, therefore, is just man's best and most successful effort to interpret and understand his universe. *The scientific spirit is the passion to understand.* It is the spirit of devotion to the truth. Such a spirit is surely not hostile to a true religious spirit which is a devotion to, and an aspiration toward the realization of, the higher values of life. We have, of course, a spirit

¹² Professor W. C. Curtis, *Science and Human Affairs*, p. 3.

¹³ *The Mind in the Making*, p. 208.

which calls itself scientific, which falls short of openmindedness to all truth; and we have a spirit which calls itself religious, which clings to the traditions of the past instead of seeking to build the aspirations and values of life upon the facts established by enlarging human experience. It is these narrow manifestations of the scientific and of the religious spirit which come into collision with one another and give rise to the so-called "conflict of religion and science." There is surely no sound basis for such a conflict in a truly rational mind, and it is time that talk of such conflict should cease in our civilization. The great object of ethical religion is to redeem mankind from a life of sin and to bring men into harmony with themselves and with their universe. This cannot be done without knowledge of the forces which make and mar the lives of men. In other words, religion cannot perform its work without science—without trustworthy knowledge of the forces at work in human life. Now, science reveals that these forces which shape human life are mainly social in nature. Therefore, religion must seek the aid of social sciences if it is to create a better human world. *Religion must enlist the scientific spirit and employ scientifically tested knowledge of human life if it is successfully to accomplish its work.* We may rest assured that the religion of the future will be at one with science in that it will make practical application of scientific ideas and achievements, especially in the human sciences, and will welcome the scientific habit of mind as its necessary ally.¹⁴

RELIGION NEEDED AS WELL AS SCIENCE

But if science stands for knowledge, for carefully sifted and tested knowledge, what more is needed? May we not

¹⁴ Compare Curtis, *Science and Human Affairs*, p. 8.

trust that such knowledge will be utilized as need for it arises? What need is there for religion in a fully scientific world? Will not science be able to satisfy also the ethical and philosophical desires of men which have hitherto been satisfied by theology and religion? The answer is plainly that *the problem life presents is much more than a problem of knowledge*. It is even more a problem of motives and of will attitudes—of aspirations, desires and determinations. The human world is governed not alone or mainly by thought, but even more by emotion. Knowledge alone does not suffice to motivate the human will in a socially right direction. We have, also, to find a way of diffusing among men right aspirations and right desires—right emotional attitudes—before we can be sure that they will use knowledge rightly. Now religion stands for this element of aspiration and emotional value in human life. It is in this way intensely concerned with social values. At its best, religion is a setting of the affections upon the highest personal and social values and ideals which we know, that is, upon what we may call divine things. It is the cultivation of faith, hope, and love in human life. *The religious spirit is the spirit of devotion to ideal social and personal ends and of the consecration of individual life to these ends.*¹⁵

Science, if it is to benefit man in an idealistic social way, is consequently helpless without religion. Religion needs science to give it knowledge of the best means to reach its end, but science needs religion not less to move men effectively to use aright the truth which it discovers. "Each," says Professor Harry Ward, "is impotent to change mankind without the other; one for lack of technique and one for want of power."¹⁶ Social science needs the aid of

¹⁵ This view of religion was elaborated in my *Reconstruction of Religion*, pp. 40-46, 55-66.

¹⁶ *The Journal of Religion*, p. 477, Vol. II (September, 1922).

religion if it is to become something more than a polite amusement, and religion needs the aid of social science if it is to become practical for human living. Of course, the social science needed is one which is not afraid of value-judgments, which is broadly synthetic of all the facts and values of human life, and so humanitarian in the best sense—the sense in which science as a whole has always claimed to be of benefit to man. In other words, science needs to become socialized quite as much as religion. “If,” says Professor Ward, “the future of mankind depends upon religion becoming scientific and therefore social, it equally depends upon science becoming social and therefore religious.”¹⁷

The spiritual regulation of man's social life, moreover, has always been largely a matter of religion. If at times the social basis and social purpose of religion have been lost sight of, that should not obscure the essentially social nature of religion, or the necessary functions which it performs in energizing and stabilizing personal and social life. If there is one thing which the scientific study of social life has revealed clearly, it is the power of religion over the social and personal life of man; and we have no right to assume that man will be able to dispense with its power in the future. *Science has discovered no substitute for religion as a spring of social idealism.*¹⁸ Religion, therefore, must continue to furnish the aspiration, the motive, for the realization of ideal social ends; but science must draw the plans and furnish the means. Obviously, the religious spirit cannot work intelligently and beneficently in human affairs unless it uses to the full the established knowledge which science offers to mankind.

¹⁷ *The Journal of Religion*, p. 480, Vol. II.

¹⁸ Compare *The Reconstruction of Religion*, Chap. II.

SOCIOLOGY A BASIS FOR THE SYNTHESIS

Now, that scientific knowledge which concerns human relations and human institutions in their broadest aspects, scientific men have come to call sociological knowledge, or sociology. Just how completely we have scientific knowledge of such matters at the present time may, of course, be questioned. But the point remains that such scientific knowledge of human relations and human institutions is what is needed by religion so far as it becomes a practical program for dealing with the world's ills. Without scientific knowledge of human conditions and possibilities, religion can do little effectively in our complex world. If there is no scientific sociology, therefore, in existence, the genuinely religious person should be supremely interested in developing one, provided we assume that science can give us effective control over forces in the human as well as in the physical world. If the term sociology is broadened, however, to include all the social sciences, as we may arbitrarily do for our purpose, then it is clear at once that much scientific sociological knowledge is already in existence, and that the question becomes the practical one of how much religious people are willing to cultivate and to utilize such knowledge. We see, also, that sociology, in this broad sense of "scientific knowledge of the collective life of man—of human living together," is the natural intermediary between science and religion. If developed religion stands for aspiration and idealism in human life, and if science stands for accurate knowledge, then developed sociology, as our most accurate knowledge of human living together, is the natural intermediary between them. It alone can furnish the basis for the synthesis of the two—that is, for that "synthesis of aspiration with knowledge" which, we said in the beginning, must be the hope of our

present world. The manifest importance of sociology for practical religion is thus plain.

But what, it may be asked, has sociology in its present stage of development, even in this broad sense, to offer to religion and to religious people? The reply is that it has much to offer. Even if one of its offerings takes the form of a program for securing more knowledge, nevertheless such a practicable program to be worked out in the future with the aid of sociology is surely a desideratum for practical religion. If we agree among ourselves to ignore, however, the relatively few radical materialists, who introduce negative conclusions into all the human sciences, and confine our attention to what I believe to be the main stream of sociological thought at the present time, then present-day sociology has much to offer to social religion which is of immediate practical value.

HUMAN NATURE IS PLASTIC

In the first place, modern sociological research has shown almost beyond the shadow of a doubt the plasticity or modifiability of human nature in social life. Much of the incubus of doubt which has rested upon the program of ethical religion in the past has been due to the supposition that human nature was unmodifiable; but *the studies among all the peoples of the world of anthropologists and sociologists show human nature to be one of the most modifiable things we know.* We are almost justified in drawing the conclusion that it may be indefinitely modified by social traditions, social institutions, and the social environment. Thus we find a great variety of forms of family life and sex relations among human beings from the lowest and most degraded bestial type to the highest and most idealistic which ethical religion has advocated. Apparently in every

case these forms are due to the social traditions and customs of the groups in which they are found. The "mores," or social standards of the group, as Professor William Graham Sumner long ago showed, are all powerful in molding human behavior and social institutions. We can no longer regard human nature, therefore, as a sort of a dead weight upon human aspirations, a thing innately depraved and fixedly perverse,¹⁹ which prevents man from realizing his ideals. To be sure, as I shall point out later, there are right ways and wrong ways—foolish ways and wise ways—of attempting to control or modify human nature and human behavior. Men have often failed in the past in their attempts at the modification of human nature, not because it cannot be modified, but because in their ignorance they have gone about it the wrong way.

What we have just said about the modifiability of human nature in family and sex relations applies equally, of course, to political and industrial relations. A great variety of forms of government have been found to exist among the various peoples of the world from the most oppressive and degrading despotisms to the most ennobling democracy. In every case what one of these forms is found to exist seems to depend chiefly upon the prevalence of certain traditions and customs, though other factors, such as the use of physical force, are not absent. But we may safely affirm that the mores are all-powerful in the political as well as in the other aspects of our social life.

Again, a great variety of forms of industrial life and organization are found in human groups, from the most absolute slavery to the utmost freedom of contract and cooperation. While conditions in the physical environment and the use of physical force have played a part in

¹⁹ On this point, see Tennant's excellent discussion, *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, especially Lecture III.

establishing and maintaining these various forms of industry, yet on the whole the main part has been played again by the traditions and customs of the peoples. Slavery, when once established, becomes supported by tradition and custom, and often tradition and custom maintain it long after other factors become relatively unfavorable. It is certain, at any rate, that the mores play the decisive part in the *maintenance* of slavery and, for that matter, of any other form of industry. It is also certain that human nature finds it possible to accept, because of influences in the physical environment and the influence of social tradition, almost any form of industry and to maintain it for centuries. So far as science can see, our present industrial life rests simply upon our social traditions and customs and upon conditions in our environment. If we can modify those traditions and customs and environmental conditions, there is no reason to believe that human nature will present any insuperable difficulty to our attaining much higher ethical conditions in our industrial life than we have yet attained.

Another illustration may be afforded by military and warlike activities. It has been supposed by many that man is naturally and ineradicably a fighting animal and that wars between human groups are simply the outcome of this deplorable trait of human nature. Careful investigation, however, seems to show that the military activities of peoples, and especially what we call militarism, are almost wholly the outcome of their "mores." It is the establishment of the habit of fighting, which grows in time into a social custom that later becomes supported by a social tradition, which makes war so prevalent among some peoples. Militaristic mores, in other words, and not human nature, not geographical conditions, not even lack of food, are immediately responsible for the wars which have

drenched this world with blood. In the next lecture I shall try to show exactly how this internecine strife between human groups arose. It is sufficient at this time to emphasize the point that too much blame has been placed upon human nature, and not enough upon the erroneous ideas and beliefs and customs of peoples. We have every reason to believe that a condition of peace among the nations is in no wise incompatible with human nature, and that if we take wise enough measures to lessen strife among groups of men, we shall find that human nature is not averse to lasting peace.

Indeed, we may sum up this whole matter by saying that the tentative conclusion of anthropologists, sociologists, and social psychologists is that the mind of man, that is, the complex of thoughts, feelings, desires, and impulses which we actually find in human beings, is very largely a product of social and cultural conditions.²⁰ Yet it is just this complex of thought and feeling which is ordinarily termed human nature. There is, to be sure, an original nature of man which comes to us through heredity. But it is just the modification of this original nature by the influences of the physical and social environment which gives us the nature or the character of the adult individual. Hence the mind of the adult individual, even its very method of working, is largely an acquirement from the social environment. "*The mind*," says Professor Robinson,²¹ "*is a matter of accumulation and it has been in the making ever since man took his first step in civilization.*"

To be sure, the sanest, the most careful anthropologists and sociologists, do not go so far as to regard the human individual as a mere blank piece of paper, so to speak, upon

²⁰ Perhaps no book has more ably presented this conclusion in a popular way than Professor James Harvey Robinson's *The Mind in the Making*.

²¹ *Op cit.*, p. 206.

which any impress of his culture or civilization may be made. We must admit the fact of an original human nature. How great a part this original human nature plays in human society, however, through original impulses that assert themselves in a practically unmodified form has not yet been determined. But it is certain that the researches of anthropology and sociology do not sustain the contentions of those schools of social thinkers, such as the Freudians, who throw so much stress upon instincts that they claim original impulses practically determine the form of social institutions and the behavior of civilized men. On the contrary, all sociological researches point in the opposite direction. They show clearly enough that the difference between savage and civilized man is one of habits, ideas, standards, and values. Even with respect to the great variations in human conduct in civilized society, social research leads to the conclusion that *the criminal and the saint may be made out of the same original human material*—that, e.g., whether a normal child shall grow up into a criminal or into an ideal social personality depends quite entirely upon the influences around him in his social environment, and especially in his personal education.

In a word, sociology finds that current popular opinion errs in abstracting the person from his social environment and assuming as innate that which is social in origin and nature. This is perhaps due to the tendency to identify the familiar with the natural. Beyond question, *science shows that human personality is created in a social situation and that it is always largely a social product.*

HUMAN INSTITUTIONS ARE PLASTIC

It follows that the social behavior of men and the institutions of human society are plastic and modifiable. They are the result, not so much of innate traits plus the in-

fluences of physical environment, as of mental patterns in the minds of the individuals of a group. These mental patterns, while greatly affected by innate tendencies and by conditions in the physical environment, in almost every case have been transmitted to the existing members of a group by previous generations. In other words, the mental patterns which stand immediately back of our social behavior and our institutional life come to us from tradition and from custom. As we trace their origin back in human history we find that while the physical environment and the innate dispositions of man have often played a part in their formation, yet it is also true that many other factors such as the degree of ignorance or knowledge possessed by the group, its good or bad fortune in the distant past, and the like, have also played a part. In other words, sociology finds that human institutions are derived from customs, customs supported by certain beliefs and opinions which may be right or may be wrong.

The public opinion or popular belief which lies back of an institution is, therefore, the result, not of organic evolution or of any innate biological traits, but of a *learning process* which has gone on in the group by the method of trial and error. Human institutions, sociology shows, are in every case *learned* adjustments. As such, they can be modified provided we can obtain control of the learning process. The custom or tradition out of which an institution is formed is easily enough changed, provided we can show to all concerned that it is an error, and provided also we can change those material conditions in the environment which have come to support the institution and perhaps make it advantageous for individuals or a class of individuals to maintain it. This may be difficult in practice to do, but careful study shows clearly enough that the social and institutional life of man is indefinitely modifiable,

in the way of more reasonable adjustments to the requirements of social existence.

We may perhaps sum up the conclusions of modern sociology on this point by saying that the substance of culture, or civilization, is social tradition; that this social tradition is indefinitely modifiable through further learning on the part of men of happier and better ways of living together; and that, *if it were possible to control the learning of all individuals, in the way both of ideas and of emotional attitudes, as they come on to the stage of life, it would be possible to modify the whole complex of our social life, or our civilization, within the comparatively short space of one or two generations.*

This is not saying, however, that human groups could devise any sort of institutions which they choose and establish them as going concerns. Modern social science is very far from endorsing the contract theory of society, either as a theory of the origin of human institutions or as a theory of social reconstruction. On the contrary, as I shall strive to show you later, social science shows that while there are many wrong ways of constructing institutions there are only a few right ways; and that thus the matter of building institutions aright becomes, so to speak, as much an engineering problem as the building of roads or bridges. But what social science does show is the modifiability, the plasticity of existing institutions, and the possibility of reconstructing them in accordance with rational ideas and human advantage, theoretically even within a comparatively short space of time, if we understood practically how to control all conditions.

SOCIAL SCIENCE REINFORCES PRACTICAL RELIGION

Thus *the scientific study of institutions reinforces ethical religion, in that it inspires men with faith in the possibility*

of remaking both human nature and human social life. If the sum total of the researches of the scientific students of human society is taken into account, I venture to assert that there is nothing in those researches which should discourage any reasonable attempt at social amelioration. On the contrary, a just understanding of the results of these researches would release the energies of men for rational attempts at the remaking of their world, quite as much as the inspirations and intuitions of moral and religious enthusiasm; and such energies released by a rational understanding of the nature and possibilities of human society would have the advantage of being from the start directed and controlled by intelligence. Here again, then, social science turns out to be the strongest ally of ethical religion.

We may go further and say that the old idea that man can no more improve his social and cultural life by "taking thought" than he can lift himself by tugging at his boot straps is a superstition in the light of modern science; for the scientific study of human society shows that *institutions everywhere are a product of the creativeness of man.* It is not simply stone tools and modern machines that are products of man's creativeness or inventiveness; so are institutions, whether domestic, economic, political, religious, or educational. In fact the whole culture of man, anthropology and sociology now generally recognize, is in one sense a work of art. It may be very hard to change the mental patterns which lie back of the production of a certain type of tools, or of a certain type of institutions; yet this has been done over and over again by hit or miss methods in the past, and the scientific imagination is confident that new and superior ways will be discovered of doing this in the future. While the social and cultural evolution of man proceeds in part in an unconscious way, yet in part it also proceeds through conscious inventiveness or creation; and

this conscious creativeness we find upon examination plays a larger and larger part as we come down in human history in the making of institutions, and so in the making of the whole complex of man's social life. The unconscious, unintended element which enters into the making of human institutions and human relations thus seems destined to become smaller and smaller as man develops, through the aid of science, a more complete knowledge of himself and his world.

Moreover, human creativeness is not shown merely by the making of tools and institutions. As Professor Hocking has pointed out, man is really engaged in the task of remaking himself, his own human nature, and it is in this task especially that man shows his creative power.²² Man accomplishes this task through education in the broadest sense of that word; that is, he uses the knowledge, standards, and values which he has discovered, to control and modify his own conduct. While the knowledge, standards, and values which man has discovered can be used advantageously only if used to bring conduct into harmony with the objective conditions of human existence, yet this should not obscure the fact that man is taking a conscious part in his own evolution. Consciously he is setting up mental patterns, or, as we say, "ideals," by trying out which he controls conduct. Man is thus truly consciously engaged in building his human world and in modifying his own nature. He may, of course, make mistakes in his efforts at conscious self-control and social control; and if such mistakes concern the whole fabric of civilization and the fundamental standards or patterns by which men generally control their conduct, the results may be disastrous.

Thus modern social science would reinstate and re-emphasize the idea of human responsibility for the affairs of

²² *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, Chaps. I-III.

our human world; only it would say that that responsibility is not merely an individual affair but also a collective matter. Communities and nations are responsible and to be held responsible for the general conduct of their affairs not less than individuals. Nor does this perception of a collective or social responsibility, we may remark in passing, decrease individual responsibility. On the contrary, it should increase enormously the sense of responsibility in all who have any understanding of modern social science; for it becomes evident at once that we all have a double responsibility, a responsibility for the conduct of the affairs of our individual lives, and at the same time a responsibility as members of groups for the conduct of those groups, whether in relation to their internal affairs or in relation to other groups. *Social science thus means not only an awakening, but a deepening of the social conscience—not only an understanding of social obligations, but an increasing of the sense of social obligation.*

SOCIOLOGY A BASIS FOR ETHICS

It is just here that the truly great contribution of scientific sociology to our ethical and religious life becomes apparent. It is sociology as a basis for ethics²³ which really creates the interest of the most socially-minded persons in sociology and in the other social sciences. The modern spirit demands for ethics something more than a basis in revealed religion or even in abstract metaphysical principles. Concerning the use of alcoholic beverages, for example, we want to know not merely some metaphysical principle or the teachings of revealed religion, but the near and remote social effects of their use; and it is upon the basis of this latter knowledge that the modern mind de-

²³ See Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*, especially Chap. III.

cides largely what the social ideal regarding their use should be. The modern spirit thus manifests itself as scientific and matter-of-fact even in the realm of ethics. Social knowledge, we see, is indispensable for the construction of sound ideals of human living, whether these concern the family life, economic life, political life, international, or inter-racial relations. Thus modern ethics is, as a matter of fact, seeking a scientific basis, which, since morality is a social matter, means largely a sociological basis. This does not mean necessarily the overturning of long-accepted principles of morality. On the contrary, as I shall strive to show, it will probably mean the corroboration of those principles and especially of Christian ideals.

Now the bearing of all this upon religion is evident. As Professor Hobhouse remarks,²⁴ religion has come to have "its firmest root in ethics." But if ethics must find its firmest root in scientific social knowledge, then it is evident that rational religion must also find rootage in social knowledge—in a scientific understanding of the conditions and needs of human life. While it is wrong to think that sociology will displace theology, yet it is evident that *in so far as religion becomes a program for the transformation of this world, it must depend increasingly upon sociology.* Theology itself is, indeed, being so modified in a scientific and social direction today that it is now sometimes difficult, in the case of the more socially-minded of our theological thinkers, to tell where their sociology ends and their theology begins. We may safely conclude, therefore, that sociology, while not a substitute for theology, will become the ally of scientific theology in attempts at the interpretation and practical development of the religious life of man. This is surely, if one studies and compares carefully the

²⁴ *Morals in Evolution.*

sociological and theological literature of the present, the trend of what is actually taking place.

But let us now consider, first in a general way, just what help sociology has to offer to scientific ethics,²⁵ and incidentally to rational religion, and then what it specifically has to offer. In general, the scientific study of human society has shown beyond question the relativity of moral codes and social institutions. While there is a core of general principles which are the same that run through the moral codes of all peoples, yet the study of the actual life of those peoples shows also moral codes the most divergent in many respects. This we have already implied in speaking of the various forms of the family, of industry, and of government, which we find among the many peoples of the earth known to history and anthropology. And this is what we should expect when we understand that man is building his culture and his institutions by the trial and error method. We find not only widely different institutions but widely different moral codes, so much so that it has often been denied that there are any similarities among such codes. When, however, these codes are studied carefully, they are seen to show progressive evolution. This evolution may, of course, be at many points divergent, but there is also convergence in certain general directions. Scientific students of society have given up the idea of simple evolutionary series; but social evolution remains a fact, even if there are many series instead of one; and convergence in certain directions is beyond question.

How are we to explain the evolution of moral codes and their tendency to converge in certain main directions rather than to diverge? The sociologist can only answer that

²⁵ Perhaps no book shows sociology's contribution to ethics so clearly as Professor Hobhouse's *The Rational Good*. His *Morals in Evolution* presents the same evidence more in detail.

while moral codes and institutions are relative to a particular stage of culture, there is, nevertheless, a universality of social principles, and that the very relativity of moral codes is to be explained as due to the learning by peoples of these universal social principles through the trial and error method. *Social or moral principles²⁸ are thus universal, and in a sense absolute, while moral codes are relative and changeable.* Thus the principles by which man should guide himself in the use of alcoholic beverages, for example, are universal, that is, inherent in man's physical, mental, and social nature. These principles are therefore open to scientific discovery, and rationality would demand that men should conform their conduct to these principles once discovered. But the moral code in regard to the use of alcoholic beverages varies greatly among different peoples, because fully established knowledge regarding the scientific principles which should control conduct in this matter has not been secured or diffused. When such scientific knowledge regarding the effects of alcoholic beverages is secured and diffused among peoples, we may expect that in time human conduct will be brought into conformity with the standard set by the scientific principles discovered.

The effect of the development of a scientific sociology upon ethics has often been debated on account of this confusion as regards the relativity of moral codes and institutions and the universality of moral principles. It has often been claimed that sociological research shows all morals to be purely relative and merely social conventions. But social science shows, if it shows anything, that *the social world is a world of law or regularity*, and that what we call moral principles are social principles, looked at from

²⁸ "Principle" is here used in the sense of a way of working of a fundamental force or agency.

the standpoint of the ideal. These social principles operate in all human groups of which we have knowledge and are rooted in the fundamental needs and conditions of human living together. We cannot think of any society, for example, which will get along well which regularly ignores the personality of its members. Again, the requisites for successful cooperation, for social unity, for social continuity, and for social harmony are about the same everywhere. *Moral principles, or the principles which underlie norms for ideal human living, are thus universal. But moral codes vary greatly because these principles are not at all, or only imperfectly, apprehended.* Thus sociology shows not only the relativity of the actual morals of any people, but also the universality of the social principles underlying the evolution of morals.

Both of these conclusions are of the utmost importance for ethics and religion. Too often in the past social progress has been hindered because of a belief in the absolute character of some existing moral code or moral system. It is only as we perceive the relativity of the actual, existing moral system to which we or any other people have attained, that we may hope to improve that system. Institutions, moral codes, and even moral standards are not ends, but means. As means to the end of the social and spiritual development of humanity they are relative. Too often abuses have been maintained in human society by appeal to the supposed absolute character of existing social institutions or moral codes. When men clearly see that these are means, not ends, and that the end is the spiritual development of humanity, then the energies of men will be released for progress.

The ends of human development, however, are not relative, but universal and absolute for man. There are not several divergent ideals for human life and human char-

acter which are equally valuable. On the contrary, sociology plainly shows that the principles of successful human living together, or of harmonious association, and of social progress are universal, and so as absolute for man as the law of gravitation. Hence the social ideal for man presents itself as one, and not as many. Hence sociology reinstates ethics as a science; for *any science, let us remember, even normative science, requires principles of universal validity in order to be science at all.*

Now all this has the utmost bearing upon religion. Religions are always systems of absolute or universal values. Without such values—values which claim the sanction of the divine—there is no religion. *Science, ethics, and religion all alike demand universally valid principles for their existence.* Denial of the existence of such principles in human life is equally destructive of all three. It would leave as valid only the physical branch of science and perhaps not that. Social science, therefore, by demonstrating the universal validity of its principles, has performed an immense service for ethics and religion. It has laid a fresh foundation for a science of ethics; and if "religion has its firmest root in ethics," then it lays afresh also the foundations for practical religion. The human world is then no longer a moral chaos or a mere complex of arbitrary conventions designed by man; but *a theatre of intelligible laws and principles which, by a learning process, may be discovered by man and practically realized in his life.*

SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO ETHICS AND RELIGION

But what, more specifically, are the laws and principles which sociology has discovered in regard to human relations that are of significance for ethics and religion? This

is the question which I shall try to answer, although it is impossible to do more than touch upon the more salient features of sociology which are significant for practical religion. All sociological principles are of interest to those who are working for a better human world. It may, however, be convenient at this point to outline briefly, as a sort of syllabus, the principles which I shall try to discuss at length. If both human nature and human institutions are plastic and modifiable, if both can be moulded to suit the requirements of our social life, what then are the sociological principles which should guide us in our attempts to control individual character and to build better institutions? They are many, but I shall emphasize three.

The first is the principle of *socialization*. Sociology shows that it is the incorporation of the individual into a group and the growth in capacity and will to act together of groups of individuals which develops personal character and community life.²⁷ It is this process of socialization which has produced human culture. It has made the unity and the life of human groups from the family to humanity. As we ascend in the scale of human social evolution, we find widening socialization of individuals and increasing cooperation, both in extent and in complexity. On the other hand, unsocializing agencies produce internal conflicts within groups and destroy group life. The principle which underlies social progress would therefore seem to be a widening and increasing socialization of individuals. Objectively this increasing socialization shows itself in the maximization of harmony and cooperation and the minimization of hostility and conflict among men. Religion should therefore strive to develop a socialized character in

²⁷ See Maciver, *The Community: A Sociological Study*, Bk. III, Chap. III, especially pp. 214-226.

individuals, and to build institutions along lines which favor the proper socialization of individuals.

The second is the principle of *mutual service*. Sociology demonstrates that cooperation is the main building principle of social life on the objective side. The simplest study shows that social life is carried on by the continual exchange of services on the part of the members of a group. Where cooperation is harmonious, it involves an equal exchange of services, and hence it benefits equally all members of the cooperating group. If exchange of services grows unequal, it tends to become exploitation, and exploitation sooner or later weakens or destroys those who are exploited, and thus puts an end to cooperation and even to social life. The equal exchange of services, the equal conferring of benefits, on the other hand, promotes cooperation and social life, and is what we ordinarily call social justice. Human history shows beyond question a struggle for social justice and a widening and intensification of mutual service. Increasing mutual service with decreasing exploitation is therefore involved in social progress. Therefore, religion should strive to develop in individuals the attitude of mutual service, to decrease exploitation, and to mould our institutions so as to promote social justice.

Third is the principle of *good will* or *love*. Many sociologists have been loath to recognize this principle. Indeed a certain school of sociologists, as is well known, refuses to recognize any subjective element whatsoever as at work in social life. But the great majority of sociologists, as we have seen, recognize that in these subjective elements, that is, in the inner attitudes and dispositions of individuals, lies the real key to their social behavior. The emotional attitudes of men count for as much in social life (if not for more) as the objective forms of social organization. "*Sentiment*," says Professor Cooley, "*is the chief motive-power of*

life." Back of cooperation and mutual service, in other words, must stand sentiments and inner attitudes which are favorable to them. Deeper than the socialization of conduct or behavior is the socialization of the emotions and the impulses, because these are what usually motivate our conduct. Now, the inner attitudes which are favorable to our fellows have been called by various names such as sympathy, altruism, and good will. The traditional name employed in religion, however, is "love," and this I shall use, as on the whole the term best suited to characterize that *inner attitude of devotion to the welfare of others* which we shall find to be a chief motive working both for social unity and for social progress. Without it cooperation and mutual service in any high degree are impossible. It has often been remarked that service becomes slavery when rendered under compulsion, even though the compulsion be only a sense of duty. We must have an inner attitude of love to prompt us to untiring service. So, also, sympathy and understanding are necessary for the higher forms of human cooperation. Social progress depends, as Kidd has rightly contended, not simply upon increasing in society the fund of accurate knowledge, but even more upon increasing the fund of altruism or of effective sympathy and good will.²⁸ Another social thinker has asserted after a survey of all social evolution that the law of progress is the law of increasing sympathy.²⁹ I shall endeavor also to show that the spiritual progress of human society, and so *all lasting progress, does depend upon widening and in-*

²⁸ *Social Evolution*, pp. 199-206. We may, of course, recognize the essential truth of this contention of Kidd without approving his narrow and negative attitudes towards the intellect or reason. Kidd's irrationalism is as unscientific as the attitude of those who fail to see the place of the emotions in the social life.

²⁹ Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, vol. I, p. 10.

creasing love and good will; that love is preeminently the social passion and so the main dynamic upon which we can rely to motivate effort for the improvement of social conditions; that it is capable of being greatly increased in human relations; and that the extending and conserving of love and good will is one of the chief tasks of practical religion.

Each of these principles of human living together, *socialization*, *mutual service*, and *love*, we shall discuss at length in later lectures, showing their significance and validity, first from a social scientific, and then from a religious, point of view. These principles are not only social and sociological, but it is evident that they are also the principles with which practical religion has long concerned itself. The very names which we have used to describe these principles are taken from the vocabulary of religion. Science cannot claim, therefore, any priority in the discovery of these principles, but science can greatly aid practical religion if it can show men the validity of these principles from a scientific standpoint. Men have long acknowledged these principles of religion as ideal and beautiful, but in general they have doubted their practicability in real life. Hence it is not untrue to say that *as principles for practical social living* men remain ignorant of these principles even today. It is left to science, then, if it is to become a real aid to religion to demonstrate the practical validity of these principles as a basis for human living together.

THE LOW SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE OF OUR WORLD

It has been said that the present world is a world of high intelligence and of low ideals. If this is true, it is because our intelligence for all its achievements is limited and partial. *It has been trained too much in the control of mate-*

rial forces and has concerned itself too much with means, rather than with ends. What we lack is a high social intelligence, high social vision. Our social meanness is largely a result of our social ignorance. Especially is it ignorance of these simplest sociological principles and of their corollaries which we have just mentioned which is at the bottom of much of the conflict and division of our present world. Indeed, it is not too much to say that our world is perishing just because of this sociological ignorance.

What can practical religion do? It is evident that it must seek first of all to inculcate in all individuals, and especially in the young, the simple social and ethical principles which make for harmonious and satisfactory living together. But the inculcation of these principles would mean much more than the formal teaching of certain precepts and certain emotional attitudes. Science sees no hope of eliminating sociological ignorance and its consequences from our world without scientific demonstration to the mind of our youth of the validity of social principles. Fortunately, the progress of the social sciences makes this more and more possible. More and more the study of social facts and conditions makes it clear that cooperation, as we have just said, is the building principle of our human world, and that the widest and most lasting cooperation among men is impossible without understanding, sympathy, and good will or love. Study of this kind will develop in our youth *an efficient social imagination* which, together with a right emotional attitude, would form a sound basis for a higher social morality.

Practical religion must, secondly, seek to control public opinion and social conditions. If there is anything which social science has proved it is that changes in individual character and changes in public opinion, in social standards, and in material social conditions must keep step together;

otherwise all efforts at improving individual character may be thwarted and undone. As Dean Brown has said,³⁰ "The effort of the church has too often been directed exclusively to the regeneration of the individual considered quite apart from the system of things in which he was a consenting or maybe a controlling item"; and he rightly adds, "Those who lay the entire burden of the world's advance upon individual regeneration are endeavoring to row their boat with but one oar." There must be attention to mass movements, public opinion, customs, and institutions. But to attend to and direct mass movements for the social regeneration of mankind with the best intelligence, practical religion again requires the help of social science.

A social intelligence which is high social vision, growing out of scientific social knowledge, may be made to do team work with our religious aspirations; and thus, as I said at the beginning, we may, *if we will boldly harness together our science and our religion*, find a new "synthesis of aspiration with knowledge," which will turn back the flood of barbarism that now threatens our civilization, and put a fresh impetus of faith into all our work for human progress.

QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION

Has the Christian church intelligence enough to recognize all this, and to see that the intellectual honesty, open-mindedness, and sincerity of the scientific spirit are the necessary allies of the Christian spirit in any enduring work for the redemption of mankind?

SUGGESTED READINGS

ELLWOOD, *Reconstruction of Religion*, Chaps. I, II.

CONKLIN, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, Part III.

CURTIS, *Science and Human Affairs*, Chap. I.

MATHEWS AND SMITH, *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, Articles on "Science in Relation to Theology," "Sociology," etc.

³⁰ Charles R. Brown, *The Social Message of the Modern Pulpit*, pp. 152, 170.

II

SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND CHRISTIANITY

One way in which social science can aid practical religion is to show the place and significance of the Christian movement in social evolution. That movement is surely one of the most significant things in the whole course of human development, yet remarkably little in the way of worth-while scientific investigation has been done upon it. Probably this is due in part to the taboo in certain scientific circles upon any attempt to investigate relatively recent religious phenomena; and also in part to the lack of a social-evolutional view of religious movements until recently in most circles of religious thought. The time is now ripe, however, for the work of a bold and creative scholarship upon this problem; and we cannot doubt that the outcome of such work will be fruitful for both social science and for religion.

I would not claim, of course, that such an interpretation of the Christian movement, in terms of social evolution, is the only possible interpretation, or exhausts its meaning. It is only one helpful approach to the proper understanding of that movement. Philosophy and theology may offer more profound interpretations; but so far as the Christian movement is a social movement, aiming at social progress in certain directions, it will be found most helpful to consider it as an outcome of the forces in and behind previous social development¹ and as a possible factor in future social progress.

¹See *The Reconstruction of Religion*, Chap. III.

HUMAN SOCIAL EVOLUTION ESSENTIALLY SPIRITUAL

Social evolution is to be sharply distinguished from organic or biological evolution. Social evolution is essentially psychic or spiritual in its nature, that is, dependent upon mental evolution. The social evolution which we see in the animals below man is of a very limited scope, and is dependent upon animal instincts and certain hereditary traits and capacities. Because animal social evolution is thus limited, no progress takes place in the social life of animals. Such social life as there is seems to be almost entirely fixed and controlled by inherited capacities and instincts. The social life of man, while it may depend in some degree upon inherited capacities and instincts, rises, however, far above that level. Human social life seems to be, indeed, wholly a matter of acquired habits, of acquired intelligence, and of acquired values. The type of adaptation among human beings, as Professor A. G. Keller says, is mental.² Because the social life of man is built upon acquired mental traits rather than upon hereditary ones, it is not transmitted by heredity, but is learned by each generation from preceding generations. Each new generation has to learn its social adjustments from a preceding generation, and then has to modify them. Hence it is, as I have already said, that the social life of man is plastic and modifiable. Human social evolution is accordingly largely an evolution of "culture," or of civilization in the broadest sense of that word; that is, it is an evolution of habits, ideas, standards, values, skills, customs, traditions, and institutions.

Such "cultural" evolution doubtless rests upon all the previous organic, mental, and social evolution of the living world; but it is so distinct from it that we find nothing

² *Societal Evolution*, p. 21.

comparable to it in the rest of the world of life, and it therefore requires distinct and separate treatment. Such cultural evolution is primarily an evolution of co-adaptive habits. The vehicle by which it is transmitted is the web of intercommunication among human beings which we call language. It is equally an evolution of the ideas, standards, and values (accompanying and reinforcing these habits) which circulate through a group by means of language. The patterns of action which animals go by are shut up within their nervous organization as individuals or communicated only by means of the imitation of one animal by another. But among human beings the patterns of behavior have escaped, so to speak, from the individual brain and are transmitted from individual to individual not simply by imitation, but by the spoken word or language. Thus man's superior powers of intercommunication as well as his superior powers of ideation and of the formation of habits have enabled him to build up a world of behavior unlike that of any of the brutes. This world of human behavior, so far as it has been settled and systematized, we speak of as human institutions or social organization. Attached to these institutions and the various forms of social organization are certain ideas, standards, and values which accompany them as inner controls over these forms of social behavior. These ideas, standards, and values as they become organized and prevail in a group we speak of as the "social mind," and when they are transmitted from generation to generation we speak of them as "social tradition"; and all of these things put together—the objective organization and institutions of society and the subjective ideas, beliefs, standards, and values which accompany them,—constitute what we call collectively human culture or civilization.

MENTAL PATTERNS IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Thus it is evident that culture or civilization is made up not simply of acquired habits but, on its inner side, of mental patterns, patterns of action lodged in the minds of individuals. It is also evident that these mental patterns are the standards by means of which the members of the group measure and control their behavior and develop their culture. Thus if we take the making of a stone implement, we find that it is invariably made with a mental pattern in mind. If the actual stone implement made conforms to the mental pattern, we may properly call it the objectification of an idea. Such patterns for the making of stone implements become a part of the social tradition of a group and are communicated from individual to individual. There goes along with them, of course, more or less imitation of related objective bodily movements. The superior imagination, reasoning, or skill of some individual may improve the pattern which he has received from others, and consequently the tool which is made. This would mark a further step in tool-making and so in culture. On the other hand, it is possible that a new pattern for a tool will mark not an improvement, but a deterioration, in which case the results experienced in the use of the more poorly formed tool will probably lead to its elimination.

Now, this process followed in the formation of mental patterns for the making of stone tools is practically the same process used in the making of institutions, that is, sanctioned and systematized ways of living together. However, it is not so easy to test whether a change in an institution is an improvement or a deterioration as it is in the case of physical tools. To test out the good and bad points of an institution may require, indeed, the experience of several generations. Moreover, in transmitting

the mental patterns of institutions to the young, immediate tests of the correctness of any pattern and of its utility are out of question. While the patterns for the making of tools may not only be set immediately before the young but their relative correctness also be tested by actual experience, the pattern on which an institution is formed has to be received more or less upon faith by the younger generation, for the trial of its utility must be the work of years. The "pattern ideas" associated, therefore, with forms of the family, of government, of industry, and general social organization do and must have attached to them peculiar sanctions. These sanctions are usually either of a magical or of a religious character. For a supernatural sanction attached to any idea makes it very difficult to change.

Before we proceed to the actual description of the evolution of the patterns of man's social and cultural life let us note that the getting and testing of patterns, and so cultural evolution, proceeds by a trial and error method. There was no other method of learning in primitive times, and even yet mankind is making very slow progress toward any other method. This is especially true of human institutions. Whatever errors man may make in the making of physical tools may, as I have just said, be easily detected and corrected; but this is not so in the case of institutions. Nevertheless it is true that man has learned to perfect his institutions just as he has learned to perfect his physical tools—through trial and error. However, in the case of institutions errors may persist for thousands of years and possibly for thousands of generations. But man is continually evolving and is continually striving to perfect patterns for human relations as well as for tools and machines. It is the evolution of these patterns for human relations by means of the trial and error method which will especially help us to understand the evolution of

religion, and so the social-evolutional significance of the Christian movement.

SOCIAL TRADITION MADE UP OF PATTERN IDEAS

Let us now recall that the pattern ideas for tools, for institutions, for all sorts of social adjustments, when passed along by communication from generation to generation, become the social tradition. This tradition is continually kept growing by the modification or elimination of old patterns and the addition of new ones. Originally man must have started without social tradition. Like the brutes he lived merely in a world of objects. With the formation of the first pattern ideas and their transmission by the spoken word came the first beginnings of social tradition. While all savage groups which we now know are dominated by a body of custom and tradition, yet at first social tradition must have been very small in amount and its social influence very slight. But with the growth of speech and the perfecting of tools and their patterns came the growth of social tradition. And with its growth in bulk came growth in its social influence. Men now came to live not so much in a world of objects as in a world of ideas—of pattern ideas—which immediately controlled their adjustments both to the objects of nature and to their fellows. Moreover, this growing social tradition had added to it in the course of time the prestige of antiquity and so of mystery. Social traditions of all sorts came to be venerated as the wisdom of the past whose origin was shrouded in mystery. It was easy to attach supernatural sanctions to such traditions. In this way the whole of the tradition or custom of primitive society became religious, and thus practically all-powerful. If the patterns back of the social tradition were erroneous there was little chance of sifting

out the errors except possibly through the competition between and elimination of the groups affected by them. Thus errors in the folkways and mores once acquired might persist for thousands of years. Conceivably, indeed, erroneous pattern ideas regarding human relations, if they do not affect vital organic processes, may persist indefinitely so far as natural selection or elimination is concerned. Natural selection, in other words, is not adequate to build any high type of social life from the standpoint of human values. Only rational criticism and selection of patterns on which to base human relations is equal to such a task; and rational selection came into our world practically with the advent of science. It is therefore but of yesterday.

But the point I wish to emphasize here is that *the evolution of culture is in essence an evolution of pattern ideas, by means of which human conduct is controlled*; that hence as human evolution advances men live more and more in a spiritual world, a world of ideas and values; that errors in this world of ideas and values can be corrected only by spiritual means, by growing social intelligence and growing social sympathy, not by the processes of physical nature. The spiritual world, or the spiritual phase of culture, is accordingly the supreme concern for civilized man, and the getting of correct patterns on which to base his conduct in relation to every situation in life is the supreme value which man is now more or less consciously seeking. But if in the eyes of science the social tradition is full of erroneous pattern ideas regarding human relations, how did they get started, and why have they not yet been eliminated?

SOURCES OF OUR PRESENT SOCIAL PATTERNS

Let us consider, first of all, how men got these mental patterns. It is not difficult to see in the case of tools that

some of the patterns came from objects in nature, some from animal instincts and the organs of the body, and some perhaps from accidental adjustments which proved to be happy ones. In the case of human institutions the patterns came in part from animal instincts, in part from those primary groups, such as the family and the neighborhood, which sprang up primitively to satisfy human needs, and finally in part from primitive occupations.³ Much has been made of the main primitive occupations especially as a source of primitive social patterns. Thus the occupation of hunting has been claimed to furnish most of the patterns for the life of primitive man, and many even for the life of civilized man.⁴ From the hunting of animals developed all predatory and many non-predatory occupations. Modern war is but a development of the original hunting pattern. Modern business also is largely a development from the primitive hunt, and even modern scientific research, it is said, is a hunt after truth.

How did man ever develop anything else than this hunting pattern? The reply is that hunting was not the only occupation of primitive life. At most it was but the main occupation of half of the primitive community, namely, the men. The other half of the primitive community, the women, had as their main occupation the care of the children. Alongside of the hunting pattern there developed, therefore, in primitive society the pattern of "child care" and all that goes with that occupation. If

³By "primitive" is here meant the earliest distinctively human stage. That this was a "pre-barbarian" or "nature" stage is agreed to by all anthropologists. The universality of the family and the neighborhood groups in all stages of human culture is generally recognized by sociologists. See Cooley, *Social Organization*, chaps. III-V.

⁴See especially Dewey's paper on "Interpretation of Savage Mind," in Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 173-186.

with any justice we may trace the patterns of modern war, business, politics, and science to primitive hunting patterns, we might with equal justice trace the patterns back of modern home life, education, philanthropy, and religion back to the primitive child-care pattern.

It is not too much to say that both of these patterns have played a fundamental part in the development of human culture. They have often strangely intermingled and at times manifest themselves in the same institution. However, in general, we seem to have followed the hunting pattern with its use of force, domination, and predatoriness toward those outside of our group, while we have followed the child-care pattern with its altruism, philanthropy, and gentleness within our group. Through all the ages the contest between these primitive patterns of human conduct has gone on. Even yet the question before our civilization is whether the hunting pattern with its predatoriness and ruthlessness, or whether the child-care pattern with its sympathy and gentleness shall dominate human relations.

We can more accurately state our problem of the origin of the social patterns in our present civilization, however, by saying that men have always had two broadly contrasting sets of patterns or types of conduct, one which they followed in the social life within their groups, and another which they followed in their relations with men outside of their groups. Now the primitive groups were face-to-face groups, or, as the sociologist calls them, "primary groups." In other words, they were chiefly the family and the neighborhood groups. The standards of conduct within these groups seem to have been from the very beginning those of sympathy, kindness, mutual service, and love. They were mainly what we have called the child-care pattern. But the standards of conduct toward those outside of these groups were usually those of distrust,

hostility, and even hatred. These standards, therefore, tended to conform to what we have called "the hunting pattern." Men outside, in other words, were regarded with such suspicion, distrust, and hatred by the narrow face-to-face groups of primitive times that they were often treated more like animals than like men. They were legitimate objects for the hunt and for predatory practices of all sorts.

SOCIAL PATTERNS OF SAVAGERY AND BARBARISM

Primitively, however, human groups were scattered and lived in relative isolation while the world was slowly gaining its human population. The typical group was a horde, or neighborhood, made up of a few, usually not more than a dozen, related families. Such groups had little contact with other human groups. Their main struggle was with physical nature and with the brute world below them. In other words, primitively there was of necessity little war between human groups, because the world was scantily populated, groups were widely scattered, and their struggle was largely with the forces of physical nature. Paradoxically, these "nature peoples," who seldom engaged in war but lived mainly by hunting animals and gathering wild fruits, we have called "savages," though it is certain that they had few, if any, of the ferocious and predatory traits which were later developed by human groups in the stage of barbarism.

It is easy to see how then these predatory traits developed. With the improvement of tools, and especially with the first beginnings of the cultivation of the soil, food supply and so population would increase, human groups would no longer be so isolated, but would be in more or less close contact. During the period of isolation, however, the attitude of human groups toward one another had

become one of suspicion and distrust. Kindliness and mutual service had been limited in their development to the internal life of small face-to-face groups. The later multiplication of groups and of contacts between groups along with the limitation of natural resources, especially of food supply, accordingly brought conflicts between groups. Neighbor groups which encroached upon one another, regarded each other as enemies, and not as human enemies, but as like the enemies in the animal world below them with whom they were accustomed to struggle. Hence the predatory, hunting attitude which man had developed toward the brute world through long ages of struggle became turned against his fellow man. The hunting pattern became the approved pattern of conduct for all relations with strange groups. A further incentive toward the development of this pattern as the standard for conduct in intergroup relations arose as soon as it was discovered that the food supply and even the women of a hostile group offered booty of very considerable value to those who could take them. Strong fighting groups made it their business to hunt out weaker groups whose food supply, women, and children they could seize. Thus these fighting, conquering groups if successful increased in size through the absorption of other groups and continued to grow by war and other predatory practices, until they became tribes, and still later nations.

Now, this all happened in that stage of human development which we have come to call "barbarism." While, as we have said, the primitive savage stage was of necessity one of relative isolation and of relative peace between human groups, the stage of barbarism was one of group contacts and of continual warfare, in which large and powerful units came to conquer and absorb smaller groups, until groups approximating the size of some modern nations

were reached. The traditional ethics of group relations through all this stage was one of hostility and warfare, the right of the strong to plunder the weak being practically unquestioned. Moreover, as the weak were made the slaves of their conquerors, it was also held that the conquering or master class had the right to exploit without limit any subject class. Men came to live by plundering their fellows, warfare became the most honored occupation, and the power to exploit masses of men came to be regarded as the highest social honor. The peaceful mores of primitive life were completely reversed, so far as the relations between groups were concerned; and even within the group self-interest, power, and pleasure became acknowledged more and more as the ends of action. Man had awakened to self-consciousness, but the consciousness was almost entirely in terms of self-interest and directed toward the attainment of power and of selfish pleasure.

A totally new culture with new standards had evidently replaced primitive culture. It is not unfair to say that this culture was in the main predatory, though, of course, primitive kindness, sympathy, and love still dominated more or less within the primary or face-to-face groups of men. The external relations of the larger groups, however, were relations of almost unceasing hostility and war. This is well illustrated by the population of Papua or New Guinea. Every Papuan village regards its surrounding villages as hostile and potential if not actual enemies, so that it is almost impossible for the British administrators to secure any sort of cooperation even among neighboring villages. The same condition obtained, of course, for ages in Europe. At the height of barbarism, indeed, it would have seemed to a reflective mind almost impossible that humanity should ever escape from the *cul-de-sac* of unending conflicts between races, nations, classes, and even to some extent

between individuals, in which it was caught. While it has not yet completely escaped, there is every reason to believe that the stage of barbarism or predatory culture is a transitional stage between the relatively adjusted and harmonious life of the lower nature peoples and the even more perfectly adjusted and more harmonious life of the higher civilized peoples, which is for the most part still to be realized.

Professor Robinson in his *Mind in the Making* says,⁵ "There are four historical layers underlying the minds of civilized men—the animal mind, the child mind, the savage mind, and the traditional civilized mind." But the anthropologist and sociologist would interpose between the savage mind and the civilized mind the barbarian mind. It is the barbarian mind with its traditions of power and pleasure as the ends of action which lies immediately back of the civilized mind which we are trying to develop. The barbarian mind even more than the animal, the savage, or the child mind, though strangely compounded out of these, explains the anachronisms in our present as well as in medieval culture. But the rational civilized mind, if it continues to learn, will ultimately reject these socially unworkable patterns of barbarism for those first tested and proved workable in primary groups.

For the patterns set by the primary or face-to-face groups were not destroyed even by the shock of barbarism; and while man found satisfaction in plundering and destroying his fellow men and in pursuing power and pleasure as ends, yet the deeper satisfaction always remained in the sympathy, kindliness, and mutual aid experienced within primary groups. A life of predatoriness, or even a life with power and pleasure as its ends, has its drawbacks, and as soon as men reached a stage in which there could

⁵ *Op cit.*, p. 65.

be some thinking done upon the problems of life this became manifest. It became clear that the patterns for human living set by the primary groups were, after all, the only ones which men could follow with satisfaction to the end. Hence we find, as soon as written literature began to become common, protests against "the mores of barbarism" with their predatory standards of selfish power and pleasure. These began to become common among the great semi-civilized peoples of Asia in the first millennium before our era. It was no accident that that millennium saw all over Asia the birth of new religions, which sought either to break entirely the mores of barbarism or else greatly to modify them. Such were Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. All of these systems of religious thought and values must be regarded as gropings toward a new and better social system than any which barbarism or early civilization had afforded. They were steps, even though we judge them inadequate, toward the regeneration of our human world, and the ushering in of a true civilization, of a culture truly adapted to the requirements of man's existence.

RELIGION'S RÔLE IN CHANGING SOCIAL PATTERNS

Here it may be remarked that the study of the whole history of human culture from the most primitive times shows beyond question that its great changes have always been accompanied by changes in religious beliefs and values. There is, furthermore, every reason to believe that changes in religious beliefs and values have something to do with changes in culture, if not with initiating them, at least with establishing them. Religious beliefs and values are, after all, as we have already seen, but the highest social and personal "pattern ideas" with ■ supernatural

sanction attached to them. As men came to live more and more in a spiritual world, i.e., in a world of traditions, of pattern ideas, it is evident that the pattern ideas or traditions could not remain unaltered but would have to undergo change along with any great change in actual conduct or behavior. Man adjusts himself not only in practice to his actual environment, but by imagination to any potential environment which he desires to see realized. Hence the mental patterns back of his conduct not only change with changed conduct, but may anticipate such changes. Indeed, that seems to be the function of man's thinking so far as it is directed toward the patterns of conduct—to introduce changes into these patterns in his mind imaginatively so that they will pilot the way to new and better conditions of living.

Thus the human mind, through social imagination, may see the possibility or the need or advantage of new and better social conditions, and set them up as an "ideal" or a "pattern" to be realized and worked toward, just as it may work toward an improvement in a physical tool or machine. It is well understood that this is the method of invention in the making of tools, and it is surely no different in the making of institutions or social systems. Thus most of the great social advances of humanity during the last three thousand years have been thought out beforehand by pioneering minds—seers, philosophers, statesmen, religious teachers, and moral idealists. These utopian dreamers, as we might call them, living ahead of their age, anticipate social changes which sometimes take many generations to work out completely. And as we have already said, it is especially the religious thinkers and moral idealists whose thinking has been fruitful in initiating great cultural changes. Hence we find all revolutionary changes in human culture, that have turned out to

be real advances, preceded by religious reformations or revolutions.

The reasons for this are plain if we understand human psychology and sociology. As I have said elsewhere,* "the pattern ideas or standards of a new culture do not arise gradually out of those of an old culture or in general mix harmoniously with them. They arise suddenly as new inventions, new perceptions on the part of social leaders, and cultural evolution proceeds by one type entirely supplanting another type. . . . Since the patterns of a new culture concern human relations, they demand more than mere intellectual assent. They must become social values with compelling social sanctions. They need accordingly a decided emotional setting in order to overcome the native egoism of the individual, since the break with old habits and the entering upon a new and higher form of social organization entails sacrifices in many cases. This emotional setting the patterns for a new culture get through the sanction of religion." In other words, a new religion, or at least the reconstruction of an old religion, is always indispensable to the creation of a new and higher type of culture.

THE CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT INITIATES A NEW SOCIAL PATTERN

It was, therefore, as I have just said, no accident that when mankind began to outgrow barbarism in the first millennium before our era, there were numerous attempts among all the civilized peoples of the time to construct new religions with a more or less humanitarian trend. Let us remind ourselves again that the method of human development, like the method of organic evolution, is essentially a method of trial and error. Many experiments

* *The Reconstruction of Religion*, p. 75.

have to be made in a new social direction before a fruitful one is hit upon, which is adequate to produce the new type of social life. Some of these experiments, of course, will turn out to be of a retrogressive rather than of a progressive nature. Thus it is well known that even within the circle of Greco-Roman civilization about the time the Christian movement started there were many other attempts at the starting of new religions, some of which were decidedly retrogressive in character. We cannot, therefore, claim that because the Christian movement was an attempt to found a new religion which would be adequate to produce a new type of culture, it is on that account free from errors. On the contrary, its social and cultural worth will have to be demonstrated quite independently, which I hope to do in the later lectures in this series. Man's attempts at adjustment to the requirements of his existence are not always successful and every attempt, therefore, demands careful scrutiny, whether made in the name of religion or upon any other basis.

We shall also need to remember at this point that as there is a competition and selection among social groups and types of social organization, so there is a competition and selection among pattern ideas in human society. The pattern ideas of a new culture must therefore always enter into competition with the pattern ideas of an old culture and by showing their superiority displace them. This is not always easy to do, and therefore the patterns of an older type of culture may persist while the new is emerging for an indefinite period of time alongside those of a new. In the meantime the competition goes on one with another and this gives rise to the great moral conflicts which we find in our human world. Such conflicts are always at bottom conflicts between old and new cultural patterns. Any new system of religious and ethical idealism

must obviously enter into conflict with the systems which it tries to replace. The Christian movement, therefore, had to enter into conflict not only with the competing religions which it found in the world at the time at which it started, but also with all those with which it has come into contact since. This is not to say that like all social movements such a movement should not find methods of adjustment with competing systems of beliefs and values, especially when it finds elements of permanent truth in those systems. This is exactly, of course, what the Christian movement has found itself forced to do more or less through all the ages. At times, however, as we shall see, attempts at adjustment with other systems have led to compromises which have impaired the value of its own patterns.

The place and significance of the early Christian movement in social evolution should now be fairly clear. It was one of a series of attempts to transcend the ethics of barbarism, which, as we have seen, was essentially predatory as regards national, tribal, and class conduct, and in part even as regards individual conduct, and to replace this ethics by a universalized, social, humanitarian ethics. As the last of such attempts within the period of classic antiquity it proved to be far superior to the preceding efforts. This, however, probably was not mainly due to the fact that the Christian movement started with clear perceptions as to the mistakes of other religions. In part this was so; but even more it was due to the fact that the Christian movement sprang directly from what had been previously the most fruitful development in the evolution of religion; that is to say, the Christian movement came directly out of the main stream of religious evolution. It came directly out of Judaism, though, of course, the stimulus of other advanced oriental religions cannot be denied.

ORIGIN OF THE PATTERN IDEAS OF CHRISTIANITY

Now Judaism, from the standpoint of the sociologist, may well claim to have been a generalized type of social religion fitted to go on and produce a still higher social type. This was so because the ancient religion of the Hebrews had preserved to a remarkable degree the patterns of primary group life. We do not know enough yet about the social history of the Jewish people to know why. But we do know that their religion, as no other religion in early antiquity, idealized and spiritualized the values of the primary groups, especially the family.⁷ Possibly the relatively isolated and peaceful pastoral life of the early Hebrew tribes had something to do with it. At any rate, their pastoral patriarchal family life seems to have been of a high type and to have made it comparatively easy for them to idealize its values and attach to them their religious beliefs. It is usually assumed that the concept of the Fatherhood of God, which is one of these idealizations of a value taken from the family life, is late in origin even in Hebrew history. But it may be suggested instead that this conception of God is comparatively early⁸ and sprang up when the Hebrew people were still living a relatively isolated pastoral life; and that the conception of God as King and "Lord of Hosts" is relatively the later conception. I throw out this thought merely to suggest that Judaism was from the start a religion which tended to idealize the values of the family life in such terms as fatherhood, brotherhood, service, love. These terms, taken

⁷ Perhaps no writer has shown this better than McCurdy in *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, Vol. II, especially Chap. II.

⁸ An eminent student of the Old Testament tells me that there is no evidence for this hypothesis. The suggestion is, of course, not a necessary part of the argument.

from the family life, at any rate, became the very phraseology of the higher development of Hebrew religion and ethics. Quite naturally these values appropriated from the family were first attached to the clan, then to the tribe, then to the nation, all of which groups were regarded essentially as kinship groups or enlarged families. Thus *Hebrew religion preserved wonderfully the values of primary group life*. It only needed to transcend the bounds which it had set for itself by the narrow conception of a limited kinship, limited at most to the nation, to become a universal and so a humanitarian religion. Therefore, the claim that Judaism represented the main stream of religious evolution has a good sociological foundation, if we can establish the validity of the ideals of primary group life for the social life of humanity in general.

It was, of course, the Hebrew prophets who attempted the work of purifying and expanding the Hebrew religion so that it should be fit to become a universal religion. It is impossible to speak of their work at this point except to say, as every student of the Bible acknowledges, that their work foreshadowed the work of Jesus. They not only reached the conception of the Fatherhood of God, and of love as the main content of religion, but they also reached the concept of the kinship of all nations and races of men. It is only fair to say that Jewish particularism had already burst to this extent the shell of nationalism even before Jesus began his ministry.

Nevertheless, no fair-minded student of the evolution of religion or of social evolution would deny that it was the religious genius of Jesus which brought all these humanitarian tendencies of Judaism to a focus, so that they produced, so to speak, the white heat of a new religion. Prior to Jesus the universal and humanitarian tendencies of later Judaism remained scattered and ineffective; but in

Jesus' life and teachings they suddenly leaped into a new religious enthusiasm able to infect his followers also. As Professor Simkhovitch⁹ and others have pointed out, this was probably due not entirely to the superior intuitive genius of Jesus, but also to the ripeness for the change of the times in which he lived, and particularly to the situation then among the Jewish people themselves.

However much in Jesus' teachings we may rightly attribute to his creative personality, we must also recognize the influence of his immediate environment and of the long line of prophets who stood back of him. At the time Jesus lived and thought the currents of Jewish national life had turned away from the religious and social idealism of the later prophets. A narrow nationalism had taken its place, there was an increasing trend to trust in the force of arms, and formalism in religion was crushing out the prophetic spirit. In short, the forces of ethical and religious reaction were ascendant. Jesus saw that all this was a mistake. He rose superior to his environment, and asserted that the way of life for Israel lay in the fulfillment of the prophetic ideal; that God's kingdom was not of this world, but a spiritual kingdom; that Israel's dominion must therefore be spiritual and could not be established by worldly means, and particularly not by force; that true religion was a love of spiritual things, not of ceremonial forms; that love should rule in all the relations of men to one another; and that to serve the welfare of men was to serve God.

Though the Christian movement started as a revival of the best in the prophetic religion of the Hebrews, *it was*

⁹ In his book, *Toward the Understanding of Jesus*. The view of Simkhovitch that Jesus presented an actual social program or policy is accepted by the author. The acceptance of an eschatological view of Jesus' teachings would not, however, for the reason pointed out on page 57, wholly invalidate the argument of this lecture.

virtually a demand for a new human world, for a new type of culture which should repudiate entirely the standards of barbarism. It was, as one writer well says, "a resurgence of life from its natural depths and sources," a perception that the whole development of barbarian culture was a mistake,¹⁰ and that the true patterns for the ultimate social and spiritual life of man lay in the love, service, self-sacrifice, and spiritual satisfactions of primary groups. Faith and love, and not force, it was perceived, must be the patterns of a satisfactory social order; the ends of life were not to be found in self-seeking, but in the service of others.

THE CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT A REVOLT AGAINST BARBARISM

As a revolt against surviving barbarism the Christian movement naturally presented an opposite set of ideals, taken, as I have just said, from the relations and values of the family life. There had been, of course, previous to the Christian movement, many attempts to transcend the predatory ethics of barbarism and to introduce the standards of a new culture. Most of these movements we would now judge as failures or as but partial successes. Whether it was due to the fact that Jesus possessed, as Simkhovitch says,¹¹ the most towering intellect of antiquity—a mind greater even than that of Aristotle,—or whether it was due to the influence of the prophetic teachings behind him, his insight led him to emphasize the values of the family life as the true values of ethics and religion, and hence the

¹⁰ Quite naturally, therefore, early Christianity prophesied the utter destruction of the barbarian world. Psychologically, this is what we should expect. Such prophesies are paralleled by the prophesies in the social revolutionary movements of the present day, regarding the utter destruction of the existing order.

¹¹ *Toward the Understanding of Jesus*, pp. 58, 73.

pattern for a new type of life, a new human world. In the world-view of Jesus, God was Father, all men were brothers, the relations between God and men and of men themselves were essentially the same as the relations in a family. *It was a social world-view. Family affection thus was made by Jesus the type and pattern for all relations between men and between God and men.* Sacrificial love, such as might be shown by a father toward his children, was to be the redeeming force in our human world. That explained why the new type of life was to be established, therefore, not by physical force, but by faith, hope, and love; by gentleness, kindness, and mutual service; by the inherent power of truth and right. But God's kingdom, the new world in which love was to rule, could not be established without moral conflicts; therefore, those who were seeking its establishment should be prepared to leave all to follow the new way, even to the extent of renouncing all that they possessed.

It was not wholly a new view which Jesus thus presented. It is easy enough for us now to see that it was a view which had long been maturing, not only in the social and religious thinking of the ancient Hebrews, but also of several other ancient peoples, who were trying to grope their way out of the patterns of barbarism to a new and better way of human living. It was the peculiar merit of Jesus, however, that he presented this view of life with wonderful consistency, that he made central in it the values of love, of service, and of self-sacrifice for the sake of service, grouping all the other values of life around these; and that he exemplified these patterns perfectly in his own life and death. It was also a merit of his teaching that it came in the fullness of time, when the patterns of barbarian culture were being increasingly discredited among the more thoughtful, not only of his own people, but of many other

peoples. Men turned with relief from the predatoriness and frightfulness of their world to the new and better vision of things which Jesus presented.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that Jesus himself was fully conscious of the social and cultural transition which he sought to effect. Probably it is true that his consciousness was wholly religious, in part mystical, and possibly even apocalyptic; and that the vision which he cherished was something more than merely a social vision. It is not necessary to overlook or to deny the mystic elements in Jesus' vision to see its social significance. The point is that *the religious consciousness is a form of social consciousness*, and that a religious vision necessarily includes a social vision. The patterns for the religious life always come from the social life and always have a social significance. It was just because Jesus was a religious teacher that he was fitted to lead men into a new social world, a new type of culture. His generation would not have listened to him if he had not been. The patterns, or the vision, which he presented never could have broken the power of the patterns of pagan barbarism if they had not been clothed with religious, yes, with miraculous, sanctions. Let it also be remembered that I am now attempting nothing more than a sociological interpretation of the Christian movement, that is to say, an interpretation in terms of its significance for social and cultural evolution. I have already admitted that the interpretations of theology and of the philosophy of religion may be more inclusive, and so more profound. I would simply contend for the value of the sociological interpretation for those who are interested in the significance of religion for the *social* life of man. I would also add that it is this sociological interpretation which the world peculiarly needs in the

present hour when its social and cultural life is so sadly disturbed.

CONTACT OF CHRISTIANITY WITH BARBARISM

If it is a new religion, presenting new patterns for social life supported by a supernatural or superhuman sanction, which must always mediate the transition from one type of culture to another; and if, moreover, Jesus presented with clearness and consistency and religious sanction such a new set of cultural and social patterns, why then did his teachings not at once effect a social and cultural revolution? The answer is clear. The patterns of the new social order which Jesus taught came into a world that was almost completely dominated by the patterns of pagan barbarism. The patterns of barbarism were not only enmeshed with the whole of social tradition, but they were entrenched in the religion, in the education, and, above all, in the government of the time. Rome dominated the world, and its whole empire had been organized upon the basis of predatory force. The whole weight of the Roman state, the whole power of organized state religion, the whole organization of business and industry, were against the new teachings. Organized authority of every sort regarded these teachings as subversive of the existing order. Only the teachings of the later Hebrew prophets and some of the ideas of Greek philosophy, along with that general sympathy and kindness of human nature which life in the primary groups had everywhere kept alive in spite of the prevailing barbarian institutions, may be said to have been on the side of Jesus' teachings. It might not be wrong to say that it was one great teacher and a little handful of faithful disciples, with a perception of new truth and right, against the world. When we remember this we surely ought

not to wonder at the slow progress which the teachings of Jesus made, and even yet make; for our institutional and social life today has not yet escaped from the organization upon the basis of force and self-interest which was so firmly established in barbarian times. *It is a mistake to think that truth even when perceived can at once prevail in our human world.* When we remember, however, the actual progress which the teachings of Jesus and his handful of original followers have made in our world, we should surely not lose faith in the inherent strength of truth and right—in their power to reconstruct the social order in the long run, even though the power of state and church and school be all arrayed against them. Our world surely needs fresh faith of this sort just at present, for again there is a tendency among us to think that we can build upon force and authority and have our world a secure world.

The new patterns for human living which Jesus taught, even though they were in one sense as old as civilization, encountered, then, obstacles of every sort, both in the minds of men and in human institutions. Even in the minds of his closest followers there was, we now see, much misunderstanding. In the minds of the multitude there was little capacity to assimilate the new patterns at all, because their traditional standardized beliefs denied them any real hearing at all. Moreover, the animal or natural man, as the leaders of the early Christian church plainly perceived, was also largely opposed to these new patterns for behavior. Only a new man, converted to faith in them by a proper social and religious education, could take them up and realize them. But against such social and religious education for a new social order stood practically all of the institutions and traditions of the old social order. It is no wonder that progress was slow under such circumstances and that many compromises were made by the

churchen in order to survive. From the sociological point of view the miracle, under such circumstances, is the rise, the survival, and the relative fidelity of the church. If the deeper hidden forces of social and cultural evolution had not been on its side, this could not have happened.

JESUS SET THE PATTERNS OF TRUE CIVILIZATION

Jesus, then, was the herald of a new day in human culture—a day in which the patterns for conduct among men shall be taken from the love, gentleness, and mutual service which are exemplified by the primary groups of men when at their best. Even though he was only a herald, he, more than anyone else, must be said to have first set definitely the patterns of a true civilization opposed to the predatory patterns of barbarian culture. But, it may be asked, how do we know that Jesus set for us the patterns of true civilization; that in his fundamental ideals of life he was right? Have you not already admitted that human society in its trial and error method of acquiring new patterns for behavior makes one experiment after another? Why was not the Christian movement simply one of these experiments? Has not the experience of the world already definitely proved that it was merely a beautiful dream, and not practical? Is not science, with its revelations concerning the nature of man and of human society, definitely against the idea that the social patterns which Jesus taught are practical on a world-wide human scale?

I shall try to answer these questions as fully as I can in succeeding lectures. But even here it may be worth while to point out that there is some presumption to begin with in favor of the Christian ideal of life. The student of human culture finds every reason to believe that barbarian culture was but transitional to a higher, more

settled, more harmonious, and more satisfactory way of human living. The whole barbarian period was one of readjustment in which the spirit of man was, so to speak, just awakening to its human possibilities. It was one, therefore, of crude experiments,—such as cannibalism, slavery, autocracy, and militarism. Only at its close was writing invented which gave man power over his ideas and traditions. When these ideas and traditions were set down in writing, he first began to be able to criticise them effectively. Next he developed power to break with his own traditions even and to remake his human world. From all that we know of the limitations of barbarian society and barbarian culture, it is inconceivable that the patterns of power and pleasure and self-interest which were central in it, should prove to be the patterns for man's ultimate conduct. They were too much merely the patterns of the relations of strange and hostile groups. As man becomes better acquainted with himself and with the rest of his human world, and as his sympathies and understanding widen, it is inevitable that these patterns, upon which barbarian culture was founded, and which, as we have said, go back to the old hunting pattern of savage times, shall come to occupy a secondary place. New social and cultural patterns are bound to take the lead and alter the social life of humanity into their own likeness, which will more and more resemble the social life of a neighborhood or of a family. Are these new patterns for the new civilization which must be ahead of us, if our world is not going back to barbarism, to be essentially the patterns which Jesus taught?

Paul, who must surely be reckoned among the great thinkers of antiquity, gave it as his conviction for his day, "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ." A recent English writer speaking

of the present tendencies in science has declared: "The attitude of serious thinkers is totally different from what it was thirty years ago. . . . If anyone were to declare that the dominant school of philosophy in the near future would be definitely theistic, and even explicitly Christian, it would not appear too bold a prophecy to be realized." On the philosophical side I would not pretend to be competent to speak. But while it may be, of course, premature to say what the final verdict of social science will be upon this most momentous of all human problems,—the problem of the main social patterns which we should set up and try to realize in our civilization,—there are many reasons for declaring that the trend in the social sciences at present is strongly toward the patterns perceived and taught by Jesus. Reasons for this conviction will be set forth as our discussion continues.

QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION

Is the Christian church, however, willing to proclaim the Christian revolution, and to reaffirm its unflinching faith in the pattern set by its Founder?

SUGGESTED READINGS

ELLWOOD, *The Reconstruction of Religion*, Chap. III.

CASE, *The Evolution of Early Christianity*, Chaps. I, II.

RAUSCHENBUSCH, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, Chaps. I-IV.

SIMKHOVITCH, *Toward the Understanding of Jesus*, pp. 1-83.

III

THE PRINCIPLE OF SOCIALIZATION¹

Ours is a divided world. Races, nations, classes, and individuals, far from being united in the work of life, are living oftentimes in isolation, distrust, antagonism, and sometimes in open conflict. Even within small communities the gulf which separates the rich and poor, the privileged and the non-privileged, the educated and the ignorant, is often so great that there is little understanding, sympathy, or effective cooperation among these different elements. In the world at large misunderstanding, antipathy, and hostile conflict are, in general, only too painfully evident.

THE MEANING OF SOCIALIZATION

The one indispensable remedy for all this, according to the constructive psychological school of sociological thinkers, is the socialization of the individual—of all individuals. According to this school, it is not coercive forms of social control, or some redistribution or reorganization of the material conditions of life which will put an end to these divisions and conflicts among men, but the socialization of individual character—the creation of socially-minded men and women. For instance, if we wish to put an end to war, it will not be possible to do this by any external form

¹In discussion groups and study classes, in which it is desired to use this book as a text, it will be well to begin with this chapter.

of organization among the nations or by any division of the wealth and material resources of the earth. No external machinery will be anything more than an aid. The vital thing will be to undertake a socialization of individual character that will be effective to small groups not only within, but within humanity as a whole. Again, if we wish to put an end to divisions within the nation and to the threat of civil war, it will not be possible to do this merely through the recognition of the interests of certain classes or factions. Only the socialization of the individuals who make up those minor groups with reference to the larger group, i.e., the nation at large, will prevent the manifestation of group egoism on the part of these minor classes.

But what is meant by socialization of individual character? And why oppose this method to the method of social control or external social constraint? And what significance has all this for ethical religion?

By socialization we mean, as Professor E. W. Burgess says,² "conscious and willing coordination by the person of his interests with those of the group"; or, as Professor Ross puts it,³ "the development of the *we*-feeling in associates, and their growth in capacity and will to act together." Socialization may also be briefly defined as the development of the social spirit in individuals—the creation and cultivation of social-mindedness. The social spirit of men may, of course, be high or low in its ethical aim; but as it develops and universalizes itself on its way, to include all men, it purifies itself. Socialization, as it has reference to larger and larger groups of men, tends toward moralization. Socialization may exist, of course, with reference to very small groups, such as the family, or local community; but sociologists generally use the word as having reference to

² *The Function of Socialization in Social Evolution*, p. 222.

³ *Principles of Sociology*, p. 395.

very large groups, especially to nations, civilizations, and humanity. In general, the sociologists of the school of which we are speaking would not recognize socialization as complete unless it led the individual practically to identify himself and his interests with those of humanity as a whole. Such socialization is, of course, a spiritual matter. It is the psychic articulation, or, as Comte would have said, "the incorporation," of the individual into the collective life of humanity.

The outstanding trait of the highly socialized individual is his sense of social responsibility. He not only identifies himself with his fellow-men, but he holds himself responsible for their welfare, so far as it lies within his power. Social obligation is the key to his conduct. He puts himself at the service of his group. He is socially conscious. He thinks not so much of himself as of his associates.⁴ He accepts responsibility not simply for his own welfare, but also for their welfare. He is, in a word, *moralized* with reference to his group; and hence if *that* group be for him humanity, socialization and moralization in an idealistic sense will coincide.⁵ *Socialization in its higher phases becomes a process of moralization.* All this presupposes the development of a social sense—a sense of individual and collective responsibility—within the individual. It is a

⁴ Compare the statement of Professor Soares (*The Social Institutions and Ideals of the Bible*, p. 376): "The true socialization of the individual has taken place when, regarding himself as an end—that is, a being whose good is worthy to be sought—he regards all other persons also as ends, never using anyone simply as a means, and finds his own welfare in the welfare of every group to which in any wise he belongs, even the great human group in its entirety."

⁵ Compare Soares' suggestive statement (*op. cit.*, p. 377): "Socialization beyond the attainment of one's group is moral leadership."

matter not of external constraint, but of conscious voluntary choice on the part of the individual.

The socialization of individual character, then, is not something external. It involves the achievement of self-control on the part of the individual, so that he consciously and voluntarily modifies his behavior and shapes his purposes to promote the welfare either of humanity as a whole or of some smaller group. If the socialization of the individual has reference only to smaller groups, such socialization may lead to group egoism, and so work at cross purposes with the interests of humanity at large. Accordingly, in discussing the process of socialization I shall assume humanity as the unit of our thinking, recognizing that while a person may be socialized from the standpoint of a small group, he may not be a socialized individual with reference to humanity. I shall endeavor to show, however, that if he is socialized with reference to humanity, he will be socialized also in the best way for life in smaller groups.

SOCIALIZATION, A BASIS FOR THE SOLUTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

It is to such socialization of the individual or to the development of the social spirit in individuals to which sociologists of the constructive psychological school look for the solution of the great problems of our civilization rather than to mere external social control. Social control depends upon constraint of the individual, while socialization would place control within the individual. *Socialization's aim is personal character.* Thus would it reconcile social control and self-control. We might say that socialization of the individual when achieved expresses itself in *social self-control*. Such socialization of individual character must reach not simply the intelligence and the will,

but also the sentiments and emotions of individuals. It can be accomplished manifestly only through an educational process which undertakes to modify the whole nature of man. This socialized character or social spirit in individuals is the dynamic upon which the social thinkers of the school of which I have spoken rely to bring about enduring social order and social progress in our human world. But the process of socialization is itself complex and will need further analysis. Socialization is a blanket term, and until it is analyzed will convey little meaning.

The logical opposite of socialization is, of course, the voluntary separation and isolation of the individual from all group life. But the practical opposite which we find in human society is the predatory and selfish behavior of individuals with reference to their own groups. Professor Giddings has furnished an interesting analysis of socialization.⁶ He says, "the zero point of socialization is criminality, that degree of departure from prevailing and approved behavior which the community with relative severity punishes." The unsocialized individual, Professor Giddings goes on to specify, shows instincts little controlled, his sympathy is deficient or narrow in range, he is cruel in an unfeeling and brutal rather than in a deliberate way, his tastes low and crude, his ideas are elementary and limited in number and range. The highly socialized individual, on the other hand, Giddings finds to be dependable and helpful, mindful of the value of social usage, but also independent in thought, courageous, willing to experiment, but with full responsibility for the results. His emotions are abundant and varied, his beliefs subject to review and modification, his ideas abundant and organized; he is open-minded but insistent upon evidence; judicially critical rather than fault-finding; inventive and creative.

⁶ *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, pp. 287-289.

In a further analysis Professor Giddings finds that the process of socialization is a process wherein there is a growing consciousness of kind, an increasing like-mindedness, increasing sympathy and understanding, and increasing friendliness or affection among the members of a group.⁷ It is this process in its development which leads to cooperation and makes cooperation possible, especially in its higher forms. It is socialization, too, according to Giddings, which produces all rationally conscientious human behavior. The socializing forces—the influences which promote cooperation, which develop the social spirit, which promote human fellowship, and which lead us to identify ourselves with our fellows and ultimately with humanity—are, accordingly, the true constructive forces at work in the building of human society.

We may carry this analysis of socialization a step further sociologically by saying that socialization is the participation by the individual in the group consciousness; and that in its highest forms it is a participation by the individual in the higher social values. It is only through participation in the group consciousness that associates get the *we*-feeling and develop capacity and will to act together. While at first all this may take place on a very low plane, yet as the group enlarges from the primitive horde to humanity as a whole, and as it comes to include not only the living but those yet to be born, social consciousness is extended, social values universalized, and socialization becomes, as we said above, increasingly a process of moralization.

SOCIALIZATION AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Thus the whole of social evolution is, in one sense, a development of socialization. Objectively animals are

⁷ *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 304-312.

socialized—that is, induced to live together in groups and to cooperate—by the pressure of environment and of life needs. Among them there may be some beginnings of the subjective or spiritual side of the process of socialization through the development of the consciousness of kind or kinship and of sympathy. But conscious and willing co-ordination by the individual of his interests with those of his group, conscious participation of the individual in the mental life of his group, could not have existed before the human stage was reached. It is this participation by the individual in the mental life of his group, as we have seen, which has made possible cultural evolution, the distinctively human phase of social evolution. Men have learned to make tools and to build institutions in proportion as they have learned in common the ideas, standards, and values of their groups, and to coordinate themselves with their groups. Civilization itself is therefore a product of socialization; and moralization is, I have just implied, but carrying the process of socialization to an ideal plane, coordinating the individual not with any local and temporal group, but with universal humanity. “To obey the moral law,” says Miss Follett,⁸ “is to obey the social ideal. The social ideal is born, grows and shapes itself through the associated life. . . . We can have no true moral judgment except as we live our life with others.”

Out of the increasing socialization of men, therefore, have issued all the wonders of human social and cultural evolution and all the graces of human personality and character. “It is the community of ourselves,” says Dr. A. J. Todd, “that has hauled us up out of the Eocene pit and made us men.”⁹ The chief function of family group among human beings, for example, certainly is to socialize its

⁸ *The New State*, p. 55.

⁹ *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 78.

members. The family is indeed the primary socializing agency of human society. Within the family group individuals begin to be cured of a native egoism by constant practice in adjustment to others, and so are socialized—in part, at least—for their larger human relations. With entrance into the neighborhood group there is wider socialization and the process of social adjustment is carried still further. As we have already seen, the whole development of human culture has been, in one aspect, an attempt to take the socialized patterns of action derived from experiences within these face-to-face groups of men and carry them over into human relations in general. Thus cultural evolution indicates the gradual extension of the socialized patterns of behavior of primary groups to the total social life of humanity.¹⁰

The whole complex system of existing human association and institutions may be interpreted as so many devices for socializing the individual. The multitudinous voluntary associations of the present age, for example, exist to promote fellowship and cooperation along certain lines of social interest. That explains why they are rapidly becoming the foremost agencies for the promotion of civilization. Even government and law have as their real objective not the external constraint of individuals, but the production in them of willing law-abidingness and cooperation. Moral ideals, religion, and education manifestly aim to cultivate those attitudes and values in individuals which will social-

¹⁰ Compare the statements of Professors Park and Burgess (*Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 496): "Socialization . . . sets up as the goal of social effort a world in which conflict, competition, and the externality of individuals, if they do not disappear altogether, will be so diminished that all men may live together as members of one family."

ize them with reference to certain groups, large or small. More and more people are coming to believe that the aim of those institutions should be to teach men to identify themselves with their fellows everywhere, so that from the standpoint of social evolution their purpose may be stated as the creation of a universal human fellowship.

SOCIAL UNITY, COOPERATION, AND FELLOWSHIP

But with the particular manifestations of the socializing process we are not now immediately concerned. We shall return to them later. I wish now rather to consider the connections of the socializing process with the universal problems of social life; namely, unity, cooperation, and fellowship.

It is manifest that the unity of a social group grows out of the coordination of the activities of its members. In proportion as this coordination is willing and voluntary, in that proportion social unity becomes a spiritual matter—a matter of individual will and purpose. The unity of all human groups from the family to humanity at large depends, therefore, upon socialized character in individuals in some degree. In one sense the matter of social unity is a matter of securing coordinating habits in individuals. But back of these coordinating habits must lie corresponding coordinating feelings and ideas—that is, socialized purposes. While it is probably true that *similar* habits, and *similar* corresponding feelings and ideas in a group coordinate most easily, and so conduce to social unity, yet it must also be remembered that *different* habits, and the *different* feelings and ideas which accompany a division of labor within a group, may coordinate and so also work for social unity, provided there is a common purpose. Differ-

ences may be tolerated in a group, and even recognized as valuable, if they can be made to work toward the realization of a common purpose. Unity, not uniformity, is what needs to be sought by a group; differences, if not too wide, are compatible with unity. Accordingly, it is the socialized aim or purpose in individuals, not their similarity as individuals, which is the essential thing in the social unity of any group; or what comes to the same thing, the socialization of the character of its individual members with reference to the group. If we want unity in humanity, therefore, we must seek, not to make all individuals alike, which we cannot do, but to socialize the character of individuals with reference to humanity.

Let us now note the close connection between socialization and cooperation. Virtually these two words describe different aspects of the same social process. Cooperation is the more objective word, while socialization describes certain internal changes in the character and conduct of individuals. While cooperative behavior vastly preceded the development of the spiritual process of socialization, and while socialization from an evolutionary point of view may be regarded as an outcome and an aid to cooperation, yet socialization practically precedes the development of the higher forms of cooperation among human beings. Through cooperation men become socialized; and also through socialization men are prepared for wider cooperation. Cooperation and socialization have thus developed together in human society. Every advance in human cooperation at present must have a correspondingly socialized character in individuals to support it.

Now cooperation may be said to be the key word to the understanding of human society. As I pointed out in the first lecture, cooperation is the constructive side of social

life.¹¹ Not only is human civilization as it exists a result of cooperation, but progress for the future depends upon the increase of cooperation. "Progress," says Miss Follett rightly,¹² "is not determined by economic conditions, by physical conditions, nor by biological factors solely, but more especially by our capacity for genuine cooperation." That is the secret of progress. The law of progress accordingly, as we have said, is the law of the maximization of cooperation among all men. Back of cooperation, however, lies much which needs analysis.

Harmony and cooperation in humanity are not the result of automatic processes. Natural selection and mere habituation to environment are wholly insufficient to produce the cooperation necessary for human culture. That can only be secured by getting cooperative attitudes *taught* to individuals; in other words, getting them to participate in the mental life of the group, by submitting to the spiritual processes of socialization. Thus, individuals learn and in no other way can they secure the cooperative attitudes which are adequate for civilized social life. Practically, therefore, cooperation in civilized society depends absolutely upon the socialization of individual character; that is, the development of the social spirit in individuals, or the creation of socially minded men and women; which also, as we have seen, is a complex process. If social progress depends upon maximizing harmony and cooperation among men, it obviously also depends upon maximizing socialization; and socialization in its higher phases, especially when its reference extends to all humanity, we re-

¹¹ "Only through cooperation and mutual help," says Ratzel (*History of Mankind*, Vol. I, p. 25), "has mankind succeeded in climbing to the stage of civilization on which its highest members now stand."

¹² *The New State*, p. 93.

peat, becomes moralization. Unless widening cooperation is accompanied by the appropriate socialization of individual character, it is bound to start reactions against itself and break up in conflict. If we wish to avoid the risk of conflict destroying cooperation, therefore, we must pay attention to the socialization of individual character. In other words, we cannot maximize cooperation in society through any sort of external social machinery or organization apart from the socialization and moralization of individual character.

All advances in human fellowship manifestly depend upon increasing socialization. Human fellowship itself—that is, acquaintance, sympathy, and understanding among associates—is an outcome of socialization; and these elements in fellowship react to socialize still further the individual associates. Thus, “true sympathy,” says Miss Follett,¹³ “is a sense of community. . . . It is a recognition of oneness. . . . It can not be actualized until we can think and feel together.” For this reason Miss Follett sees in the development of the group spirit, or of true socialization, carried out on a humanity-wide scale, the solution of our problems, national and international. That true fellowship which some day shall harmonize the relations of classes, nations, and races, must come from the promotion and widening of the socializing process.

THE SOCIALIZATION OF INSTITUTIONS AND GROUPS

But before we attempt to see how this can be accomplished, let us consider the meaning of socialization for groups and institutions as well as for individuals. It may sound strange to say that the modern family needs socialization; but it is too isolated and too individualistic. In

¹³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 45, 47.

some way or other it must be taught as a group not to serve each other less in the home but to serve the community, civilization, and humanity more. The family as at present organized is too exclusive and too selfish. Its members think too much of their own happiness. This is the reason why it is frequently unstable. While it has been the primary agency for socializing individuals by getting cooperative living started within the home circle, if it is to do its work efficiently in the present and in the future, it must learn to think less of its own welfare and more of the welfare of the community. The larger life of humanity must be made to flow through the family, that is, the family life itself must cultivate and show more of a wider social spirit. Otherwise it easily becomes an impediment to community welfare and so to social progress.¹⁴

In the same way industry, while it has served to socialize individuals by the division of labor in the work of production, needs further socialization. Industry must make the promotion of human fellowship one of its pattern ideas, it must become more broadly and genuinely cooperative throughout; it must organize itself to show more regard for the personality of those engaged in it and for its total effect upon human culture, than for the goods or the wealth which it produces. It should produce goods primarily for human use, and not primarily for profit.¹⁵

National groups, too, in our age manifestly need to be socialized with reference to humanity. Our world suffers from too much national egoism. Instead of the war having taught the nations how to live together as one family, there seems just now to be a stronger tendency than there has

¹⁴ Compare the statements of Soares (*op. cit.*, pp. 338, 339) on the limits of family loyalty. "Evidently there may be a higher duty than family loyalty."

¹⁵ See Chapters IV and VI of this book.

been at any time for a generation toward national isolation and exclusiveness. The new isolation some advocate for this nation and for other nations would put an end to all international migration and even greatly limit foreign commerce. It is claimed that through such isolation our nation and other nations would have a chance to realize without outside interference each its own life and destiny. All this is, of course, inimical to the development of the social spirit among the nations. If the general theory of socialization and of its relation to culture which I have just set forth is true such a policy of national isolation and exclusiveness, if carried out, would be a mistake which would set back human progress. This is not to say, of course, that nations and peoples may not develop contacts and intermingle too rapidly, before they are prepared, before they are sufficiently socialized in their mental attitudes with reference to one another to cooperate successfully. But this is an argument, not for national isolation, but for the promotion of the socialization of peoples by the extension of mutual acquaintance, and understanding, and of such cooperation as they are capable. If we want a secure peace among the nations we must get all nations to recognize that they constitute but a single family with the real identity of interests which we find among the members of a family.

But we shall be successful in socializing the behavior of groups of men only if the individuals which make up these groups are socialized with reference to humanity at large. The family, the trade union, the industrial corporation, the state and the nation will no longer manifest group egoism when their constituent members have fully developed the social spirit. Thus, as I said at the beginning of this lecture, if the members of minor groups develop the social spirit toward all humanity, they will be socialized at the same time in the best way for membership in their own

groups, provided we wish these groups to be a benefit to the total life of humanity. This is another reason for promoting and widening the socializing process among individuals.

SOCIALIZATION AND SOCIAL MORALE

But before we consider how we can promote and widen the social spirit in all individuals, let us note that the socializing process, when carried to its full and complete development, when it eventuates in social discipline and social self-control, issues in what has now come to be called "morale." It is the group spirit which determines the morale of the group, and morale is high or low according to the worthiness and unworthiness of the aims of the group. Individuals through participation in the mental life of their groups, as we have seen, have their behavior transformed and made to conform to the group standards. We see this on an imposing scale in time of war; but in peace also every social group has its standards, its morale, to which the behavior of its members more or less conforms. *It is this social fact—the domination of individual behavior by the standards or the morale of the group—which enables us to say confidently that we are just beginning to explore the possibilities of social life, of social organization, and so of social progress.* Of course, only as the aim of the group is high, can the morale of its members be high as judged from an ethical standpoint. Fortunately, it seems to be true, however, that groups with relatively unselfish aims seem to be able to command greater enthusiasm and better morale in their members than groups with low aims.

It is this fact upon which Mr. Benjamin Kidd bases his social optimism in his remarkable work, *The Science of*

Power. Using the phrase, "the emotion of the ideal" for the emotion aroused by an ideal vision of social possibilities, he says, "it is evident on reflection that there is no goal to which the emotion of the ideal is not capable of carrying the human mind. . . . It is capable of accomplishing anything to which it may be readily directed over long periods of time. It is the nature of the inner vision which it brings into being that it leaves the possessor never satisfied with the world as it is, and that it drives him through every degree of effort to endeavor to realize his ideal. Evoked under suitable conditions in the mind of the young, it is able to render the successive generations of men upon whom it acts fixed of purpose, capable of the most surprising labors, and sufficient to otherwise impossible measures of self-subordination and self-sacrifice."¹⁰

Certainly we must agree that the possibilities of social discipline, of social self-control, of social morale, whatever we may prefer to call it, are far from being realized in our human world. Social organization has always been one of the most important factors in human behavior, as the practical managers of men know full well. For this reason human history has been a succession of trials of different forms of social organization in the family, in the community, in industry, in the state—men trying out for their own ends each form to discover its effects upon human personality and behavior. But even more important in its influence on human behavior is the mental life behind the social organization of the group, the group spirit. It is these control ideas which immediately mould individual behavior and even more than group organization have they been the concern of the great practical managers of men. A clear understanding of the power of the group spirit and of the methods by which its control may be exercised in

¹⁰ *The Science of Power*, p. 155.

the interest of a higher civilization is above all what is needed in our social and religious leaders of the day. We must agree, therefore, with Kidd when he says, "the science of creating and transmitting public opinion under the influence of collective emotion is about to become the principal science of civilization, to the mastery of which all governments and all powerful interests will in the future address themselves with every resource at their command."¹⁷

Kidd goes so far as to claim that "civilization has its origin, has its existence, and has the cause of its progress" in the collective emotion of the ideal.¹⁸ Probably no scientific sociologist or anthropologist would quite agree to such a sweeping generalization. But it surely points to the secret of the higher forms of social morale. Morale is an outcome of the socializing process; and its highest type is realized only when the spirit of service and self-sacrifice with reference to all humanity is dominant.¹⁹ Indeed, this only means carrying to the limit the social spirit—the process of socialization. We are surely not claiming too much when we claim that out of the socializing process has grown all of the higher manifestations of human culture, of cooperation, of fellowship and of social morale. How, then, may we go to work to promote and widen still further this socializing process?

PROMOTING THE SOCIALIZING PROCESS

It is evident in the first place that we must develop more like-mindedness among men as regards the essentials of human living together. More attention must be paid to

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹⁹ Compare *The Reconstruction of Religion*, p. 181.

the ends of life and to those fundamental laws and principles by which men everywhere live together successfully and harmoniously. Social knowledge of these fundamental social laws and principles and of the conditions under which every class, nation, and race of men live must be diffused among the masses of mankind. Only thus can there be common understanding among all men, and without this understanding the development of a common spirit in our humanity is impossible. We may safely trust the logic and the criticism of science to bring like-mindedness among men in regard to the problems which this diffusion of social knowledge will inevitably bring to consciousness in their minds. Thus we may expect and count, as the work of science advances, upon increasing like-mindedness among men as regards problems of human welfare.

RELIGION AS A SOCIALIZING AGENCY

But intellectual agreement is only a step toward the development of an adequate social spirit among men. We need a will to be fair and a will to help. We need justice or fair exchange among men, and we also need mercy. Intellectual like-mindedness will aid in getting this social good will; but in addition to the increasing like-mindedness which science is promoting among the intelligent and rational elements of humanity, there is even more need among men of both likeness and rightness in regard to fundamental emotional attitudes. The highest manifestations of the social spirit, or socialization at its fullest, are possible only when men cherish the right emotions and develop good will on a universal scale. If it is the work of science to bring men to intellectual agreement regarding the problems of life, it is surely the work of religion to cultivate the right

emotional attitudes to motivate men—to set them at work with mutual good will to solve those problems practically. For religion, let us remember, concerns itself with the values of life. It directly evokes the emotional strength in a mood which, as we have seen, is an immediate control over individual behavior. If we wish to universalize certain feelings and emotional attitudes in human groups it can best be done through the agency of religion, because religion brings its values to the individual consciousness with an absolute sanction. It is no accident, therefore, that throughout human history religions have been used to diffuse the values, standards, and emotional attitudes which groups of men have believed to be necessary to control group behavior and to secure a proper group morale.

It may be said, of course, that the diffusion and standardization of values and emotional attitudes in human society can take place through other means than religion. This cannot be denied. But it may be pointed out that thus far intellectual education has notoriously failed to accomplish this task and that religious education has been found to be by far the most effective way of educating and disseminating the emotions, especially when the emotional attitudes sought are of a high social and moral character. In these cases such a degree of subordination of selfish impulses and emotions is demanded that something like what Kidd calls "the emotion of the ideal" is necessary; and this emotion of the ideal is impossible without that faith in the higher possibilities of life which is at the heart of all religion. Men participate most easily in the consciousness of the higher social values through religion. Hence religion has always been, and so far as we can see, always will be, the most effective means of controlling the life-moods of man in socially advantageous directions. There certainly can be no adequate socialization of indi-

vidual character, as we pointed out at the beginning, which is not a socialization of the human heart, that is, of the sentiments, emotions, and affections of men; and if religion at its best is, as we said in the first lecture, a genuine setting of the affections upon the highest or divine things in life, then such religion, we must own, can best socialize the human heart.

Of course, if a form of religion is unsocial, other-worldly, or immoral, it may do the very reverse. We must recognize and always remember that religion is a power which may work both ways in human society. I am concerned at present only to point out that *if religion itself is socialized, it can be the most effective agency of which we have knowledge in the socialization of individual character*, and so in the development of an ethical social spirit among all men which shall transform our civilization. Social science alone cannot socialize the characters of men, because science as such has little direct influence upon the sentiments and emotions, which, we repeat, are the immediate controls over individual behavior. Religion, on the other hand, directly deals with these elements in human nature. In the whole course of its development it has been more or less at work at this task of socializing the emotions and the will of man, usually, to be sure, with reference to very narrow groups, and sometimes even for perverse social ends. Nevertheless, historically religion has been cultivated and developed among men as a socializing agency. However faulty the religions of the past may have been, this does not prevent us from purifying religion and utilizing it as the great agency to socialize men now and for the future.

Our world, we all agree, is now badly divided and even torn by open conflicts. It sorely needs to develop a social spirit which shall include all men and which shall heal its multitudinous divisions. We should be very foolish if we

failed to make use of religion to do this work. There is, indeed, nothing else equal to the task. But what religion shall it be? Is Christianity broad enough, social enough, and humanitarian enough to be adequate for the task of socially redeeming mankind?

CHRISTIANITY AS A SOCIALIZING AGENCY

There are many, of course, who, on account of the historical associations of Christianity, would deny that it is fitted to undertake the task of socializing mankind in a supreme sense—that is, of developing a universal human fellowship which shall heal the divisions and put an end to the strife among men. They look, therefore, to a new religion which shall be based upon science and which shall be a synthesis of all that is best in all religions.

But if we go back of historical Christianity to original Christianity, the religion of its founder, we have in essentials ready to our hands such a competently socializing religion, one which is consistent with the principles of social science and which embodies a synthesis of the religious aspirations of mankind—if only we can develop and apply this religion of Jesus to existing conditions. Jesus died, I take it, not so much to make men free or happy as to make men one—at one with God primarily, to be sure, but also at one with one another. He clearly taught a universal human fellowship, an inclusive love of all men for one another. It is surely right to say that his aim was to socialize the human heart in the highest sense; and as we have seen, any socializing process which does not reach the heart is vain. Moreover, Jesus, unlike Gautama Buddha, sought to socialize the human heart in an active rather than a passive sense. He sought to send forth and have his disciples build a new human world, a new social world, in

which men should live and work together as brothers. *The redemption of our human world was his passion.* Hence, he taught that God was to be served through the service of men and that we must love one another if we are to please God. He taught, in other words, a religion of human love and human service.

Jesus so perfectly illustrated this religion in his life and death that it has been rightly said that his is the one completely socialized character in all history.²⁰ He set a new pattern for human relationships—the completely socialized pattern. As we saw in the previous lecture, any new pattern in human relations must first be thought out by some master mind, next be realized in one or a few lives and then imitatively taken up by the mass of men who will gradually come to appreciate and understand its value. This is the method of social evolution in the material realm; it is also the method in the moral or spiritual part of human life. *Social evolution proceeds by anticipation of its goal.* If the complete socialization of man is the goal of social evolution, it is not strange that the completely socialized pattern was first set clearly in human history by one master mind.

But are not the difficulties of actualizing such a religion of love and service as Jesus taught in the social policies and organization of men insurmountable? Is the religion of Jesus as a social program practical, or no more than a beautiful dream? Are not the hard facts of social science against any such utopian ideal? Many have thought and said so, both within and without the Christian church, even though professing to honor the teaching of Jesus for

²⁰ Says Professor Soares (*The Social Institutions and Ideals of the Bible*, p. 377): "The moral achievement of Jesus was that he exhibited the complete social attitude in all relationships. . . . Thus Jesus is for us and for all generations the norm."

its social idealism. On the other hand, Kidd, in the work to which we have already referred, has said in effect that this social ideal, provided a clear vision of it is lodged in the general mind, "utterly impossible as it might seem, could be imposed on civilization in a single generation."

This is the problem which I shall endeavor to discuss in the subsequent lectures. We must, to be successful, show first the possibility of establishing among men an economy of mutual service; then the possibility of a civilization which is genuinely humanitarian, pervaded by a universal good will or love; then the means of overcoming the present antagonisms and divisions among men; then the method of educating the young for a Christian social order; and finally the need and the way to provide our age with adequate spiritual leadership. I shall hope to show that, while Kidd is theoretically right from a strictly scientific viewpoint, yet there are practical difficulties with which he does not deal, and which we must not overlook; but that the lack of social faith which we often find even among religious people is far from a justifiable attitude, and is perhaps the greatest impediment to the realization of a Christian social order.

QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION

Is the Christian church willing to train all its members to become socially minded and to make humanity henceforth the unit of all their thinking?

SUGGESTED READINGS

- COOLEY, Social Organization, Chaps. III-V.
 GIDDINGS, Studies in the Theory of Human Society, Chap. XII.
 KIDD, The Science of Power, Chaps. IV, V.
 ROSS, Principles of Sociology, Chaps. VIII and XXXII.

IV

THE PRINCIPLE OF SERVICE

The socializing process leads to social solidarity—the unity of the group, both in its mental and material life and the interdependence of its members in a common life process. The first groups to achieve this solidarity and interdependence of all their members were small. They were such groups as the family, the neighborhood, or the local community. Later they came to include groups much larger in numbers such as kinship groups and tribes; and with the widening of the socializing process within historic times, they have come to include groups as large as states and nations; and now we are just at the point where we are beginning to think of all humanity as one huge group and to talk of its solidarity.

MUTUAL SERVICE AND GROUP LIFE

Now, groups which have achieved solidarity, whether families, neighborhoods, clans, or nations, have always had common sense enough to recognize that their solidarity is the result of the cooperation and mutual service of their members. Mutual service, accordingly, has been the consciously recognized principle of group life from time immemorial. The sociologists of the nineteenth century made no new discovery, therefore, when they perceived that reciprocity of service is the foundation of all social life as well as of all organic life. These sociologists made a mis-

take, however, when they pressed the analogy too far which undoubtedly exists between the organization and life of a social group and the structure and life of a biological organism. For the interdependence which we find among the members of a social group is of a different sort than the interdependence which we find among the cells of an organism. It is chiefly on a mental and social plane, not on a physical. Moreover, human groups are made up of relatively independent, self-determining, self-conscious persons, quite unlike in their natures, relations, and behavior to the natures, relations and behavior of the cells of an organism. Nevertheless, the interdependence of individuals in social life is not less close and not less real than the interdependence of cells and organs which we find in organic life. In both cases, it is a reciprocity of services. In both cases, there is participation in a common life with common activities, and a real identity of interest of every part with every other part, so that all are members, so to speak, one of another. The members of a social group, like the cells of an organism, in other words, live by cooperating with one another and by the mutual exchange of services; or, more strictly, a social group exists only in virtue of the cooperation and exchange of services of its members.

Let us take the family as an example. The family exists and persists as a family only by its members continually conferring benefits upon one another—only by the continual exchange of benefits or services. The father contributes the fruits of his labor and the mother the mother's work incident to the care of the family. Even the children contribute their share to the life of the family group through the happiness and development which they bring to other members of the group. Of course, all the services which the members of a family render to one another are

not necessarily of a material character. The exchange of ideas, the conferring of happiness, mutual help in the development of moral character, are not less services than physical labor or material commodities. Nor are all the services rendered always positive. There must be mutual sacrifices in a family group on the part of its members as well as the conferring of positive benefits upon one another. Indeed, the exchange of sacrifices for the sake of the good of all, in our stage of development, frequently bulks quite as large as the exchange of positive services. Moreover, if the family life is to reach its happiest and best development there must be a certain balance, or equality, in the services and sacrifices exchanged by its members. If some member of the family fails constantly to return service for service, benefit for benefit, sacrifice for sacrifice, then to that extent the family life is injured and its harmony is disturbed. The family, in other words, presents itself as a system of "mutualism," as the social scientists would say, that is, as *an economy of mutual service and mutual sacrifice on the part of all of its members*.

Now, the family typifies human society at large. Mutual service is the vitalizing principle in the life of every human group. Conflict with other groups has been a factor itself in social evolution only because it has taught groups the necessity and value of mutual service among their own members. The collective life of men which we call human society, in other words, is carried on only by the continual exchange of services and sacrifices. It is only by mutual service that men live a social or even a human life. Reciprocity of service, then, is at the basis of all human institutions and of all civilization. The richer is the exchange of service, the more social values there are produced, and the more social life there is built up. Moreover, if the social life is to be satisfying and harmonious for all individuals

and classes, there must be equity or relative equality in the exchange of services and sacrifices. If there are some individuals or classes who will not render service for service, benefit for benefit, sacrifice for sacrifice, then the whole social life is injured and rendered inharmonious. The more equal the exchange of services in society the more satisfying and harmonious is the social life. *The perfect form of human association would be where there was equality of service rendered.*¹ Then there results what we might call a social equilibrium.

MUTUAL SERVICE, COOPERATION, AND SOCIALIZATION

This is only saying, in effect, what we have already said, that cooperation is the constructive principle of group life, and that in general the wider and the more harmonious human cooperation is, the richer and the more perfect is the social life of mankind as a whole. Now, cooperation if it is one-sided cannot remain harmonious. As soon as it becomes one-sided it tends to pass over into exploitation; exploitation produces dissatisfaction, and the whole harmony of the social life is disturbed. Cooperation is at its best when it takes the form of equal mutual service. Then it is, as we say, democratic, and benefits and develops all, if not alike, at least in proportion to their capacity to develop and to receive benefits. This is also what we ordinarily call social justice. Social justice, in other words, is such a balance and equality in the services and sacrifices which the members of a group render to one another in order to live together that all are benefited either in pro-

¹ See Novicow, *The Mechanism and Limits of Human Association*, Section III (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII, p. 314).

portion to the service they render, or at least in proportion to their ability to receive.

Again, mutual service is simply the objective expression of socialization. Just as cooperation flows from socialization, so mutual service is the result when the process of socialization is complete. When we are thoroughly at one with our fellow men we wish to benefit them. When we identify ourselves with humanity, we wish to serve humanity. Hence, a humanitarian religion and ethics is necessarily one in which the service of humanity becomes the end of life for the individual.

Every violation of the principle of mutual service in human society breaks social bonds, impedes the process of socialization, destroys cooperation, and injures the whole fabric of civilization. It is a violation of the whole nature of social life, and for that matter in the long run, of truly successful personal life. For, as Professor Hobhouse says, "The social type inherits the earth. It does not defeat itself. It succeeds."² *We are, in any true view of human life, all one, and it is our business to serve one another.*³ Yet since the opposite view is common there is need to demonstrate its falsity.

MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE OF MEN

Let us use this illustration, suggested by the Russian sociologist, Novicow.⁴ Imagine the world, he says, inhabited by two individuals only, A and B. If A kills B, A is left alone in the work of controlling nature to satisfy human needs, and his power of mastering nature, therefore, is reduced by half. If A threatens B without killing

² *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 25.

³ Compare Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 483.

⁴ *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII, p. 315.

him, both lose time, and energy is devoted to non-productive purposes. If A compels B to give him more than he gives back to B, some intimidation or violence or fraud must be used; there will be resistance and again there will be some loss of energy and both will ultimately become poorer. But when there is no injustice, there is no resistance, and cooperative action can develop its full power. In other words, the more social injustice there is in the world the greater is the misery therein. The satisfactoriness of our social life, as Novicow says in effect, is in direct proportion to the percentage of justice that reigns in society; but social life is nothing but the sum total of individual lives, and when we say that the satisfactoriness of social life is in direct proportion to the percentage of justice, we really mean that *the satisfactoriness of each individual life is directly proportionate to the sum of justice in human society.*

Thus men live together successfully and satisfactorily by the practice of conferring mutual benefits upon one another. Yet, as we have said, the opposite belief has been in evidence through all the ages of recorded human history and still prevails in our civilized society of the twentieth century. Men still believe that a satisfactory social life may result from despoiling and plundering, or at least exploiting, other men. As Novicow says, "Throughout the ages people have imagined, as they still imagine, that one can become wealthy much faster through plunder than through honest labor. Production and spoliation are the two fundamental phenomena found in the human species. Production leads to association and life; spoliation leads to dissociation and death; production is a sane and normal condition; spoliation is abnormal and pathological. The human species has for thousands of years been revolving around these two poles. But the social question will be

solved only when we realize definitely that spoliation is fatal to the despoiler," as well as to the despoiled.

WRONG PATTERNS IN OUR CIVILIZATION

In other words, two social attitudes, two patterns of action, have held men since the beginning of recorded human history. The one we may call the "contributive" attitude, namely, that for the individual the purpose of life should be to contribute something to the life of one's group—ultimately, of course, to the life of humanity. The family group or any other group, as we have seen, can exist and persist only as its members contribute something continuously to the group life. Nor would any sane person claim that by contributing their services and sacrifices for the life of the whole group the members of a family group are thereby destroying themselves. On the contrary, all human experience shows that they are not only developing and enriching the life of the group, but incidentally also their own individual lives. Indeed, sociology shows this to be the way that human culture and human personality have been developed. *The developing social life of humanity has made us and given us all that we possess. To humanity, therefore, the contributive philosophy holds, we owe all that we have.*

The other social attitude which has contended with the contributive since the dawn of history may be called the "possessive"⁵ attitude, since to it the purpose of life is the seeking and getting of personal possessions. It holds that

⁵"Acquisitive attitude" is a phrase which perhaps equally well describes the social attitude referred to, and is preferred by Tawney in his illuminating book, *The Acquisitive Society*. The adjective "possessive" is preferred by the writer because it emphasizes "keeping and holding."

the individual is enriched by taking as much as he can get in the way of services or goods from other individuals and returning as little as possible. In other words, the enrichment of the individual is proportionate to the excess of his getting from others over what he gives to others. From this standpoint the group becomes simply a means to serve the individual in question. Other persons become *means* for enriching and developing one's own personal life. *The possessive attitude toward life, in other words, if allowed to dominate, leads to using persons as means. The contributive attitude toward life regards persons as ends.* Popularity we call the possessive attitude toward life the "get" or "take" attitude, and the contributive the "give" attitude.

Now if the analysis which we have previously outlined of the social life is correct, namely, that social life exists only through cooperation and the mutual exchange of services, and if, moreover, it is the richness of social life that develops and enriches personal life, then *the possessive attitude toward life is the result of an illusion*. One is tempted to say that it is an illusion of the same extreme degree of scientific falsity as the illusion that the sun revolves around the earth. *Both* appear to be so, but neither one is so. So to the unthinking mind it appears that individual life might be indefinitely enriched by appropriation from others. It looks as though the good of life must be sought in possession, not in giving or contributing. There may possibly be a sense in which this is true, but in the practical social sense it is not true. In a practical social sense men develop their lives by giving to, and not by taking from, others. They find their life by giving it freely for the good of others. As soon as they come under the illusion that they can live by taking principally, they warp their own personalities, defeat their own purpose to enrich their life,

and impoverish the life of their group. For they bring themselves into conflict with other individuals. Out of this conflict grows waste of energy, waste of productive power; the whole group is impoverished, and ultimately even the individuals who maintain the possessive rather than the contributive attitude toward life.

THE LUST OF POSSESSION

Our world is, however, dominated by the lust of possession.⁶ It is this lust which largely controls not only our business life, but our political life, and large sections of our intellectual, educational, domestic, and general social life. Many deny that any other system of social economy is possible in human society. A short view of human history would seem to sustain their contention. But a long view reveals that *an economy of self-interest is neither necessary nor desirable in our human world*. Other forms of human society have existed and other forms are still possible. It is ignorance of the nature of human life as essentially social which leads men to endorse such views. Single individuals may, of course, profit in a material sense from an economy of self-interest or a social order based on the lust of possession, but society as a whole does not profit. It is only a few individuals or a class, and even they are injured morally. The argument of Novicow is good here. Using "spoliation" to illustrate the social results of the extreme manifestation of the possessive or "take" attitude, he says:

*By the "lust of possession" is meant the dominance of the acquisitive or possessive attitude over the contributive attitude. This is, of course, an evolutionary survival from the moral point of view. Tennant (*The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, Lecture III) shows admirably how this was once, at a much lower stage of development, socially and morally normal.

"The object of spoliation is to procure profits for the individual who practices it, that is, to enrich his life. But the attempt to enrich life by methods which destroy life is absolutely unrealizable and borders on the absurd. Nobody claims that spoliation is of any advantage to the victim. But a great majority of men live, nevertheless, in the gross illusion that spoliation in general is profitable. In arriving at that conclusion they fail to see two facts: first, that there must of necessity be a victim in order that there may be spoliation. Hence, the number of those who are plundered must equal at least the number of the plunderers. If spoliation is advantageous for only half of the human race, then the profit is already reduced by half. But they fail to see another still more important thing; that is, that, given a reign of plunder, no one can tell at any given time whether he is the plunderer or the victim. . . . We forget also that, were spoliation profitable, everybody would find it so and would wish to practice it. But if everybody should wish to rob his neighbor, then all would, in turn, have to be robbed. . . . We see, therefore, that spoliation, in any of its aspects, is opposed to co-operation. Cooperation enables man to adapt his environment to his needs in the shortest possible time; spoliation prevents him from accomplishing that end."

We cannot doubt that Novicow's argument is equally valid against the milder manifestations of the "take" attitude in human society, less harsh forms of exploitation, or indeed any form of getting something without giving an equivalent in return.

One must add that our present social economy of self-interest has brought our whole civilization almost to shipwreck; and that the lust of possession has meant the destruction of every civilization of the past. It has been

¹ *Op cit.*, pp. 319-321.

responsible for practically all the wars which have made our earth a place of blood and tears. It was peculiarly responsible for the Great World War through which we have just passed; for if the nations of Europe had not played the game of "grab and get" with one another during the whole of the nineteenth century, there would have been no World War.

EXPLOITATION A CAUSE OF POVERTY AND CRIME

Moreover, in the form of exploitation, namely, the use of our fellow human beings as means rather than as ends, the possessive attitude is responsible for a large part of the misery and poverty in modern civilization. It is obviously responsible for the existing poverty which is caused by war and by the burden of military armaments. Even in peaceful business, however, the maxim too often is that "the way to get rich is to get other people to work for you"; in other words, use men as means to getting rich. It is this selfish use of one man by another which accounts for most of the industrial poverty of the modern world. Some of our poverty, to be sure, is due merely to ignorance and some to defects in individual character which lead to inefficiency. But practically all students of poverty are agreed that the bulk of poverty in the modern world is caused by exploitation rather than by defects in personal character and intelligence. Trace disease, which also is one of the most frequent immediate causes of poverty, and back of such preventable diseases as tuberculosis lies not only ignorance, but too often the use of human beings as means rather than ends. Much of the preventable disease in modern civilization, in other words, is due to exploitation.

It is notorious that it is the possessive or "take" attitude, with the brakes off, which causes the bulk of crime against

property. It is the extreme reaction from the results of the use of human beings as means rather than ends, indeed, which gives rise to the majority of these crimes. When we examine the criminal and his criminal acts carefully we find that almost invariably crime is a product of social conditions. If we must speak plainly, it must be said that *we would not have much crime if we did not have a semi-criminal civilization*—a civilization, in other words, which over-stimulates the lust of possession on the one hand, and which dwarfs and warps personal character through exploitation and deprivation of conditions for normal living, on the other hand. The possessive attitude in society thus works both directly and indirectly to cause crime. One might show that the same is true also of vice, especially in its organized and professional forms.

Our only conclusion can be, therefore, that the possessive attitude as a pattern for social behavior is a wholly insecure and unsafe foundation for any civilization, and particularly for a complex one like our own. The great scourges and evils of our civilization, such as war, poverty, disease, vice, and crime, have their main root in this wrong social pattern with its far-reaching ramifications. We can no longer safely attempt to live by this pattern or continue to let it dominate in our civilization. Our civilization, indeed, is rendered tolerable only because it is not the sole pattern for social behavior. As we have already seen, the contributive pattern of mutual service, taken largely from the family life and fostered by idealistic religion and ethics, has also existed side by side with the pattern of "take" or "get." In a part of our social life we have had and carried out the contributive or the "give" attitude. Why should we not take this contributive attitude in all relations of life? If it is the possessive attitude which particularly threatens the stability of our institu-

tions, how is it that this pattern for social behavior got under such headway, and why do we persist in following it, if it is an error?

THE POSSESSIVE PATTERN A PAGAN SURVIVAL

In part I have already attempted to answer this question by showing that it is an illusion, readily fostered by superficial social thinking, of the same baffling kind as the illusion that the sun revolves around the earth. It is easily rationalized and justified because certain of the original impulses of human nature are on its side. If they had not been, such a pattern probably never would have gotten started, but to ascribe its persistence and predominance in our civilization to human nature is a grave sociological and psychological error. Human nature, as we have already seen, is plastic and accepts readily enough what the mores or moral standards of a group endorse. The real explanation of the persistence and predominance of a possessive pattern of action in our civilization must be sought, therefore, in our past social history and in our social traditions.

We have already given the explanation in the second lecture. We have seen that human culture has passed through a predatory stage which we call barbarism, and that we have surviving with us today many of the typical barbarian patterns for social behavior. You will remember that the whole organization of the barbarian world was predatory, based upon possibilities of conquest, of plunder, and of domination of one group by another. In this transitional stage of human development men looked upon other men as means for the gratification of their selfish lusts. Every tradition, as we have seen, dies hard in human society, even though it is erroneous. Consequently,

many men have not yet outgrown the view that their fellow human beings are so many objects for domination and even for spoliation—means to self-gratification rather than ends to serve. The barbarian standards of power, pleasure, and self-interest still prevail among us, and hold the majority of men in their grasp. Out of them, of course, issues the possessive attitude toward life as the dominant attitude. It is, however, when allowed to dominate, an attitude inconsistent with an ethical civilization and like all the traditions of barbarism must be replaced by a more socialized, civilized, humanitarian attitude toward life. If cooperation is the law of group life then instead of spoliation and exploitation we need an attitude toward one another of mutual service; instead of a social economy based upon the individual lust of possession we need an economy of unselfish service.

THE MEANING OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SERVICE

The increasing solidarity of mankind makes us all increasingly part and parcel of one another. In order to safeguard our increasing interdependent life we need a humanity-wide recognition of mutual service and mutual sacrifice as the patterns for social behavior. Not power, nor pleasure, nor personal profit should be the dominating purpose of our individual behavior in any of the relations of life, but everywhere the service of our fellow men, and especially of those who need our help. We cannot achieve this by taking self-interest as our guide, but rather by consciously identifying ourselves with the various human groups to which we belong such as the family, the neighborhood, the community, the nation, and *humanity*. We must perceive that our life is part of a larger life and that our just rights, as well as our obligations, spring from our func-

tions in the larger life of humanity. As Professor F. W. Blackmar says: "*The only justifiable individualism is that which seeks fullness of individual life through devotion to the common life of humanity.*"^a

But if the present social order is too largely dominated by individual lust of possession, how can it be changed, and what would an economy of mutual service be like? What would it mean in regard to individual behavior for family life, for business life, for political life?

It is plain that for the individual a life of service would mean, first of all, the giving up of self-interest and self-seeking as the main motives in life. *The main motive of life would then become the contributing of something of value to the life of the world. It would be creation rather than possession.* Self-development and self-culture would become by-products from serving humanity. Nor is such an ideal impracticable. Self-interest and even self-culture have never been able to command from men the enthusiasm which unselfish service has. Contributing has always brought to men a keener joy than possession. Men, too, have always found the most satisfying self-development indirectly in the service of the common welfare. "To live for others," as a general maxim of life, would be found to be carrying only a step further a process which nature has already begun within the family and within other face-to-face groups of men. So to live would be to lift individual and social life at once to a new plane, freeing it from much of the pettiness and meanness now so common, and giving it an atmosphere of creativeness and nobility now all too rare.

Even the family life itself which gave birth to the principle of service would be transformed by the service ideal of life. Marriage would no longer be contracted for

^a *Justifiable Individualism*, p. 142.

dominantly selfish aims. The family life would no longer be an excuse for aristocratic exclusiveness and selfish luxury, and hence the family would no longer be an excuse for men plundering and exploiting their fellowmen. The family group would expect to be held to the same accountability for its influence upon the total life as any other institution, and expect to be judged by its service to the community. Both the individual selfishness which now threatens the stability of the family as an institution, and the group selfishness which often makes the family a hindrance to progress and to the common welfare, would disappear. In their stead we would have an unselfish family life which would accept the service of humanity as the criterion by which it would wish to be judged. Such a family life would not only welcome into its midst the little child, but it would rejoice in opportunities to be a good neighbor to all who in any way needed help.

It is our business and industrial life which most needs to be transformed, of course, by the principle of mutual service, for it is this portion of our life which has been most deliberately organized upon the basis of self-interest. Profit rather than service has too often been adopted as the end of business. Consequently, it is in business that we find the most glaring departures from the principle of service. This is not difficult to understand if we stop to remember that only a few generations ago human slavery was still common. The tradition of exploiting human beings in industry for the profit which can be made from their labor is still strong in our business and industrial life. Now, if we could lift business and industry to the plane of mutual service, all purposeful exploiting would disappear at once. Not only would labor cease to be exploited but capital and labor would cease to combine to exploit the public. Both capital and labor would regard themselves as

partners in the common service of the public. *They would ask accordingly from the public only just compensation for the service which they rendered.* Neither capital nor labor in a society organized upon the principle of service would think of determining themselves what their compensation should be. They would be willing to leave the determination of both just profits and just wages to disinterested competent representatives of the public. They would gladly submit to intelligent public regulation; and if the public showed itself unintelligent or selfish in the compensation which it offered, both capital and labor would patiently seek redress through legally constituted methods, much as the individual now seeks redress for other wrongs in legally constituted courts. Just as ministers, teachers, and a few other classes now permit their compensation to be fixed by the public conscience, so would all economic classes under a régime of mutual service. They would, moreover, seek only peaceful means of settling their differences when differences arose. The use of force by one class as against other classes would be out of the question. Service and duties, not rights, either of individuals or classes, would be emphasized.

THE SERVICE IDEAL AND BUSINESS

Thus the whole atmosphere of our business and industrial life, indeed, would be changed. Neither individuals nor corporations would seek "something for nothing"; neither would seek a maximum of profit for a minimum of service. Gambling and speculation as they now exist in our business world would disappear entirely. In their place would simply be *compensation for services rendered to society, society determining itself what the just compensation would be.* Consequently, all men and groups of men would seek in a spirit of emulation to serve society through creative

labor, either of a material or a spiritual nature. Human values would be kept uppermost and cooperation for the sake of maximizing production would become popular. Private profit as a dominant motive in industry would disappear and public service, the motive which has animated all of the noblest and best of our race, would become almost universal. Consequently, the whole level of the economic life of the masses and with it the level of their personal characters would be lifted.

Wherever there was economic surplus under a régime of mutual service that surplus would be devoted to the common good. It is probably true that no economic organization of society can prevent what we may call "findings," or income which comes not through labor, but from social circumstances or the bounties of nature.⁹ These findings have been very great in our economic age, and for some time to come they should continue to be large through new inventions and the development of natural resources, if from no other causes. If the large part of these findings were to be voluntarily devoted to equalizing the opportunities for education and other forms of social improvement for the less fortunate classes in society, our civilization would go ahead by leaps and bounds; for it is for lack of education and opportunity that these classes now act like a dead weight upon social progress along every line. Now, under a régime of equal service men would be anxious not only to share their surplus for the common good, but even to sacrifice in other ways for one another. If the spirit of the service of humanity controlled our economic life, there would be little danger that our resources might not prove ample to secure an adequate and normal life for

⁹ For more exact definition, see the discussion of "findings" in my book, *The Social Problem, A Reconstructive Analysis*, pp. 159, 160, 176-180.

practically all classes of our population. For the spirit of mutual service and of cooperation would put an end to strife between economic classes and vastly increased cooperation would maximize production. As things are now, the poverty of our world is in large part produced by the great amount of energy wasted by selfish indulgence, by misunderstandings, and by open conflict.

Moreover, *the principle of mutual service would straighten out the whole problem of property and property relations in human society.* Men would no longer regard themselves as the possessors of privileges, but as trustees having obligations to the community and to humanity at large for all the material wealth which was left in their hands.¹⁰ Ample opportunities would still be given for private initiative and ample scope for the exercise of all creative faculties; but the dominant motive would not be the degrading one of personal selfishness but the ennobling one of public spirit. How public spirit may be made to replace selfishness, even in the economic world, is the problem which we shall consider in the next lecture.

But before turning to that problem let us note how the principle of public service would transform our political life. Our politics would become a politics of patriotism in the best sense; its aim would no longer be to promote the selfish interests of certain classes of individuals, but to build up the commonwealth. Officials would regard themselves, not as possessors of personal power, but as servants of the people. Voters would consider primarily not their personal private interests or their class interests, but the welfare of the whole country. Moreover, the various nations, if controlled by the spirit of known service, would speedily disarm, reducing their military and naval establishments merely to police forces. They would unite in cooperating

¹⁰ Compare Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, Chaps. I-III.

with one another to promote world-wide public health, world-wide fair conditions for labor, world-wide utilization of natural resources for the good of all humanity, world-wide education, and world-wide justice and good will.

THE PRACTICABILITY OF THE SERVICE IDEAL

Now, this dream is not so impracticable as it is often represented to be by its critics. No dream which all mankind dream is impracticable, if it is within the possible limits of reality. This dream is clearly within the limits of social reality, because on a small scale it has been realized over and over again within the face-to-face groups of men. The difficulty is in realizing it on a world-wide scale, when there is so little understanding sympathy, and good will among men. To realize it in our civilization at large, evidently we must understand how and use the right apparatus to modify human nature and to control social forces. It is not a mere dream, any more than a pattern for an efficient engine is a dream. We have seen that social efficiency and social progress depend upon cooperation and that cooperation is only practicable in the long run if mutual service to all who are cooperating is involved. The dream of a cooperative society which shall illustrate the principle of mutual service is as scientific as the dream of an engine which shall utilize every known principle of economy in its construction.

At bottom, of course, the realization of such a society depends upon the discovery and the diffusion of adequate scientific knowledge. Human society, we have seen, like the human individual, can make better adjustments only as it learns better patterns for action. We have also seen that at the present time the patterns for action that continue to be taught and used in society are often wrong. We

therefore have a double process of education before us—to unlearn the old patterns for social behavior which have come to us from the traditions of barbarism, and to learn the new patterns which have come to us from the social idealism of religion and from social science. The problem of making practicable the principle of the service of humanity as a pattern or standard for action is therefore first of all a problem of getting that principle universally understood, a problem of education. But the educational agencies of our society are so numerous and so difficult to control, that our problem is still far from solved in a practical sense. How can we give the right social education to the masses of our people? How can all be given moral and religious education of the highest type? Moreover, what is the dynamic which will move men to action even if their mental patterns are right? These are some of the questions which we still have to answer.

CHRISTIANITY A RELIGION OF SERVICE

Let us note, however, in concluding this lecture, that the dream of a human society which should illustrate in all of its relations cooperation and mutual service at their maximum is the dream of ethical religion and especially of Christianity. The service of all, even of the weakest and meanest, the redemption of all human relations, so that they shall be like the relations which we see within the family at its best, was clearly the teaching of Jesus. The principle of service stood out in his mind, unclouded by any doubt, as the principle by which men should live together, not a selfish service within a narrow group but a service as wide as human needs. Jesus may not have used the phraseology and the scientific technique of a sociologist,

but no sociologist has yet been able to surpass his insight into human relations. Nor did he for one minute consider his dream to be unrealizable. He clearly conceived of its realization upon earth among men.

Paul also, the great interpreter of Jesus, had the same clear vision. He also saw the solidarity of men as a fact and that men could live successfully together, therefore, only through cooperation and mutual service. Likening human society to the human body, he stated for all time in memorable words the fundamental principle of mutual service. "The body," he says, "is not one member, but many. . . . If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole were hearing, where were the smelling? . . . And if they were all one member, where were the body? But now are they many members, yet one body. And the eye cannot say unto the hand 'I have no need of thee'; or again the head to the feet 'I have no need of you.' . . . There should be no schism in the body; but the members should have the same care one for another." Again he says: "We are . . . severally members one of another."

Moreover, both Jesus and Paul saw clearly that back of human solidarity and the mutual service which it involves lies a deeper principle; they saw that "out of the heart are the issues of life"; that organization and machinery can accomplish nothing worth while unless back of them is a spirit and an enthusiasm which will give them life and power.

QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION

Is the Christian church willing to make the service of mankind the service of God, and to ask all its members to dedicate their lives and their possessions to that service?

SUGGESTED READINGS

DRUMMOND, The Ascent of Man, Chap. VII.

FOSDICK, The Meaning of Service, Chaps. I, III, VI, and VIII.

KROPOTKIN, Mutual Aid, A Factor of Evolution, Conclusion.

NOVICOW, Mechanism and Limits of Human Association (in *American Journal of Sociology* for November, 1917), Sections I-III.

V

THE PRINCIPLE OF LOVE

In any attempt to build an ideal human world we must sooner or later face the problem of motivation. What will lead men to want a better human world? Take those who are quite contented with things as they are. Why should they wish a change? Granted that conditions may be bad and even degrading for some people, if we ourselves are comfortable and happy, why should we want to change? What should make us desire to change the existing order, when that change may mean for us, moreover, the loss of our comforts and privileges?

Moreover, even if the sociologists have made out that the formula for social progress is the maximization of cooperation and mutual service and the minimization of hostile conflict, how shall the will to serve and to avoid conflict be secured in the mass of men, especially when service may mean individual sacrifice? How shall we create that social good will which will lead men to identify themselves with their communities and ultimately with the Great Community of humanity; which will lead men to prefer the interests of the community, and even of humanity, above their own interests?

THE MOTIVATING POWER OF THE EMOTIONS

Those who hold to the egoistic theory of human nature say that these problems are incapable of solution; but, as

we have already seen, an exclusively egoistic theory of human nature has no foundation in scientific psychology. The truth is rather that these problems have been largely solved so far as theory is concerned; but that they are very far from solved in practical living. Nor will they be solved practically until there is more candid recognition of certain intangible realities in human experience which are all-powerful in individual behavior. The realities to which I refer are the feelings, the emotions, the sentiments, and their associated impulses. Both objectivism and intellectualism in social science ignore the existence or deny the potency of these realities in our social living. But that is the reason why both objectivism and intellectualism fail to present an adequate and workable social philosophy. The majority of psychologists and sociologists, however, are coming slowly to recognize the power of the emotions and sentiments, as well as of ideas, habits, and environmental conditions, over human relations. Thus, as we have seen, Professor Cooley says: "Sentiment is the chief motive power of life and, as a rule, lies deeper in our minds than thought, from which, however, it is not to be too sharply separated."¹ Again, a colleague of mine in Educational Psychology well says:² "Our emotions are the most intimate parts of us; they are back of nearly all that we voluntarily do. At the bottom of nearly every act is love, or hate, or envy, or jealousy, or anger, or fear. *Nothing of great consequence is ever undertaken that does not have back of it some emotion.*"

Now, in other words, this teacher of educational psy-

¹ *Social Organization*, p. 177.

² Pyle, *The Psychology of Learning*, p. 280. (Italics mine.) Compare also the statement of Edman (*Human Traits and Their Social Significance*, p. 128): "All human relations are qualified by the presence, more or less intense, of emotion."

chology tells us that emotions and emotional attitudes are the main source of our motives, especially in affairs of great consequence, and exercise an immediate control over most of our voluntary actions. Yet social scientists and ethicists have been slow to recognize this, and have even been loath to use the names of the emotions and sentiments to describe human motives.⁸ In part this may be due to the fact that the psychology of the emotions and sentiments is only partly explored and is still a field of conflicting theories; but this avoidance of frank reference to the emotions in social theorizing is also due oftentimes to the desire of the thinker to escape the charge of sentimentalism. Hence such terms as "good will" and "altruism" have been preferred by many social, ethical, and even religious thinkers. However, the question remains what makes the will good, and if altruism be defined as action favorable to others, then what is it that leads us so to act? There can be no objection, of course, to using good will and altruism in their proper places, but this should not lead us to avoid the problem of the emotions and of the part which emotions and emotional attitudes play in our social life. In our analysis of motives especially we must get back of habit and even of will to the things which have to do with the control of habit and will.

THE MOTIVE OF LOVE IN RELIGION

Now religion in this matter is somewhat more advanced than some of our superficial social science. For a long time ethical religion has recognized, as we have said, that "out of the heart are the issues of life." What our moralists and social thinkers have called altruism and good will, religion

⁸Scientists generally, as has been well said, have been "too afraid that the product of the intellect would be marred by feeling."

has not hesitated to call "love." It seems to me that there is good reason for retaining this emotional term in our scientific social thinking, especially when that thinking has to do with the practical reconstruction of our world; in other words, when it laps over into the field of social ethics and social religion. "Good will" is an inadequate term to convey to the popular mind the intenser attitude which social science finds necessary to motivate men to lives of service and self-sacrifice. Too often good will is taken to be a more or less contemplative or passive attitude. Even if we say *active* good will, we still fail to fix the attention upon the emotional attitude which must be cultivated in order to secure acts of good will. The same objections may be offered to the word "altruism," which Comte coined as a substitute scientific term to take the place of the word "love." Comte himself found that his new word was inadequate, because it failed to include the emotional side which later in his life he saw it was necessary to emphasize. Moreover, both altruism and good will are terms which have been exposed to much the same criticism as is directed against the use of the names of emotions and sentiments to distinguish human motives.

There is good reason, therefore, for adhering to the traditional language of ethics and religion. It is the language of the common people and may in the long run be less subject to misunderstanding than technical terms. It would be better, in my opinion, to re-define, for the sake of clearness and exactness in our thinking, these terms of ordinary language than to make too large use of invented technical terms. This is especially true when it comes to the presentation of religious truth. The word "love," for example, if it contains the essential idea we wish to convey, should be re-defined in such a way as to make its social and religious meaning clear. This would surely be better than

to discard such a word as love because, like liberty, so many crimes happen to have been committed in its name. Unfortunately we have not, as perhaps the writers of the Greek New Testament had,⁴ different words to cover the different meanings in popular usage of this one word in English. If we hold that the depth of emotion and passion which the word implies even in popular usage is necessary to describe the attitude which will motivate men to service and to sacrifice, nothing seems left for us to do except to re-define the word.

THE DEFINITION OF LOVE

Our task in re-defining the word love in a proper way for social, ethical and religious usage is made more difficult by certain recent developments in scientific speculation which attempt to offer what I may call a purely physical theory of love, namely, that all love is simply a sublimation of the sex impulse. This theory is, of course, particularly associated with the Freudian psychology, although advocated in essence by many thinkers who are not called Freudians. The theory is in contradiction to human experience at many points, as there are obviously many other kinds of love than the love of the sexes. Various ingenious explanations have been devised by the Freudians and others to explain the discrepancies between their theory and the ordinary facts of life. Whatever the ultimate relations between the physical fact of sex and the spiritual expe-

*The reference is to the difference in meaning between the two Greek verbs, *phileo* and *agapao*. The exact distinction between these synonyms is still a matter of dispute among Greek New Testament scholars. It is worthy of note, Professor F. C. Porter of the Yale faculty tells me, that in the original Aramaic which Jesus spoke there were not two words for "love," but only one as in English.

riences of our social life may be, it is safe to say that as yet there is no scientific warrant for reducing even all forms of natural affection to the sex impulse, to say nothing of the higher ethical sentiments. This is simply the old confusion in a new dress between love and lust which has been common in all ages. It is exceedingly to be regretted that certain men in the name of science are now promoting this confusion, because it makes people apprehensive when the word love is used, even in religion. In other words, this theory, as exploited by some writers, drags the name in the dust.

Almost equally bad in its effects upon the popular mind has been the romantic view of love as something necessarily connected with marriage or other sex relations. This is really the same theory as the preceding one, only a loose, popular expression of it. There may be, of course, some justification in popular language for the use of the word love to designate preeminently the natural affection between the sexes; but it has never been the only use, and the tendency of popular writers constantly to use the word love in this romantic sense and to associate it sometimes with questionable forms of social behavior is to be deprecated, because it degrades the popular conception of love.

As against the Freudian psychologists and the romantic novelists, sociologists would offer an altogether different conception of love. They would not deny, of course, that the primitive roots of love, and for that matter of human association, are in the reproductive process. But they would say that it is as absurd to confound love in the social sense with the sex impulse as it is to confound selfishness with the hunger impulse. There must necessarily, according to modern psychology, be some emotional attitude forming in the process of socialization, and there is also necessarily some formed emotional attitude which

represents the relative completion on its inner side of the process of socialization (what I have called the socialization of the heart) when a person comes to identify himself with other persons. What shall we call the emotion which accompanies the growth of each increment of socialization? What is the socializing emotion? What, moreover, shall we call the emotional attitude which leads a person to identify himself with other persons—the social passion which leads one to forget self for the good of others? It is surely important that we have words here to designate clearly to the popular mind the emotional attitudes which accompany and complete on the inner side the process of socialization—words to designate socializing emotion and that complete socialization of feeling and will, which we might call “social passion.” Sympathy, in the broad sense of feeling for others, is a term which may be properly used to cover all of the emotions that are favorable to identifying ourselves with our fellow beings. Love is simply the same process carried to the level of passion, so that it constrains the will to acts of devotion to the well-being of others.⁵ Professor Graham Wallas, in his well-known work on *The Great Society*, has defined love as “the common conscious factor in those dispositions which incline us to benefit our fellows”;⁶ but this is surely, according to the distinction just made, more nearly a definition of sympathy. There can be little objection, of course, to using the word love in such a broad way as to include sympathy, and at times we shall inclusively so use it. But there also is an advantage in having a separate word to refer to sympathetic

⁵ A good psychological statement of the relations of sympathy and love will be found in Edman's *Human Traits and Their Social Significance*, pp. 90-96 and 128-137.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 161.

emotions brought to such a passionate intensity that they control the will.

It is noteworthy that Wallas finds both the significance and the origin of love, in the sense in which he uses the term, in the social process, not in the physiological process: "A certain degree of love," he says, "is stimulated by our perception of other human beings, both generally and particularly when we feel that it is in our power to injure or benefit them. In its origin such love may have been one factor in a disposition inclining us to aid our tribal comrades in hunting or fighting or flight. Introspectively it presents itself as an emotion which may be so weak and vague as only just to reach consciousness, or so intense as to create almost an intoxicating exaltation, and it is accompanied by a conscious desire for the good, either of mankind or a nation or a class, or of some individual."⁷ This may be accepted as a fairly good description of love from the introspective or psychological point of view.

A sociological definition of love will, however, be more helpful to us than a psychological one. From a sociological point of view we may define love, in a broad sense, as *a valuing of, and a devotion to, persons rather than things*. And in this broad sense, love is the only possible basis of right human relations, and hence the only secure foundation for a complex civilization. The opposite attitude, the valuing of things above persons, means the destruction of all higher human relations. It may be objected to this definition that popular usage sanctions the use of the word "love" to express our attitude toward things; but even Aristotle pointed out the absurdity of using the word to designate our *liking* for inanimate things; for, he says, "It is ridiculous to wish the good of things." Social, ethical,

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 143.

and religious thinkers have almost uniformly through the ages used the word to designate *a social attitude*.

LOVE THE SUPREME SOCIAL PASSION

But there may be in our valuing of and devotion to persons a large alloy of selfishness, and hence we also need a definition of love at its purest, to understand it in the ethical sense. At its purest and best love is a valuing of persons for their own sakes without any material benefit to ourselves in view. *It is a social attitude of unselfish, passionate devotion to the welfare of others.* It is this purified love of which religion speaks, and which even the most scientific sociologists must sooner or later recognize as the essentially redemptive motive in our human world.⁸ For love in this sense is social passion at its highest and purest. It is the advent of love in this sense which marks the complete socialization of individual motives with reference to the person or persons loved. And it is surely only love in this sense which is worthy of the name, whether it be the love of friends, of kindred, or of humanity. Even the love of "lovers," of husband and wife, of parents and children is but a mockery unless it is an "unselfish, passionate devotion to the welfare" of loved ones. Religion and ethics have not arbitrarily warped or strained the meaning of the word, therefore. They have simply gone to the heart of its meaning and stripped away its accidental accretions, revealing love at its purest as the divine ideal for human relations. With almost incredible socio-

⁸This does not, of course, preclude the recognition of the legitimate place of other emotions as motives in the social life if they are subordinated to love or good will. As Professor Stratton points out (in *Anger: Its Moral and Religious Significance*), a distinct contribution of Christianity is its enlistment of anger in the service of love and good will.

logical insight, exceeding that of slow-moving science, religion and ethics have gone to the family group for this ideal, and have set up family relations not only as the type for all love, but as the pattern for all social relations among men whatsoever.

It is love in this sense of an unselfish, passionate devotion to the welfare of others which alone is an adequate motive for the mutual service and mutual sacrifice which our human world needs for its redemption. Service which is not motivated by love, but by self-interest or by a sense of duty, either cannot be relied upon or else becomes a sort of slavery. But service, even to the extent of complete self-sacrifice, becomes a joy if it springs from love. This has been the experience of mankind through the centuries, whether the service be rendered to one's friends, one's family, one's country, or humanity. Thus love raises human life to an altogether new level, reconciling happiness and service as ends. Deeper than mutual service and co-operation in human social life, therefore, is mutual love. Service is the normal expression of love, and all genuine love seeks to express itself in service. Love, therefore, is the key to the socialization of human motives, to social good will, and so is the dynamic, which may yet redeem mankind from barbarism if it can be rendered intelligent, and sufficiently increased and broadened. In brief, as St. Bernard said, "love is the lever of the soul."

The main criticism which the more intelligent students of social life have passed against love is that it leads to group selfishness. Notoriously it frequently does so in the case of "lovers" and in the family life. Thus a mother may have an unselfish, passionate devotion to the welfare of her children which we may have to recognize as love at its purest, and that same mother may disregard all the rest of the world for the sake of her offspring. There are

men everywhere who, for the sake of the welfare of their families, of their class, or perhaps of their nation, seem inclined to disregard the welfare of the rest of humanity. We see this contradiction illustrated in our civilization everywhere and repeated on a million-fold scale. Therefore, we are told that love as a social principle breaks down, and that we must go back to some humbler principle, such as justice or the equitable exchange of services. But idealistic religion has perceived this fact and forestalled the criticism by pointing out that the love which is needed to redeem our world is not only the love of one, or of a few, but of all. *It is an all-inclusive love.* The love of our families or of a few friends may teach us what love means, but unless we broaden our love to include all of our fellowmen we shall, after all, be no better than the barbarian world, for even they carry love that far. *It is a universal, inclusive love which alone can socialize in any complete sense the human emotions and will, and so teach men the service of humanity at large.*

CRITICISMS OF THE IDEAL OF UNIVERSAL LOVE

But we have no sooner reached this perception than we are told by certain critics that a universal, inclusive love, or the love of humanity, is a utopian dream. Love, these critics say, is necessarily confined to the small group of persons with whom we have intimate personal acquaintance.⁹ This was Aristotle's view, for example. He says, "You cannot be in love with many at once; it is, so to

⁹This is the position of Kropotkin (see Introduction of *Mutual Aid, A Factor of Evolution*) and of many other social thinkers, but not the view of the best psychologists. Compare the statement of Professor Wallas below; also Edman, *Human Traits and Their Social Significance*, p. 132.

speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object." And he quaintly adds, "besides it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleased with many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really good."¹⁰ In the same spirit Professor Warner Fite says: "Love may be quite real within a relatively narrow circle; and toward our fellowmen in the world at large we may cultivate an attitude of open-mindedness and good will. We may and ought to find a generous pleasure in every enlargement of our sympathies. But to claim that we love our fellowmen simply as our fellowmen is to assert a measure of actual sympathy and comprehension which is absurdly far from real."¹¹

The realistic student of human relations must, of course, sympathize with statements such as these; for superficial consideration of our problem would seem to confirm them. Professor Graham Wallas, who quotes Professor Fite's statement, is, however, I believe, right when he says in refutation: "This is clearly a mistake. It is true that the first-hand testimony of our senses has a peculiar quality in its power of psychological stimulus which is not shared by the second-hand testimony of imagination or memory; but nevertheless love for those whose existence is presented to us only through our imagination may act with enormous force."¹² In other words, Professor Wallas confirms, what we have already pointed out, that man adjusts himself socially largely through his imagination, and that through the development of an efficient social imagination there are no limits to our social adjustment, and so to our love. Like many other things in our world, it altogether depends upon our education. If we are educated in the narrow social

¹⁰ *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Book viii, 1153a.

¹¹ *Individualism*, p. 205.

¹² *The Great Society*, p. 150.

way in which most people are educated we shall in all probability love only, in any real sense, those who belong to our intimate circle of friends; but if our social education includes all classes and conditions of men, our sympathy, and so our love, may be taught to go out to all mankind. *The love of humanity is not a self-delusion.*

However, we may meet here the objection that all such love is purely sentimental, a work of imagination, and cannot endure contact with the real facts of human life and personality, as we find them among the mass of men. Now the scientific temper is realistic, and it must discard anything which concerns a purely imaginary, non-real human world. It is said that this universal love of humanity which idealistic religion teaches is non-real, or at least based upon a non-real conception of our human world. Here perhaps again we may profitably quote Wallas. He asks, "Has this realist conception the same power of stimulating love as the romantic conception? I am inclined to answer that as soon as our conception of mankind starts on the path from romance to realism, its power of stimulating love depends on the completion of its journey. Cynicism is often the result of half-knowledge."¹⁸ In other words, complete acquaintance with our fellowmen—with their origin, condition, and destiny—will be a better foundation for the true love of humanity than any romantic idealism. We need not fear the effects on love of actual contact with life if those contacts are made for the sake of impersonal understanding and unselfish service.

SYMPATHY AND LOVE IN MODERN SOCIOLOGY

In thus pointing to the sympathetic emotions, especially when they are raised to the intensity of social passion, as

¹⁸ *Op cit.*, p. 151.

the key to the development of social good will, I stand not alone, but side by side with the leading psychological and humanitarian sociologists of the present, and, for that matter, since the very beginning of the sociological movement. I have not time to cite passages at length from the works of leading sociological thinkers, but I should like to quote a few typical utterances. If one were to seek a scientific justification of the ethical principles and social ideals of Jesus, indeed, one could not do better than turn to the works of the leading sociologists, with certain exceptions which I will indicate. If one can judge from this general trend in sociology from the beginning, and particularly at the present time, there seems to be little danger that the Christian ideal of life will be overthrown; for that trend is unquestionably toward a re-emphasis upon the importance of the cultivation of sympathy and love in human society as a means of promoting social good will.

It may be worth recalling, first of all, that sociology started with a reaffirmation of ethical love as the foundation principle for human society. Comte's sociology was largely an attempt to find support for the ethical ideals of Christianity in science rather than in theology. Comte saw that the church had been right in teaching love as the great central social principle. His own trinity was love, order, and progress. "Love," he says, "seeks order and urges to progress; order fixes love and directs progress; progress develops order and gives new scope to our love."¹⁴ All nations, he thinks, are aspiring more or less to develop universal love.¹⁵ Perhaps confusing what ought to be with what is, he asserted in his *Positive Polity* that "we tire of thinking and even of acting, but we never tire of loving."¹⁶

¹⁴ *Testament*, p. 90.

¹⁵ *Appeal to Conservatives*, p. 27.

¹⁶ *Positive Polity*, Vol. III, p. 57.

Of course, those who hold to the hard or egoistic view of human nature have little sympathy with views like Comte's. Consequently, after Comte a reaction started against the "soft" views of the Comteans. This was led chiefly by Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx, though a host of thinkers in the social and in the biological and physical sciences followed in their footsteps. In the main these thinkers wished to interpret social evolution in mechanistic terms, or in terms of conflict, or in terms of economic processes. They saw little place in social evolution for the emotions and sentiments, or even, for that matter, for intelligent will. But this materialistic reaction has now nearly run its course. Our pioneer American sociologist, the late Lester F. Ward, was one of the first to assert the supremacy of feeling in determining social processes; and among the feelings he singled out sympathy as the basis of altruism and of social progress. In discussing the causes of progress he rightly stresses the influence of agitators and reformers, but he says, "there must be deeper causes that not only create the agitator and the reformer, but also create the quality of the moral and mental soil in which the seeds they sow will take root and grow. . . . They are many, but may for the most part be reduced to one, viz., the growth of sympathy in the human breast."¹⁷ Ward points out, moreover, the paradox that "reforms are chiefly advocated by those who have no personal interest in them," and thus he recognizes practically not only the possibility, but the actual power, of disinterested sympathy and love in human society.

We have seen already that Professor Cooley's system of sociology, based as it is on a study of the social life of primary groups, such as the family and neighborhood, makes a large place for the emotions and sentiments, and among

¹⁷ *Pure Sociology*, p. 452.

these Professor Cooley would put first sympathy, love, and kindness. He says, "the sentiment of mutual kindness or brotherhood is a simple and widespread thing, belonging not only to man in every stage of his development, but extending, in a crude form, over a great part of animal life."¹⁸ He finds the central fact of human history to be the gradual enlargement of sympathetic social feeling. It is this fact which explains the rise and growth of such movements as Christianity and democracy. The ideals of these movements, he tells us, are not socially impracticable, but are entirely in accord with human nature and with the principles of social life. In a memorable passage he sums up the matter by saying, "The mind, in its best moments, is naturally Christian; because when we are most fully alive to the life about us the sympathetic becomes the rational. . . . To one in whom human nature is fully awake, 'Love your enemies and do good to them that spitefully use you,' is natural and easy, because spiteful people are seen to be in a state of unhappy aberration from the higher life of kindness, and there is an impulse to help them to get back. The awakened mind identifies itself with other persons, living the sympathetic life and following the golden rule by impulse."¹⁹ I take it that Professor Cooley is not here stating merely a passing opinion, but giving us the result of his mature observation of human nature in society.

In a similar spirit, Dr. A. J. Todd, in his well-known book, entitled *Theories of Social Progress*, after quoting Aristotle's maxim that "Friendship or love is the bond which holds states together," goes on to assert,²⁰ "It is not too much to say that a man is just so much of a man as his sympathies are wide. . . . It is not some special quality

¹⁸ *Social Organization*, p. 189.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

²⁰ *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 62.

of altruism or sentimentality, but simple imagination and its correlative, kindly sympathy, that form the basis of social ethics and serious social reform. It is likewise the basis of our whole social organization." To bring about progress, he holds, we must evangelize and educate the individual in this direction, but such education will be futile, he adds, unless intelligent sympathy also controls the material factors in the social situation.²¹ A higher personal as well as a higher social life would result when intelligent love pervades human society; for says Dr. Todd: "We are freest when love and intelligence constrain us to identify ourselves with our fellows."²²

It is, however, Professor L. T. Hobhouse, professor of sociology in the University of London, and probably the most philosophical among English-speaking sociologists, who has best furnished us in his numerous published works with the philosophical justification of love as the central principle of the harmonious and rightly developed social life. "Each personality," Professor Hobhouse tells us, "is itself but a part of a whole and its harmony but an element of a wider harmony."²³ Hence "the moral order implies a spiritual principle which, from its most salient feature, we may call briefly the principle of love."²⁴ In regard to achievement or self-realization in the narrow sense as the end of life, Professor Hobhouse says, "There is a limit to the expansiveness of faculty and achievement where there is no desire to share the fruits with all who can enjoy them. These limits disappear only when we come to the whole world of mind, aware of itself as a unity, bound together

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 547.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 119.

²³ *The Rational Good*, p. 145.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

by love and reason. . . . The ego must find an object because it needs love, and it needs something to connect it with the world of mind. But the world of mind is based on love within, and has nothing without to connect itself with. Thus its end is the achievement and maintenance of harmony within."²⁵ Hence Professor Hobhouse concludes, that "the end must be the harmonious development, not of the individual personality as such, but of all that group with which the individual can enter into organic relations—ideally nothing less than collective humanity."²⁶ Thus Hobhouse finds in love and reason the two connecting or interrelating principles which can make our human world and human experience a harmonious unity. In the human world, however, and in all human relations love has primacy and reason should be its instrument.

Mr. Victor Branford, the founder of the British Sociological Society, has made an interesting study of "St. Columba" to show that it was the principle of love which animated the medieval saints and which enabled them to accomplish such wonders for the world of their time.²⁷ Mr. Branford holds that it is social idealism which alone can make us equal to the task of establishing a just and harmonious social order; but he finds that social idealism in all ages has had its main root in love. Hence love is the dynamic to which we must look for the solution of our social problems and the securing of an ideal social order. "The evolution of idealism in the race," Mr. Branford con-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

²⁷ Compare the statement of Hobhouse (*Morals in Evolution*, p. 580): "The few men gifted with the genius of love which enables them to feel for mankind what ordinary men feel for wife or child, have always stood forth as the teachers capable of inspiring the world with a new gospel."

tends,²⁸ "is paralleled in the individual by the cultivation of love." Quoting a saying of the medieval saints that "it is the property of love to change the soul into that which it loves,"²⁹ Mr. Branford finds in love the means of integrating personality with community, and thus of creating right relations between every individual and the common life. There is possible for us, he tells us, an ideal human world, and this ideal world may be entered by always acting as if we loved our neighbor as ourselves. For sympathy and love, using intelligence, or science, as an instrument, will build in time the ideal human community and change the whole aspect of life from one of suffering and sorrow to one of joy and satisfaction.³⁰

These recent sociological thinkers are thus in substantial harmony with Comte. While emphasizing the importance of intelligence and rationality in all human affairs, they are also not far from agreeing with the affirmative part of Mr. Benjamin Kidd's statement, in his *Science of Power*:³¹ "The cause of human progress is psychic emotion. *The great secret of the coming age of the world is that civilization rests, not on Reason, but on Emotion.*" However, Kidd in his turn failed to give proper emphasis to the equal need of intelligence along with love or good will in our human world, and indeed belittled the part which rationality might play in human society. This was a grave error, but it should not lead us to overlook the importance of his contribution when he emphasized the development and education of the sympathetic or altruistic emotions as the main thing necessary for social progress.

²⁸ *St. Columba: A Study of Social Inheritance and Spiritual Development*, p. 78.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

Thus modern social science by no means despises the part which emotion plays in the making or marring of our social life; and with impartiality it has pointed out that among all the human emotions those that we cover by such words as sympathy and love are most favorable to social progress, most capable of motivating men to make the sacrifices that are necessary to build a world of cooperation and mutual service. Moreover, social science sees clearly that these emotions must be cultivated among the mass of men and made to reach an intensity which will sweep away the obstacles now confronting a world-wide humanitarian program of justice and good will to all men. As I have said in another place, "social science sees in such enthusiasm of humanity the height of social passion and, when guided and controlled by adequate intelligence, the best promise of the world's ultimate redemption."

THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING LOVE

But the sociological skeptic may attempt to impugn the validity of this whole program by questioning the possibility of increasing love and good will much in our human world. Without denying that sympathy and love promote good will and that good will is necessary for enduring social progress, the sociological skeptic might hold that the human emotions are not modifiable in quantity any more than they are in quality. He might hold that our human world has always showed about the same amount of love and hate, and that in the highest civilization hate is quite as much in evidence as among the lowest nature peoples. Therefore, he might argue that the promotion of social progress through the cultivation of sympathy and love, and so of good will, is an illusion.

But such a skeptical attitude is surely deficient in respect for historical and social facts. In spite of the fact that our

human world is still so marred by evidences of hatred and ill will, yet it is undoubtedly true that within the last two thousand years sympathy and good will have expanded enormously. The effects of hatred and ill will in our civilization, indeed, are striking simply because we see them against the background of nearly twenty centuries of the Christian movement, during which there has been continuous though interrupted growth of sympathy and good will in human society. One of the first perceptions that comes to the historical sociologist is the expansion of the consciousness of kind, and with that expansion the growth of sympathy and altruism. Christianity itself, indeed, as a social movement is from one point of view but the latest phase of the expansion of the consciousness of kind and the growth of sympathy or love. We have had a fund of altruism growing in our world, in other words, as truly as a fund of knowledge. Our main difficulty seems to be that hitherto we have failed to unite these two main springs of social progress. We have not put intelligence sufficiently at the service of good will and hence we have not always developed our good will intelligently, and this, I believe, is the main cause of its instability.

We must admit that the cultivation of sympathy, love, and good will in human relations has hitherto proceeded in a very haphazard and unintelligent way. We must also admit that the problem of the development and education of the right emotions and emotional attitudes for an harmonious social life is still largely an unsolved problem. But when once we perceive that for our social salvation we do need more sympathy and love in our human world in order to promote good will, I am sure that we will discover how to secure an adequate supply of these quite as readily as we discover how to increase our food supply or the available supply of electrical energy. Without attempting any

exhaustive study of this problem of the control to social advantage of emotions and emotional attitudes, let us indicate three or four evident ways in which sympathy and love, and so good will, might be increased in human society.

In the first place, the most superficial study shows that men lack sympathy for one another largely because of lack of knowledge of one another and of the different conditions under which each one lives. They lack sympathy, in other words, because they lack understanding, and understanding has for its first requisite the diffusion of accurate and trustworthy information. In general, the fuller knowledge which we have regarding our fellow human beings and the conditions under which they live,—their difficulties, their dangers, their hopes, their aspirations, and their destinies,—the more adequate our sympathy is for them. Moreover, when we understand our interdependence with the remotest of our fellow human beings and how the effects of our thought and conduct at their circumference reach and injure or benefit them, then our sympathy becomes active and an habitual emotional attitude may result which is worthy to be called love or good will. While the connections between intelligence and love are not so close that one is immediately translated into the other (and hence knowledge does not at once issue in virtuous action), yet, on the other hand, it is true that fuller social knowledge expands the consciousness of kind and sooner or later reacts to develop our sympathies. *Indirectly, then, we can control our emotions through the control of ideas.* Hence we have every reason to expect that the development of the social sciences and the diffusion of knowledge, both of social facts and of social principles, which they afford, will of itself tend to bring about more social sympathy and social good will.

Another movement which may work also towards the increase of sympathy and good will among men is the demo-

cratic movement. One difficulty which we have in promoting sympathy and good will in our society is that our whole social life is so split up into narrow cliques, factions, and groups, that there is little opportunity for personal contact and acquaintance between the members of these different groups. Hence there is much opportunity for misunderstanding. A democratic social life which truly promoted the intermingling of all classes should do much to remove this handicap. This means that we should strive to promote active personal acquaintance and personal friendship on a larger scale in our society. The thing which stands in the way of our doing so is largely the aristocratic tradition from barbarian times. At present people are actually afraid of promoting too much acquaintance and friendship between different elements in our society. Witness, for example, not only the color line, but the lines drawn between the different property classes and even between the educated and the ignorant. Our children are still brought up, for the most part, in a most narrow and exclusive way. Parents are actually afraid their children will become friends of those who belong in different social strata from themselves.

Now while there may be some justification for some of the lines drawn in our social life, yet it is evident that if we wish sympathy and love to have full play to redeem our human world, lines must not be drawn the way they are drawn at present between different social classes and social strata. If the goodness of the good is to be of any benefit to our human world, the good must find ways of coming into contact even with the vicious. If the intelligence of the educated is to be of any benefit to the masses of men, the educated must come into personal contact with the ignorant. In other words, the whole aristocratic exclusiveness and snobbishness of our present social, intellectual, and

moral life must be broken down, and people must learn how to come into contact with one another in helpful ways. Friendship must depend not on the matter of class or of narrow cliques, but must go wherever human contacts go. And here I may remark to the critic that there is no danger of pulling down in this way the good to the level of the vicious, or the educated to the level of the ignorant, if contacts are sought for the sake of service. I shall deal with this problem later. At this point I merely wish to deny that there is any danger to culture through universalizing friendship, love, and good will in human society, as is so often contended. It is true, we see again, that our emotions can be controlled indirectly through controlling our association with our fellowmen.

RELIGION THE CHIEF MEANS OF PROMOTING LOVE IN HUMAN SOCIETY

→ Finally, we need to remember that religion is the great means of promoting faith, hope, and love in human society; and that among these three love is the objective, or end, and that faith and hope are means. Through all the ages, as we have seen, the main aim of religion has been to socialize the heart of man, at first in a very narrow way, but finally in Christianity in a universal way. We need to remember that Christianity is essentially a religion of love, and that it seeks to found human society upon love as a social principle. While Christianity is yet far from making love the dominant principle in human relations, yet whenever the Christian movement has most eagerly aimed at doing this it has achieved its largest successes. We have no reason, therefore, to doubt the power of religion to increase vastly the amount of good will and love in our human world. If religion is a form of effective control over the life-moods

of men it can make the dominant tone of our life-mood one of good will to fellowmen.

And religion uses to this end the two great means of faith and hope. We cannot love God unless we have faith in his goodness. Neither can we love our fellow human beings unless we have faith at least in their potential goodness—in the possibility of their redemption. We need, therefore, faith in our universe and in the possibilities of life which religion gives us if we are going to attempt to guide our life by the principle of love. The whole meaning of faith, indeed, is to give support to love. When we lack moral confidence in our world or in our fellowmen, no secure foundation for love is left. Hence by the cultivation of faith in God and faith in men we shall surely, in the long run, be cultivating love also. Faith is an immediate means to love.

And we need vision, or hope, in order to be guided by love. The pessimistic frame of mind is conducive neither to faith nor to love. We need to see what is possible, to know that it is possible, and that we can achieve it. The vision or hope of better things for ourselves and for our fellowmen has always inspired love to put forth its greatest efforts. Hence there is a profound wisdom in the remark of Mr. H. G. Wells that "the human mind has always accomplished progress by its construction of Utopias." A Utopian attitude, in the sense of an attitude of hope or rational optimism, is necessary for any great achievement, and especially for achievement in the way of building a world of good will. It is one of the indispensable functions of religion to inspire hope, that is, to sustain an optimistic attitude toward life and its problems; and it is through the faith and hope which religion brings to men that they are inspired to undertake that work of love which we call "redemptive."

Thus religion is the great educator—the great control—of the human emotions in socially idealistic directions. When once the part which emotions play in human affairs is recognized, and when the need of clear-sighted, intelligent love in all human relations is perceived, then we shall turn to religion as the great educator of the social emotions. We shall see that while science and democracy can help, *yet the final work of educating the emotions so that they shall support social idealism must be the work of religion.* Then, too, we shall see the part which religion may play, not only in helping maintain social order, but in promoting social progress, through the increasing of love and good will in human relations. The world needs more love, not more hate, if its separations, divisions, and open conflicts are to cease. Love is not a matter merely of spontaneous, natural impulse; it may also be acquired. In other words, *love is just as capable of cultivation and control in human society as is intelligence;* and religion may be the chief means of its cultivation and control, because its office is to exercise a control over our life-moods.

THE CHURCH SHOULD TEACH INTELLIGENT LOVE

The Christian church has made no mistake in preaching faith, hope, and love to men, and especially *has it made no mistake in preaching that love and good will should be the dominant attitudes in all human relations.* If it has made any mistake, it is not in doing this, but rather in failing to encourage equally intelligence; for even our sympathetic emotions and good will need to be intelligent for their activities to accomplish the most and the best. Moreover, as I have just pointed out, knowledge of the facts and conditions of human life, when wide and deep enough, awakens sympathy, love, and good will for our fellow

human beings. It has been a grievous error on the part of the Christian church that it has not done more to dispel the social ignorance which envelops our human world. *It is this very ignorance which has rendered the church's message of love and good will oftentimes of little or no value.* Moreover, to preach love and good will without preaching the duty of adding intelligence is often to defeat the very aims of love and good will. For instance, the church throughout the ages taught love and charity toward the poor, but this charity, inasmuch as it was not based upon an intelligent understanding of human nature and the conditions of human life, often defeated itself, thereby in the minds of some discrediting charity and even good will. Hence the church, if it is to use love as a motive, has every reason to insist that it must be an intelligent, clear-sighted love. Therefore, the church should welcome the work of science in its investigations of the laws of human nature and human society.

JESUS EMPHASIZED THE LOVE OF FELLOW-MEN

It is, of course, also true that at times the church has made the mistake of throwing too much emphasis upon love to God and love to Christ, forgetting altogether, or at least slighting, the love of mankind. This has especially been characteristic of those elements of the church that were devoted to mysticism and to the traditional theological aspects of the Christian religion. It need hardly be pointed out that this over-emphasis upon love to God and love to Christ by the church has not followed New Testament teaching, in which we are distinctly told that our love of God is to be *measured* by our love of our fellow-men. Moreover, it is worthy of note that Jesus himself requested his followers, not to *love him* as he had

loved them, but to *love one another*, even as he had loved them. In Jesus' mind, in other words, loyalty to him was to be shown and tested by love for one's fellow human beings. No one would, of course, underestimate the value in the religious life of love to God or of love and loyalty to Jesus himself; but unless that love and loyalty spreads to the great community of mankind it is very far from illustrating the love which Jesus preached and showed in his life.

It is quite unnecessary to say in concluding this lecture that the sociological perception that love and good will should dominate human relations and should be the basis of social organization is manifestly but a repetition of the truth which Jesus tried to teach to men³² and which the church, through all the ages, has tried to preach, though at times hesitatingly and with only a half-hearted faith. For some reason or other the church has felt that it could only halfway trust love as a social principle, but that it must put its trust also in part in the power of the state, and even of armed hosts, and also of accumulated wealth. Surely it is time, when students of human relations speak so clearly and courageously in favor of love as a basis for human relations, that the church also put its trust in this principle and in intelligence rather than in power and wealth.

St. Paul, too, laid equal stress upon the principle of love. Love with him becomes the absolute principle of the moral and religious life; for "love is the fulfilling of the law." Faith expresses itself by love and even service may be a vain and empty thing without love. The reality of all of our professions, the worth of all of our ideals, Paul tells

³²See Papini's *Life of Christ*, especially pages 111-127. "Jesus had just one aim: to transform men from beasts to saints by means of love." (p. 122).

us, is tested by the love which we bear our fellowmen, and no artificial barriers of race, sex, or economic status in any way limit the obligations of all of us to love. It would be well, in the opinion of the most careful students of human affairs, if not only the church, but all the world would listen to these two great leaders of our race. "The world's greatest need, as in the past so today, is to understand and follow the Christianity of Christ."

QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION

Is the Christian church willing to trust the principle of intelligent love in all human relations and attempt wholeheartedly to build organized human society upon it?

SUGGESTED READINGS

ELLWOOD, *The Reconstruction of Religion*, Chap. VI.
COOLEY, *Social Organization*, Chaps. XVI and XVII.
TODD, *Theories of Social Progress*, Chaps. IV and V.
WALLAS, *The Great Society*, Chap. IX.

VI

THE PRINCIPLE OF RECONCILIATION

When Gautama Buddha said, "Hatred does not cease by hatred, but by love," he was stating not merely an ethical principle, but a profound sociological law. It is love, in other words, which overcomes hate and reconciles men to one another; and this is as true of groups as of individuals.¹ But it is not love of an ordinary sort; *it is love which is ready to sacrifice*. All this is so because of the profoundly social and imitative nature of man. Through sympathy, or the contagion of feeling, feelings spread from one individual to another and from group to group; and hateful feelings spread as quickly as kindly feelings. Through imitation, or the contagion of action, behavior spreads from individual to individual, from group to group, and evil deeds are copied as easily as good deeds. Through suggestion, or the contagion of thought, ideas spread from mind to mind, and false ideas are spread as easily as true ideas, if there is no critical reasoning to break down primitive credulity. Hence it comes about that hate breeds hate, love breeds love, strife breeds strife, and kindliness breeds kindliness. Men are fundamentally imitative creatures, and they are apt to treat others as they are treated by others. This social law of action and reaction is fundamental in the moral world. How then can the vicious circle be broken? How can we escape from a world of hate and strife to a world of love and kindly cooperation?

¹ Compare *The Reconstruction of Religion*, p. 172.

BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF HATE

The answer is that we can do so only as we break the vicious circle of the imitation of evil by bringing in some other principle of adaptation. Intelligence especially must lend its aid in order to break the vicious circle. It can give love a better chance. *If intelligence can set the example of love and kindness and truth, and keep that example before the minds of men, then there can be no question but that in the long run love and kindness and truth will win out.* For the superior satisfactions which come from following love and kindness and truth will, in time, be evident to even the dullest mind. We must remember here that our principle works both ways. Love breeds love, kindness breeds kindness, and because these are socially right, they will in time overcome hate, just as truth, because it is right, will overcome error. Love, kindness and truth adjust individuals to the requirements of life in human society. Hence men, all men, will find that they can live by these things and that they cannot live by hate and strife and error. The more fully intelligent our human world becomes the better chance will love and kindness and truth have.

Now our world is manifestly one of strife, as we have already said, at the present time. Race is antagonistic to race; nation is arrayed against nation; class against class; and even individuals often against individuals. A crude Darwinian philosophy seems to have percolated down into the mass of our people and taken possession of the common mind, so that we not infrequently hear all this antagonism and antipathy of races, nations, classes, and individuals justified on the ground that it is a part of the competition of life, and something, therefore, both desirable and inevi-

table.² The sociologist can find no justification for this belief, and even the biologists, for the most part, are now beginning to repudiate this doctrine and to find in cooperation the building principle of life.³ It is not, of course, contended that competition can or should be done away with; but competition does not necessarily mean antagonism and hostile conflict. We cannot get rid of competition in human society, but we can control and regulate competition. Competition, at its best, becomes emulation; and especially on the higher social plane is there little excuse for competition resulting in antagonism, enmity, and conflict. For antagonism, enmity, and conflict initiate destructive processes which tear down instead of build up the social life. They start afresh the circle of a vicious example, and it is only with difficulty that men are recalled to the constructive work of life through cooperation and mutual service.

It is not necessary to go into details at this time. We all know how international politics, instead of being the politics of good will and of international cooperation, is still largely a politics of national self-interest, distrust, and hate. We also know how business too frequently repudiates the principles of love and service and is developed along predatory lines. Even our very family life which

² Compare, for example, the philosophy of a contemporary American novelist, according to Professor S. P. Sherman (*On Contemporary Literature*, p. 91): "In reality, our so-called society is a jungle in which the struggle for existence continues, and must continue, on terms substantially unaltered by legal, moral, or social conventions. The central truth about man is that he is an animal amenable to no law but the law of his own temperament, doing as he desires, subject only to the limitations of his power."

³ Compare Patten, *The Grand Strategy of Evolution: The Social Philosophy of a Biologist*; also the works of Thomson, Jordan, Kellogg, and others.

gave birth to the principles of love and service is the scene only too frequently of antipathy, antagonism, and conflict.

Moreover, even where we have passive good will in society there is frequently such aloofness, exclusiveness, and separation between different elements that the little good will there is rarely ever gets a chance to function. Sooner or later, too, this aloofness results in misunderstandings and conflicts. It must be said, therefore, that cold selfishness, indifferent exclusiveness, and aristocratic snobbishness are doing almost as much to keep our human world a divided world as open antagonism, enmity, and conflict. Thus our human world at the present time seems to be one of hopeless division, misunderstanding, and separateness. How can all this be changed and men become reconciled to one another? They will surely not become reconciled by coldness, aloofness, and exclusiveness, nor by merely passive good will. The wounds of our world are too deep to be healed by any superficial remedy which requires little sacrifice on the part of those who apply it. If hate, antagonism, and distrust are to be overcome, they can be overcome only by a love and good will which costs something to those who manifest it. Love and good will of the passive or contemplative sort can accomplish little in such a world as ours.

Social science has discovered, in other words, no way in which our world can be transformed from a world of egoism and strife to one of fellowship and cooperation except by the sacrifice and suffering of those who have the vision of a better human world. The love which is needed to redeem our world from sin and error, in a word, must be a sacrificial love. It must lead those who have to help those who have not. It must lead the educated and intelligent to give of their knowledge to the ignorant; the good to convey their goodness if possible to the vicious; and the

economically fortunate to share their possessions with the economically unfortunate. If those who have not were always simply innocent victims of circumstances, this might be easy; but the ignorant and the poor, as well as the vicious, share in the general depravity of the social life around them, and not infrequently on account of their ignorance and poverty develop even more unlovely characters⁴ than those who have been more fortunate in their social position. And this is true of the great groups of men, such as classes, nations, and races, as well as of individuals. Hence it is that no sort of lukewarmness will avail much in such a world as ours. It must be a passionate, burning love for our fellow-men who need our help that will reach down and lift up the ignorant, the poor, and the vicious, and undertake the redemption of races and nations backward in the scale of development. We cannot adequately meet such a situation by mere intelligence and good will as those terms are frequently understood. Nor will it help for us to put out of our vocabulary such terms as vicious and good, ignorant and intelligent, rich and poor. The facts remain; and these facts show that there are great gulfs to be bridged between classes, nations, and races before we can have a world rationally united and cooperating for the weal of all. There is no good sense in ignoring the differences which do actually exist in our human world. The question is how these differences can be overcome, how the gulfs can be bridged, how the divisions can be healed.

⁴ It is a frequent remark that "poor people have poor ways"; but considering their usual environment could we expect otherwise? Again, the depravity of the negro is continually pointed out; but what could we reasonably expect from his social situation but depravity?

PRESENT DIVISIONS IN OUR WORLD

This is surely a sociological problem as well as a problem in religion and ethics. For the sociological principle of interdependence leads us to the perception that the present differences and divisions in our human world cannot continue to exist without gravitation taking place toward a lower social level. We cannot have disease, vice, poverty, and crime in a community without those conditions tending to spread to the whole community. This is especially true if those conditions are socially tolerated. And this is true not only of a local community but of a nation, and for that matter of the whole world, for it is rapidly becoming one vast interdependent community. If socially degenerate conditions are tolerated anywhere in our world, they threaten sooner or later to drag down the whole to a lower level. The interdependence of men in a common life is not a myth of the sociological imagination. It is a stubborn fact, and a fact the significance of which is increasing almost hourly. Moreover, human progress has come, throughout all human history, through the strengthening of the weak and the development of the undeveloped. In other words, it has come through a leveling-up process in communities, nations, and civilizations, which has gradually extended the achievements of a few to the masses of men. Progress in our human world must come mainly through the development of the undeveloped resources in human beings, that is, through the redemption of those now low in the scale of social, intellectual, and moral development.

When the facts of our present social conditions are studied no unbiased student would say that the divisions, differences, and even gulfs which I have just mentioned between the different elements in our population have been

exaggerated. Twenty-five per cent of our adult population are still practically illiterate. Fifty per cent are uneducated in even a minimum sense of the term, while only one-third of our children receive any smattering of high school education whatsoever. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research,⁵ more than one-third of the income receivers of the United States had in 1918 incomes of less than one thousand dollars a year, while more than two-thirds had incomes of less than fifteen hundred dollars a year! All students will agree that even this latter amount is inadequate for a decent standard of living. Poverty even in the United States is not only widespread and bitter, but for many it is practically hopeless and hence degrading. The vicious and criminal element in our population numbers millions. In spite of increasing church membership many forms of crime, especially juvenile crime, are increasing. We have no reason for thinking that we are as yet very successful in overcoming even the crudest evidences of barbarism among us as evidenced in our economic, political, domestic, and even recreational life.

Moreover, when we extend our gaze beyond our own nation and civilization we find even more distressing conditions. Europe still presents to our eyes a welter of antagonisms, hatreds, poverty, and misery. Europe seems almost as pagan as Asia. Only one-third of the population of our world is even nominally Christian, and that one-third nominally Christian seems, just now at least, three-fourths pagan. The great tasks of true civilization—of the socialization of mankind—still lie all ahead. We have

⁵See *Income in the United States*, by W. C. Mitchell and others, pp. 134-137. The exact percentages were: under \$1,000.00, 38.74; under \$1,500.00, 72.01. It seems not an unfair inference that roughly one-third of American families had incomes of less than \$1,000.00, while two-thirds had incomes of less than \$1,500.00.

scarcely begun them. But instead of beginning them with cooperation and good will we are forced to begin them in a world of strife, of misunderstanding, and even of hate.

THE NEED OF ENTHUSIASM FOR HUMANITY

All this is no exaggeration even from the most coldly scientific viewpoint; and it shows conclusively enough that what our world needs most at the present time is reconciliation between its misunderstanding, distrustful, warring factions and groups. But this reconciliation is not going to come about easily, because the divisions and differences, the antagonisms and hatreds, of our world are too profound to be readily overcome. Growing knowledge, of course, may help to overcome them; but how is knowledge to grow in such a world of conflict and difference that there is frequently no approach between men, or at least none until we can find some way of again establishing peace and good will, sympathy and understanding? It is our supreme duty in this crisis to be intelligent, but intelligence itself should tell us that the wounds of our world cannot be healed by knowledge alone, and that knowledge may often be used by men to injure instead of to help one another. If the gulfs in our human world are to be bridged, men's hearts must be touched, their motives must be changed. Love must help intelligence as much as *intelligence must help love*.

To work effectively for the redemption of our world from its ignorance, selfishness and sin, in other words, something more is necessary than the cool, understanding intellect. That something more is a deep compassion for men wherever found, no matter what their social, intellectual, or moral condition may be. We need for the redemption of our world a deep enthusiasm for humanity which will gradually spread from the leaders among the masses of our

people. We shall not get the sacrificial service which we need from the educated, from the well-to-do, from every class of the socially fortunate, without this enthusiasm for humanity, this deep compassion for men, this sacrificial love, which will prompt the socially fortunate to share their life, their goods and achievements, both material and spiritual, with the socially unfortunate and backward. *There is no possibility of leveling-up human society without this spirit of service and sacrifice on the part of those who have, and there is no possibility of getting such service and sacrifice without the spirit of sacrificial love.* Our world at the present moment needs the enthusiasm of humanity increased ten thousand fold, at the least, in all of its advanced nations, to say nothing of its backward peoples. The humanitarianism that now exists in our civilization is still too small in amount to leaven the whole mass until it has been vastly increased.

No one can doubt that the spirit of sacrificial love aided by intelligence is equal to the task of reconciling the different elements in our divided world. I would not for one moment have it thought that this spirit of sacrificial love should be confined to the educated and the well-to-do or other socially fortunate classes. On the contrary, I believe that this spirit needs to be equally present and active among the poor, the ignorant, and the socially unfortunate. But it is the socially fortunate upon whom the obligation especially rests to show the spirit of sacrificial love. If reconciliation is to take place among men, the parties that have been socially advantaged by the wrongs in our civilization should be the ones to take the first steps toward reconciliation. It is those who have profited from the present order of things who should be the first to see the obligations that rest upon them and to show repentance for any wrongs which may have been done, either intentionally or

unintentionally. Those who have sinned least, moreover, should see most clearly the need of repentance on the part of all classes, and should not hesitate to lead the way. What, then, are the steps which should lead individuals, classes, nations, and races to become reconciled to one another and live together in peace and brotherly cooperation? Many things might, of course, be emphasized as important in working for a united world. It would be impossible even to catalog all the things which might be conceived by different people to be of importance. I shall mention, however, four things which I believe are of supreme importance if men are to become reconciled to one another and to learn to live together in sympathy and understanding, in peace and good will.

STEPS NECESSARY FOR RECONCILIATION

In the first place, *men must be taught to repudiate force and selfishness as bases for human relations.* As long as self-interest is supposed to be a proper basis for human conduct and for human relations, we shall have force used to maintain those relations, and with the use of force, the pagan philosophy that "might makes right." There is, therefore, no other way out than to repudiate entirely force and selfishness as bases for social organization. None of us believe that right relations in the family can be based upon them. Why should we believe that they can form a basis for right relations in society at large? The pattern for the right relations within the large groups of men must surely come from the patterns of right relations within the small groups. *The principles of social organization are not of one sort for small groups and of another sort for large groups.* Until we recognize this fundamental sociological truth and act upon it we can expect no general reconcilia-

tion to occur in our human world. Men have a right to expect that they will be treated with justice and kindness, sympathy and understanding, in *every* relation of life and not in a few relations. But no assurance of justice and kindness, of sympathy and understanding, can be given where the basis of relationship is either selfishness or force.

In the second place, *mutual forgiveness must be preached and practiced*. Our world is a world of wrongs. These wrongs have not been inflicted altogether by a few upon the many, although the few may be held much more responsible on account of their superior power and intelligence than the many. But the truth is that in the large we have all wronged one another and that we continue to do so. We all have need, therefore, of mutual forgiveness. Vengeance and reprisals are just as much insane proposals for group action as they are for individual conduct. We must replace hatred by love, and the only way that we can replace hatred by love is to teach men to maintain the attitude of love inclusively toward all their fellow men, even toward those who have wronged them. Otherwise, we shall have no basis for a reconciliation between the wronged and the wrong-doer. Forgiveness is not a sign of weakness in social relations; it is rather a sign of the strength of the social spirit. Especially in our age do we need to insist that nations, classes, and races should maintain a forgiving or conciliatory attitude toward one another. This in no way condones the wrong-doing of the past; but it sets all at work cooperatively to repair that wrong-doing. The most effective punishment that can come for wrong-doing to an individual or to a group who have done a wrong is to enter upon and hold to a course of life which will make such wrong-doing in the future impossible. In other words, the true punishment for wrong-doing is to be found in repentance and in the consequent change of heart and life.

Forgiveness for wrongs, instead of conducing to further wrong-doing, has been shown in all human experience to be necessary for the re-entrance upon a life of righteousness. Hence mutual repentance and mutual forgiveness should be preached and taught without ceasing in our world.

In the third place, *men should be taught to identify⁶ themselves in thought and feeling with their fellow men.* We are all, as we have seen, even according to science, members one of another. Until men learn to identify themselves in thought and feeling with their fellow men no matter how remote from them their fellow men may seem, there will be no basis for adequate and enduring reconciliation among men. Now, as I have already said, when we identify ourselves *in feeling* with others, and desire others' welfare equally with our own, or even more, we call this "love." Unfortunately we have no single word to designate the identification of ourselves *in thought* with one another. Dr. Todd has proposed for this identification of ourselves in thought with our fellow men the term "socially efficient imagination," though he himself recognizes that an older term in use is "moral imagination"; and he rightly says that a great part of the moral progress of mankind has come through the increase of moral imagination. Certainly we can have, as we have already seen, no proper love for our fellowmen, and especially not for humanity as a whole without this moral imagination to enable us to identify ourselves in thought, and so also in feeling, with any, or with all, of our fellowmen. *When we learn to identify ourselves with all of our fellows, even with the lowest and meanest, we have entered fully into that larger life which is at once true education and true religion.* This learning to identify

⁶To "identify" oneself with others in the social sense means to recognize the truth which St. Paul expressed when he said: "We are severally members one of another."

ourselves in thought with our fellows, we will find, will rapidly lessen the gulfs which exist between us and them and will make reconciliation with them easily possible. It will prepare us, moreover, for those practical renunciations which may be necessary for the completion of the process of reconciliation. Service and sacrifice will not come so hard for us when once we understand the oneness of ourselves and our fellowmen. Separateness, exclusiveness, and hostility will then become impossible. Now, increased moral imagination is easily capable of being taught and acquired after a certain degree of intelligence has been reached. We have no reason to doubt but that it is in good degree, possible for all men to cultivate and develop such moral imagination. That we shall all learn to perceive the oneness of ourselves with our fellowmen is therefore one of the indispensable steps which must be taken for the reconciliation and reuniting of our divided world.

Put in other and perhaps plainer terms, this perception of our moral identity with our fellow-men means that *we should recognize them always as ends just as we always recognize ourselves as ends*. It means, in other words, the primacy of human values in all of our thinking. Then, we will no longer think of men as "hands," as machines, as impersonal units, or as mere means of any sort, but always as persons who are entitled to the same sort of treatment as we expect and demand ourselves. This perception of our moral identity with our fellow-men makes their wrongs and sufferings our own. It at once gives free play to our sympathy, our passions, and our love, and ends all separateness, isolation, and hostility. To quote again Professor Cooley, "when we are most fully alive to the life about us, the sympathetic becomes the rational; what is good for you is good for me because I share your life; and I need no urging to do by you as I would have you

do by me. Justice and kindness are matters of course." Here, indeed, is the reason for cultivating a socially efficient imagination. Until we learn to keep uppermost in our thinking the essential resemblance and oneness of our fellow-men with ourselves, our sympathy and love for them will not be released. But sympathy and love inevitably follow the consciousness of resemblance or identity, and give rise to that intenser emotional attitude which we have said is necessary for establishing the habit of sacrificial service.

In the fourth place, *men must be taught to share their goods, both material and spiritual, with their fellow-men.* This is the last and greatest test of our social attitude. We have already pointed out that our civilization is still largely dominated by the possessive attitude, which keeps men from becoming reconciled to one another because it is a direct contradiction of the attitude of service or of love. As has been well said,⁷ "the desire to possess is in direct conflict with the desire to share. Keeping possession of that which another needs is a direct contradiction of love." Now, if we really perceive and feel our identity with our fellow-men, we will desire to share with them the things which have enriched our own life. This is a plain corollary of the contributive attitude toward life and, as I have just said, is the practical test of the socialization of character.

THE LEVELING-UP OF OUR CIVILIZATION

It is a commonplace perception of practically every student of our civilization that what our social life most needs today is a more equitable division or distribution of the goods of culture of every sort. The fact is that the whole of our civilization is in much the same situation as

⁷ Hutchins and Rochester, *Jesus Christ and the World Today*, p. 77.

that in which we generally recognize such a country as Mexico to be. We people in the United States who know at all about Mexico know that there are in Mexico as cultured and refined people as can be found anywhere; but we say they form a very small proportion of the population, and that the Mexican masses are sunk in ignorance, poverty, and moral degradation. Now, while we do not in general think of our civilization in this light, yet so it appears to the critical-minded student. I have already pointed out the ignorance, poverty, and moral degradation of the mass of our people, even in the United States, and no one who studies carefully the statistics of social conditions can doubt this. On the other hand, a fraction of our population—a larger fraction, to be sure, than in any other country in the world, but still only a fraction—have attained to a high degree of culture, intelligence, general comfort, and refinement. Now the problem before us is how the level which has been attained by these best elements in our population can be made approximately the general level for all. If the social principle is true, that culture and all the goods of culture come from diffusion from a few pioneers who achieve a certain level and then diffuse their achievements to the many, it follows that what we need is to persuade this upper tenth of our society who possess wealth, education, refinement, privileges, and other goods of culture to disseminate these possessions among the masses. If I am correct in my interpretation of social principles, this can be done without loss of real values either to the socially fortunate or to society at large; for as said in a previous lecture, life is enriched by giving, not by taking and keeping. *Our problem is, therefore, to persuade the privileged few in our society who now possess the goods of culture voluntarily to make a more equitable distribution of these goods.* I do not refer, of course, exclu-

sively to economic goods, but include such goods as knowledge, social ideals, moral and æsthetic refinement, and all other goods which come through advancing culture. To do this at once and directly is, of course, impossible, but it is not impossible to do it indirectly *through equalization of social opportunities.*

SHARING THE WHOLE OF LIFE

The educated few in our society are now, perhaps, anxious to diffuse the knowledge and intelligence which they possess among the masses. At any rate, we are as a people waking up to the importance of doing so and seem in a fair way to dispel at least the densest ignorance among the mass of our people. We are, however, only just at the beginning of this great cultural undertaking, and the ignorance of the great majority still remains, it is seen, appalling, especially their social ignorance. Through the church and other agencies, too, we have been trying to take to the masses the highest ethical and religious ideals, but on account of the barriers both of ignorance and poverty we have made, we must confess, as yet little progress. However, there is no lack of desire on our part to share our spiritual ideals. But our love apparently does not go deep enough to make us want to share the more substantial things of life. Therefore, in a certain measure, we undoubtedly deserve the rebuke of Tagore when he said,^a "Do not be always trying to preach your doctrine; but give yourself in love. Your Western mind is too much obsessed with the idea of conquest and possession, your inveterate habit of proselytism is another form of it." *It is perfectly evident that the reconciliation of men to one another can never come merely through the sharing of knowledge and of*

^a Quoted by Dr. Sherwood Eddy in *Facing the Crisis*, p. 159.

spiritual ideals, important as that may be, but only through the sharing of the whole of life and of all the goods of culture. We must, therefore, turn to the economic side when we consider in all sincerity what this doctrine of sharing our lives with others may mean in a practical sense.

Now, communism, in the sense of the common ownership of all property,⁹ is doubtless both impracticable and undesirable in a complex society like our own. But something of the spirit of communism must pervade our whole social life if it is ever to be right. We must be willing to share what we have with others for the sake of the common weal of all. We must be willing to use whatever we possess to raise the general level of welfare in our community and in the whole world. *We must, in brief, hold our goods and our very lives in trust for service for our fellow-men. That is the contributive attitude toward life.* And this can not mean for us a mere empty ideal, but *an actual working program for daily living.* For individuals it means the giving up of luxuries and even of comforts and necessities in order to share with others if thereby we may help others to attain to a better life. It means with reference to business and industry that every business and industry shall be so conducted as to diffuse its gains and prosperity in the whole community. It means in political life, that power shall not be the end striven for by either parties or nations, but rather the welfare of humanity. Now, until we can get among our privileged classes this attitude of sharing power, privileges, wealth, and all the goods of culture among those who are less fortunate than they are,

⁹ Communism in this strict sense never existed among any people, and least of all among peoples of high economic development. See Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 205-233. As Lowie says, "While full-fledged communism, to the exclusion of all personal rights, probably never occurs, collective ownership . . . is common."

I see no way of reconciling individuals, classes, nations, and races. We must not only think and feel as one; we must be one in practical living. We must learn how to share our life and whatever good we have achieved with others.

Put in plain terms, this means that our socially fortunate classes must be willing to give up their luxury, their selfish indulgences, their exclusive privileges, and their aristocratic aloofness from the mass of their fellow-men. That this is not being done at the present time on any considerable scale we realize at once when we are told that one-third of all the income of the people of the United States is spent for luxury,¹⁰ and that even for such a luxury as tobacco, much more is spent than all that is spent on education and religion combined. Now, of course, it would be wrong to say that this self-indulgence is confined to our wealthy, educated, and privileged classes; but these classes set the standard for the rest, and if they would accept in any concrete and real sense the doctrine of sharing their possessions with those who are less fortunate than themselves, they could, with their surplus alone, without even encroaching upon their comforts, furnish the opportunity and the means for the development of the intellectual, moral, and economic life of the masses, so that within a comparatively short time, the terrible contrasts in our civilization would disappear and there would be an approximately equitable distribution of the goods of culture.

Take the matter of education alone. If the amount now spent for education were trebled in the United States, it

¹⁰ This is the estimate of the Treasury Department of the United States government for the year 1919. It has often been questioned, but is the most reliable estimate available. See *School Life* for April, 1921; also *Christianity and Economic Problems*, Kirby Page, Editor, Chap. 5.

would secure opportunity for a high school education for practically every boy and girl able to receive it; it would do away entirely with our twenty-five per cent of illiteracy and with our fifty per cent of practical lack of education. It would make it possible to train all our young people adequately for useful service in life, and to dispel, to a great degree, the social and political ignorance which now enshrouds the mind of the average citizen, and to give them all the moral and religious education which we will discuss in the next lecture. It would practically equalize educational opportunities for all classes.

This is only a single example of what needs to be done along every line to insure a minimum standard of intelligence, health, income, and generally decent living conditions for the great majority of the people. In spite of our immense war debts, the surplus of the economically fortunate elements of our population would enable us to undertake in a practical way even now some such general program for the equalization of opportunity and for the promotion of the welfare of all classes if these economically fortunate elements would consent to the higher taxation of their economic surplus. We must remember, too, that this surplus comes very largely not from earnings through effort, but from "findings" that come to the economically fortunate through circumstances which have been created by nature and by society rather than by their own efforts. If the doctrine of sharing—of a contributive attitude—were accepted in a practical way by our socially fortunate classes, there would be little objection on their part to the taxation of these findings or of any economic surplus in order that the mass of men might have opportunities for a better life. They would be willing to contribute their goods and their life to build up a better life and a better world for all. It is not, of course, possible to do this alto-

gether or even chiefly through governmental action and through taxation. The church and other great cultural and socially uplifting agencies have an equal claim upon this economic surplus along with government. But practically every great cause for the improvement of human conditions at present lacks adequate financial support, while, as I have said, our people are spending one-third of the total national income for unnecessary luxuries. Until we can get a "right-about-face" in this matter among our socially fortunate classes I see little hope for the reconciliation of men one to another.

THE NEED OF STRENGTHENING THE RELIGIOUS MOTIVE

Personally, I do not believe that any such "right-about-face" in regard to sharing our goods and our life with our fellow-men can possibly be brought about without a great strengthening of the religious motive among men. We have already said that we need faith in God in order to have faith in men and in the possibilities of life. We need, too, love and loyalty to God in order to develop the highest sort of love and loyalty toward our fellow-men. A doctrine of sacrificial love and of sacrificial service will not go far, even with the best of us, unless there is a deep religious motive behind it all. The religious motive has prompted the supreme manifestations of sacrificial love and service in human history, and there is little hope of a spirit of sacrificial love prevailing in society without the religious motive. Of course, we have had much religion which has failed to give men the spirit of sacrificial love and sacrificial service. That I recognize; but I would contend that religious emotion and conviction must reinforce our love and service of our fellow-men if it is to be carried to the

point of self-sacrifice, and especially if it is to be done consistently and on a wide scale.

Many will, of course, say that even religion is powerless to effect any such voluntary revolution in our social order as I have outlined, that even religion cannot substitute for self-interest and force as the basis of our social order love and good will and mutual service. I would unhesitatingly agree with Kidd, however, in holding that a vital social religion would be equal even to this task. The emotion of the ideal, as Kidd calls it, or the religious motive, as I would prefer to say, is capable of any task which conscience sets before us. It is true that humanity cannot live always in a state of emotional exaltation and that perhaps we have little argument from the voluntary self-sacrifice of men for their country in time of war; but human experience shows that the most astonishing self-sacrifices can be made by the ordinary mass of men in time of peace under conditions of proper social discipline and with sufficient vision of some ideal to be realized. And, as I have already pointed out, the most astonishing things are done by men, not from selfish motives, but when their altruistic impulses are properly appealed to.

Yet I think we must all admit that if we are to attain permanently to a social order which will repudiate self-interest and force, and which will illustrate sympathy, love, and solidarity among men, it will have to be brought about mainly by a process of education. We will have to educate people to identify themselves in thought and feeling with their fellow human beings and to share their possessions with them to promote the common weal. We can surely educate society away from its present pagan standards to a more social and Christian way of living together. Mr. Kidd thinks, as we have said, that this can be done in the short space of one or two generations. Theoretically this

is so, but there are practical difficulties in the way which will appear when we consider the matter of religious and moral education for all of our youth. However, it is undoubtedly true that an education which would establish a social order of peace, justice, and good will among men can be brought about in a much shorter time than some suppose, if we could secure some degree of unanimity and cooperation among scientific, educational, and religious leaders.

CHRISTIANITY A RELIGION OF RECONCILIATION

While I would not pretend to be competent to interpret the New Testament, it seems to me that the doctrine of reconciliation which I have presented from the viewpoint of social science is no different from that which Jesus taught. Jesus taught that the reconciliation of men to one another must be through sacrificial love. Jesus' whole teaching was essentially a gospel of reconciliation—reconciliation of men to God and of men to one another. In Jesus' mind, this reconciliation between God and men, and among men, was one process, with sacrificial love and service dominating the whole. Jesus did not conceive that this process could go on without suffering on the part of those who undertook to carry it through, as his own life and death, as well as his teachings, attest. He saw clearly that the world could not be redeemed from its pagan standards except by the sacrifice of those who shared his vision of a Kingdom of God on earth. Therefore, he called upon his followers to renounce their possessions and their possessive attitude. "Whosoever he be of you that doth not renounce all his possessions, he cannot be my disciple." Jesus did not mean by this, I take it, to make renunciation an end in itself, as apparently Buddhism makes it. But

he saw that renunciation was necessary if sacrificial service and love were to rule our lives. Love was to be the inviolable rule of life. Therefore, we should return good for evil, though Jesus does not, it seems to me, prohibit all use of force in the hands of love, as, for example, in the exercise of the police power by a humane government. But sacrificial love was in his mind the effective means for overcoming evil, for reconciling men to one another, and so for redeeming our human world; and he sealed this belief by his sacrificial death on the Cross. No literalistic or legalistic program was his for the redemption of the world, but only a change in the human heart—the perfect socialization of that heart toward both God and man.

This is surely no impossible program, but the consummation toward which all human history has been working. No one can doubt that a Christian world, as Jesus conceived it, would soon bring about complete reconciliation among individuals, classes, nations and races. Misunderstandings and conflicts might, of course, still be possible, even in a Christian world, but these could not develop into the fixed antagonism, enmities, and separations which we now witness; for in such a Christian world an abounding love would soon heal whatever differences might arise among men. It is only such a world which will be found practicable in the long run if men are to live together in the close contact and with the limitations of natural resources which the social and cultural evolution of the future would seem to make inevitable. *We must have a Christian world, or we shall have social chaos.*

QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION

Is the Christian church willing to sacrifice itself in order to save the world?

SUGGESTED READINGS

ELLWOOD, *The Reconstruction of Religion*, Chap. VIII.

HUTCHINS AND ROCHESTER, *Jesus Christ and the World Today*,
Chap. IV.

NOVICOW, *Mechanism and Limits of Human Association*, Section IV.

VARIOUS WRITERS, *The Return of Christendom*, Chap. VII.

VII

THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

When we learn from a great religious journal¹ that "seven out of every ten children and youth of the United States are not being touched in any way by the educational program of any church," we see how far the problem of religious and moral education is from solution in a practical sense. When, again, we move among experts in moral and religious education and learn their lack of agreement, we see how far the problem is from solution even in a theoretical way. Moreover, the church seems to be the only institution which seriously concerns itself with the solution of the problem. Notoriously, many Christian homes are negligent of the Christian education of their children, though it might rightly be contended that the home is the best fitted of all institutions to give such education. The public school is scarcely concerned seriously as yet with the problem of the religious and moral education of its pupils, and on account of the separation of church and state in our society, it seems incapable of doing much toward its solution.

INADEQUACY OF PRESENT RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

We are perhaps justified in concluding, therefore, that religious and moral education is in a worse way among us

¹ *The Christian Century*, Oct., 1922. But see also Brown, *The Church in America*, p. 289.

than any other form of education. Even vocational education receives more general and serious attention and is further on the road toward solution. The reason why we have not made more advances in religious and moral education is partly due to our failure to realize its immense importance; but it is also due in part to our failure to understand the psychology involved in such education and to the stereotyped and traditional methods which have been followed. In this respect, religious education is, to be sure, not peculiar, because stereotyped and traditional methods burden practically every phase of our educational work. We are still in the toils of the obsession that our schools have only to adapt their pupils to a static world or a fixed order of things. In education in general we scarcely have as yet, Dr. Todd says,² "a vision of a world in the making, of an evolutionary process in which we are active agents, of a social order which we may help to transform into something better"; and this fault of our education in general characterizes still more disastrously our religious and moral education. We must, of course, set to work in religious and moral education, as in other education, to free ourselves from the shackles of mere traditionalism and base our program upon adequate scientific knowledge. The subject of religious education is manifestly much too large even to outline in a single lecture, and the most that I can hope to do is to touch upon some salient points in order to stir up thought in certain directions, and to indicate the solution.³

² *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 377.

³ The whole question of religious education has been so fully and ably treated by a host of writers, such as Athern, Artman, Betts, Coe, Cope, Soares, Weigle, and many others, that it seems a work of supererogation for me to speak of it at all. The best single treatise available at present is probably Professor Coe's *Social Theory of Religious Education*.

With our religious and moral education still so deplorably inadequate, it is disheartening to find that the present crisis in the world's affairs emphasizes the need of such education as almost never before. It is becoming increasingly evident to all thoughtful minds that if modern civilization is to emerge from its difficulties, a different sort of education is needed by our young people, one in which moral and religious education will be the main thing emphasized. We are beginning to see that education must reach not merely the intellect, but the will and the emotions. But even those who agree that this is so are not agreed as to how the will and the emotions are to be educated for the attainment of a progressively better social order. Not a few are distinctly skeptical as to whether such a thing is possible. They would confine religious and moral education to the stereotyped patterns of the past which strive only to secure the adaptation of the individual, through precept and discipline, to the moral order which is already realized. These people would discount any attempt to educate our youth into social idealism as dangerous or perhaps impossible.

It would seem, however, that science has so clearly taught most of us that ours is an evolving world, that we might agree that the aim in religious education, as in all education, should be to teach the pupil to solve problems for himself, the problems of the moral and religious life, and not simply to adapt himself to the present environment, but to work for the creation of a better environment which may be realized in the future. *Religious and moral education should look ahead, not backward.* If this is true, the traditional religious education of the past, which consisted in Protestant churches almost entirely in the study of the Bible, will no longer answer today. It is not that the Bible has lost any of its value for our civilization,

but that we need in addition today to put the guidance contained in scientific knowledge back of the ideals of the Scriptures. I have elsewhere said,⁴ "It is idle to think that anyone can become moral and religious in a rational way without the study of the great masterpieces of ethics and religion. Now, the supreme religious masterpieces of our cultural tradition are embodied in that unique collection of literature which we term the Bible. The ethical and religious value of the Bible, especially the Gospels, for the establishment of Christian civilization cannot be doubted. Other things being equal, a people will be Christian directly in proportion to the attention which they pay to the teachings of Jesus as found in the Bible." Let it be understood, therefore, that I would give the Bible a very important and central position, as the source book of our religious and ethical ideals, in our moral and religious education. But I cannot but agree with Professor Coe when he says⁵ "the spirit of Jesus is so forward-looking, so creative, so inexhaustible, that the Bible cannot possibly be a sufficient text-book of Christian living." *A religious and moral education, adequate for our day, must utilize all available material for religious and moral education, and especially must it incorporate scientific knowledge of human nature and of the actual conditions in which men live.*

USE OF THE EMOTIONS AND IMAGINATION IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

But how is it to touch the emotions and adequately to motivate the will? Oratory and preaching are discredited by many. A common remark among our young people is

⁴ *The Reconstruction of Religion*, p. 152.

⁵ *A Social Theory of Religious Education*, p. 315.

that they do not care for any "sermonizing." The ordinary methods of presenting religious and moral truth in the past through precepts and through hortatory appeals are discounted today, not only by the public, but often by educational specialists. A graduate student in education, who has been studying under me, says: "I would make place for a certain small amount of preaching, but not the general, wholesale amount of it which we have today. There is a tremendous amount of energy wasted in the church." This is not an infrequent attitude among educational specialists, and is in part justified by past experiences. However, I believe that what this student objected to at bottom was not preaching, but a certain style of preaching which we no longer find effective under modern conditions. There is still a place in our education and in our public discussions for the emotional appeal, provided that it is adequately based upon facts and directed to stirring the right emotions. Evangelism, especially social evangelism, must remain the crowning work of the church.⁶ To recognize clearly that there should be an emotional element in adequate religious and moral education, must not be confused, however, with the emotionalism which has so often characterized preaching and religious instruction in the past.

It is not true that we can only learn by doing. Many of the things which we wish children most to learn cannot possibly be taught by doing.⁷ To restrict our religious education to learning by doing is to make it as static as the most dogmatic religious instruction of the past. How

⁶ See Chapter XI, especially pp. 290-299 of *The Reconstruction of Religion*, also pp. 179-181 of this chapter.

⁷ Many of those who advocate "learning by doing," however, would include "thinking" in "doing." I would protest only against a narrow interpretation of this phrase. We learn by the imaginative rehearsal of activities as well as by the actual practice of activities.

can we teach, for example, children the sacredness of the marriage bond, the value of a stable family life, and the importance to themselves and to the world of parenthood by "doing"? These are not extreme illustrations. The fact is that the most important things in education cannot possibly be learned by doing. They must be learned through the imagination. *In social adjustment, imagination is as important as actual experience.* It is the socially efficient imagination in the child as well as in the adult which makes possible moral advancement. And the socially efficient imagination is impossible without the enlistment of social sympathies. Sympathetic imagination becomes, when properly trained, a socially efficient imagination. In abstract terms, I would say at once that *the proper training of the imagination in a social direction and the proper awakening of social sympathy is the key to religious and moral education.*

USE OF THE SPOKEN WORD IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Let us recall that man is an animal who adjusts himself to situations mentally, that is, by the use of mental patterns. These patterns are not mere replicas of actual experience, but often show the work of constructive or creative imagination. They have to do, not with adjustment to a fixed world, but with the creation of a new world which will be the achievement of man. Moreover, let us remember that the method of adjustment in human groups is through intercommunication; social intercommunication carries the mental patterns which have been approved by the group or by its leaders from individual to individual. This network of social intercommunication forms a large part of the real social environment of the individual. It is the key, at least so far as it carries the standards or mores

of his group, to much of his behavior. It is much more powerful in influencing his behavior than most situations in the physical environment.

Now if this analysis of the process of social adjustment is correct, then the main means of social adjustment are the pattern ideas which are communicated from mind to mind usually through language. Our social inheritance of ideals must be the basis of all religious and moral education. Language is the vehicle of social tradition by which this social inheritance chiefly comes to us. Social inheritance has nothing to do with biological heredity or with natural selection. It is that which each generation learns from a preceding and teaches to a succeeding generation, and the main method of learning in mankind is through the intercommunication of ideas. These ideas, to be sure, need to be presented in a certain way in order to become the actual patterns for action in individual behavior. The point which I now wish to emphasize is that the web of intercommunication is the chief element in the psycho-social environment of the individual, and that patterns for action, in so far as they are not individual inventions, are mainly derived from this environment.

Hence youth may have all the vision and wisdom which age and experience can bring if youth is rightly taught. Human society is not, as some have said, necessarily handicapped by the constant succession of generations. That depends upon what kind of facilities youth has for learning the vision of the past. It is true that youth is inexperienced, and that inexperience accounts for many of its mistakes and sins. On the other hand, it learns more rapidly than age, and its own unaided alertness and forward-look enable it to perceive many of the mistakes of the past. The youthful mind must not, therefore, be handicapped by too dogmatic and stereotyped instruction. Rather it must be

awakened and educational methods must be devised that will wake it up. This awakening, we are now beginning to see, must be threefold; it must consist not merely in intellectual training, but in the awakening of social sympathies and altruistic actions. In the search for these new educational methods let us not forget that man adjusts himself to his world and to his fellows not merely through experience with hard facts, but also by means of his imagination. It is sympathetic or moral imagination which enables youth as well as adults through what we commonly call "taking thought" to make the higher social adjustments.

Now this fragmentary analysis, from a social point of view, of the learning process shows clearly enough the part which socially prevalent ideas, ideals, and values play in the learning of the individual. It shows clearly that man may be largely controlled by what we call "propaganda"—that is, by the ideas, ideals, and values presented to him by his social environment. The age-long reliance of political parties, religious sects, and practically all social movements upon these "spiritual weapons" for furthering the particular causes which they represent has, therefore, not been a mistake. But the social propagation of ideas, ideals, and values in our modern scientific world can succeed only if it conforms to certain methods which science and common experience alike show to be sound.

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

In the first place, it is no longer possible in our world to convey ideas to the mind of our youth simply upon the basis of tradition or authority. The spirit of our age demands that our ideas, ideals, and values be founded upon facts. This is as true of religion and moral ideas as of any other sort. Our youth ask, when we seek to teach them

these ideas, whether they correspond to the facts of life. Reasonable demonstration of the truth of ideas and ideals we teach is necessary if we wish them to be supported by the spirit of our age, which is the spirit of science. This is just as necessary in religious and moral education in the church school as it is in the laboratories and class-rooms of a university.

In the second place, the rational faculties must be trained in religious and moral education just as much as in any other education. This is implied in what has just been said, but I mean in addition that processes of careful thinking and critical reasoning must be developed which will stand the test of open publicity. Such careful thinking and critical reasoning can be developed only by some form of discussion. Discussion between teacher and pupil is valuable, but the discussion will be of even more value if it is participated in by the members of a group who are encouraged to criticize each other's statements. In the social sciences, such group discussion has been found to be an invaluable means of education; and so it will be found in religious and moral education. Each group member is thus taught not only to think for himself, but to think so that the results stand the test of public criticism by his fellows.

In the third place, religious and moral education must be systematic and organized just as much as any other form of education. I mean by this that it must clearly teach central and subordinate truths in their relation to one another so that the mind will clearly see their relation and their interdependence. So far is this from being done at the present time that it is notorious that the pupils of our Sunday schools have frequently no clear idea even of the central principles of Christianity. So much religious and moral instruction is fragmentary, occasional, and hap-

hazard that it accomplishes little toward the symmetrical development of either the mental or the moral life. System and organization in instruction, if properly carried out, are not opposed to the attainment of that freedom and creativeness which we have already said must be one of the aims of sound religious and moral education.

In the fourth place, religious and moral education must connect itself, if it is to develop character, with the practical activities and interests of life. This is as true for the child as for the adult. The child does not live a life separate from society, but lives in society as well as the adult. Religious and moral education must aim at getting the child to function rightly in his natural, normal, everyday interests and relationships. The child must be taught that religious beliefs and moral ideals are to come into play in all the relationships of life, in the home, on the street, and in school. Especially should the child be taught to Christianize home relations; for the child must get its initiation into the larger social life through the home and the family, and it is in these home relations that the Christian principles of sympathy, love, kindliness, service, and self-sacrifice can be best exemplified and illustrated. Here, indeed, learning by doing or by practice is possible in religious and moral education. So, also, in the activities of neighborhood life and in the school; if the child can be taught to practice his religion in these everyday relationships and activities of life, there will be little danger but that he will get firmly established in his mind the right patterns for action in the larger social life of which he can have but little experience until much later. Thus can all the legitimate interests of life be idealized and ennobled by religious meanings and values and a firm foundation laid for a character whose dominant note will be social idealism.

MOTIVATION IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

But how, it may be asked specifically, can such religious and moral education be given? What, specifically, should be the means employed? If religious and moral education is no longer to be given dogmatically or upon the basis of authority, what motives should be appealed to and what means used? The reply is that religious and moral education, even in the Sunday schools of our churches, must become scientific like any other form of education. The motives appealed to should be the same as in other sound education. Religion and ethics have to do with personal and social attitudes, with character and conduct, with the individual and his relationships with other individuals. If religious and moral education is to become scientific, quite evidently it must find its bases in the sciences of human nature and of human relations; in other words, in the psychological and social sciences. Education, if it is effective adjustment for living, must necessarily initiate the learner into a participation in the social consciousness. It cannot disregard the spirit of the age, but must utilize the motives which dominate our civilization and determine our social consciousness. It must appeal to these motives to establish social righteousness. Now the social consciousness of our age obviously centers about two great movements—science and democracy. The search for truth and for social redemption distinguish the motives of our age from those of many, though of course not all, preceding ages. They are the great dominant motives of our time, and it is the sheerest folly for religious education to fail to utilize them. The challenge which is given to religion today is the challenge of science on one hand and the challenge of modern social unrest on the other. If religious education is to continue to be directed to the maintenance

of a dogmatic traditionalism, especially to sustain a system of doctrines originating in pre-scientific times, then it is bound to fail to help the individual, and it is bound sooner or later to bring disaster upon the church.

The challenge of science and the challenge of democracy to religion deserve thoughtful consideration and respect on the part of all of those engaged in religious work. The passion for truth and the passion for social redemption which science and democracy stand for are among the noblest of human motives and afford the best promise for the early achievement of a civilization better than we have yet realized. Religious education should make the fullest possible use of these motives. If religious education cannot explain how established knowledge may form a basis for religious faith and how Christianity may have a part in the making of a better human world, then there is every outlook for religion playing a diminished part in our social future. For our children will discover when they go out into the world that it is established knowledge and aspirations for social justice which control enlightened men to-day.

It may be said in opposition, and indeed it is often said, that the individual has little interest in abstract truth or in the world's salvation; that what the individual is interested in is his own spiritual consolation and his own personal salvation; that the primary motives, accordingly, which religious education must appeal to are self-interest and the desire for spiritual consolation. But this is a great mistake—one of the great mistakes of the church of days gone by. There is, on the contrary, no passion in man which is deeper than the passion for truth. So powerful is it that we may safely trust that where the appeal is to men's sense of truth, that appeal is bound finally to win, no matter what the obstacles in its way may be. Again self-interest, even

though it be interest in one's own spiritual salvation, has never been able to awaken the enthusiasm which interest in the welfare of others has done. It is the salvation, the happiness, the welfare of others—ultimately of humanity—which awakens the deepest enthusiasm and devotion of the human soul. This is particularly true the more socially enlightened and educated we become.

The motives to which religious education should primarily appeal accordingly are the love of truth and the love of right or social justice. These are also the motives in control of the scientific and the democratic movements of to-day. There ought, therefore, to be no insurmountable difficulty in getting children and adolescents to see that there is no chasm between their religious and their scientific life, on the one hand, and between their religious and their social and political life on the other. The church must not teach them that truth is one thing in science and another thing in religion. It should teach them that truth is one, and that knowledge and intelligence are to be welcomed in religion not less than in science. Intellectual honesty must be recognized as the foundation of both the moral and the intellectual life.

When once religious education is put firmly upon this basis of open-mindedness and intellectual honesty—the same as any other phase of education—many problems in religious education will be far on the way to solution. For example, the doubts natural to children and adolescents will be welcomed as a natural means of religious as well as of intellectual growth. Honest doubt will be seen to be a natural means to the development of a sincere religious life—as the only way to develop forward-looking, personal religious convictions rather than mere traditional, institutional attitudes. The Protestant denominations in particular should remember that the chief reason for their existence

is to encourage independent thought in religious matters, and that once they cease to encourage their members to think they have lost all good reason for their existence. Thus liberal religious education, like other liberal education, should aim not to teach pupils what to believe, but to teach pupils to think, and to think independently, so as to arrive at reasoned convictions of their own. In this way will the strongest type of personal religious character be built up.

Deeper, perhaps, even than the passion for truth is the passion for social redemption in the modern world. It is the challenge of modern social unrest which is the outstanding challenge to the religion and religious education of our day. The motive of redemption is preeminently the religious motive of our age, not mere personal redemption, but the redemption of our human world. Unless the mystic and the theological elements in religion can be shown to work for the practical social redemption of man, they will appeal but little to the modern mind. In general, mysticism and theology should be subordinated in religious education to the motive of redemption. The motive of redemption would demand of religious education that it stress all practical knowledge which bears upon the making or marring of human character and human welfare. The motive of redemption would stress knowledge of the actual condition of men and of the conditions under which men live. It allies itself naturally with science, but with social rather than with physical science.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

To utilize fully the prevailing passion for the social redemption of our world, religious education must enlist the aid of the social sciences. It must place in the hands of the child and the adolescent the social information which they

need in order to understand their place and their work in our human world, and how they may affect the lives of others by what they do. The child must be taught to see himself as a unit in a vast complex system, but a system which man has made and can remake through the power of public conscience, and in the making of which every individual may have a share. Thus will his responsibilities as a Christian citizen be brought home to the individual, and public spirit and social idealism be awakened within him.*

The key to a scientific religious and moral education, then, is to be found in the union of instruction in religion and ethics with instruction in the social sciences. There is no other possible way to proceed in religious and moral education after we have once given up dogmatic or authoritarian methods and have acknowledged that religion concerns not another world, but the life which men live here and now. As soon as we acknowledge this, we necessarily make religious education a phase of social education. *It is social education carried to the plane of the ideal and energized by socially idealistic emotional values.* It is, moreover, as I have already said, the only sort of social education which is adequate to meet the crisis which confronts our world; for it is the only sort of education which is adequate to produce social idealism. We must have an intelligent social idealism to meet our problems; and such an idealism can be generated among the masses only through appropriate moral and religious education.

If we want religion to function in our world, to be a real vital force in the lives of men, religious instruction, then,

* All that is said in this chapter about the importance of social education in religious education should, of course, be related to what was said in lecture III on "The Principle of Socialization." Socialization, as was pointed out, is one function of religion. But socialization is manifestly impossible without social education. See also the discussion in *The Social Problem*, Revised Edition, Chapter VI.

must be combined with social education. As Dr. S. M. Cavert has truly said,⁹ "*In the marriage of social science and Christianity is the one possibility of social salvation.*" In other words, in the union of religion and the social sciences we shall find the basis for a scientific religious and moral education. This proposition, if rightly understood, I do not believe is open to reasonable doubt. Religious education, to be scientific, must be based upon the understanding and appreciation of the spiritual needs of men; but these spiritual needs grow out of their social and cultural life and have reference to that life. In other words, they must be approached and understood through scientific knowledge both of the conditions under which men live and of the possibilities of human life. The culture of the soul has justly been said to be the object of religious and moral education; but the culture of the soul in our world will be found to depend upon the awakening, as we have already stated, of an efficient social imagination in men which will lead them to identify themselves with their fellowmen and to devote their lives to the work of uplifting and redeeming them. Such culture of the soul, then, must depend upon the practical effective union of religion and the social sciences in the work of educating the young.

The trouble with all previous moral and religious education is its failure to appreciate adequately the importance of social knowledge. It has failed to see that the culture of the soul, upon which the salvation of men depends, itself depends upon knowledge of the condition and needs of men. The sinfulness of our human world cannot be overcome merely by paying attention to the "deceitful and desperately wicked" human heart; we must also pay attention to the "deceitful and desperately wicked" in our social inheritance, or civilization. It is doubtful if the deceitfulness and

⁹ *Federal Council Bulletin*, April-May, 1922, p. 33.

desperate wickedness of the human heart would manifest itself to any considerable extent if our civilization were wholly Christian; for, as we have seen, human nature, or at least its manifestation, is readily enough modified for better or worse by the social environment. But the scientific student of society sees no hope of eliminating the evil in our social inheritance without scientific demonstration to the mind of our youth that it is evil. *Social ignorance is at the root of much of the evil in our world both in individual and collective behavior.* Scientific knowledge of social conditions and principles alone can dispel this ignorance and religion alone can motivate consistently to right social action. Some combination of religious and social education must, therefore, be achieved if we would have a Christian world.

SOCIAL IDEALISM AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

The great need of our world at the present time, as I have reiterated, is an intelligent social idealism. Now it is just the combination of religious and social education which is competent to produce such social idealism. An education which will meet the needs of our world at the present time should do, I think, four things: It must produce, first, social intelligence in our youth; secondly, serious-mindedness; thirdly, loyalty to ideal social values; and fourthly, aggressiveness in social righteousness. These are surely the essential things in a practical social idealism.

Let us see if the product of the union of social and religious education will meet these four tests. If rightly given, it cannot but result in social intelligence, because it will impart with care a knowledge of social conditions and of the principles of successful human living together. It will show, as I have already said, that cooperation is the building principle of our human world, and that the widest and

most lasting cooperation among men is impossible without understanding, sympathy, and good will. It will reveal the utter inadequacy of force and self-interest as bases for social organization. It will show that energy devoted to conflict is non-productive and that nothing permanent in our human world, therefore, can be built up through conflict. It will reveal war as the great enemy of mankind along with pestilence and famine. It will, in short, show the need of peace, justice, and good will in human relationships; but it will also inform its student fully concerning the un-Christian aspects of our present social order and show convincingly in contrast the advantages of a Christian social order. In brief, the social ignorance which now so handicaps our religious and moral life would be made to disappear.

Only some combination of social and religious education can produce in our youth that quality of serious-mindedness which we all own is a prerequisite for a practical solution of the problems of our world. It is generally recognized that trivial-mindedness is the besetting sin not only of the youth of our time but of many of our adult population. They fail to see any great need or purpose in life. They have no sense of social responsibility or obligation. To arouse the sense of social responsibility in youth and to free them from trivial-mindedness, there is undoubtedly nothing like the study of social conditions—from community problems to world affairs. Just as there is no great literature or art without a high seriousness, so there can be no great living without high seriousness; and this high seriousness can come only through the study and contemplation of the serious problems of our human life which at the present time are certainly social in their nature.

Only through some combination of social and religious education can we secure in our youth that loyalty to ideal

social values which we must have for progress toward a Christian world. It is true that it is possible to study social conditions and principles without that study awakening loyalty to great social ideals. But if social conditions are studied from a religious viewpoint and social principles taught with a religious accent, loyalty to the great ideals which guide and control the great constructive movements of our time, will then be evoked. Such loyalty can be awakened in the young only through bringing them into actual or imaginative contact with the great causes and movements of our modern world. The history and purpose of such movements as democracy, economic justice, world peace, international cooperation, and the principles expressed in them, must be studied in order to evoke in the young that loyalty to a comprehensive social program which is needed to meet the problems of the present time. Thus through making our modern world and its needs the center of attention and study, we shall be creating a patriotism of humanity combined with a "patriotism of the Cross" which can accomplish infinitely more in straightening out the tangles of our human world than national patriotism has ever been able to do.

Finally, it is the combination of social and religious education which will produce that quality of aggressiveness in social righteousness which is needed for men and women to function rightly in our world. Again, the study of social conditions and needs by itself cannot give this quality. It is only when these things are taught with a religious and Christian accent that this quality which is so much needed for social leadership will be developed. It is just here again that social education by itself so frequently fails. For we often see educated men and women who are socially intelligent, serious-minded, loyal in thought to high social ideals,

yet who are not particularly aggressive out in the open for social righteousness.

To produce this quality in the young which, as I have said, is preeminently the quality needed for social leadership, social education must be given with an outlook toward service. In other words, it must be given so as to inculcate the service ideal of life. But when social education is so given it blends insensibly with moral and religious education. Such education cannot but result in the development of an aggressive civic righteousness in all who receive it.

It is the blending of religious education, then, with social education which all of our young people shall receive to which we must look for adequate social motivation and intelligence to meet our present social problems. This is the only method by which an intelligent social idealism can become generally diffused. It is the only possible way in which we can hope to create a Christian world. All other methods will be found futile. Religious leaders, accordingly, should undertake at once to put social education, shot through with religious interpretations, in all of our Sunday schools, in Young Men's Christian Association and Young Women's Christian Association classes, and in all the other educational work of the Church or of its branches. But the real task is bigger even than this. All the youth of our country must receive this kind of religious and moral education which is, at the same time, a social education. It should be the privilege of the church and of church schools of every sort to head the procession in such universal moral and religious education; but the real problem is the bigger one of how the church and the church school may take the lead in spreading this kind of moral and religious education among the youth of our whole country, thus creating in them the social idealism which is needed to meet the present crisis in our civilization. If the church and Sunday school

will assume leadership in promoting a Christian social education—that is, as I have said, a social education shot through with religious meanings—one can scarcely doubt that the public school system will also fall into line; for the study of Christian ideals in Sunday school classes, in Young Men's Christian Association and Young Women's Christian Association classes, and in other groups, in relation to real life would soon create a Christianized public opinion which would demand that the backbone of the curriculum of our public schools from the kindergarten to the end of the college course shall become social studies given with an ethical purpose. Let the church lead the way in the teaching of social idealism, just as it did in the cause of temperance. Then the public school will follow. Thus, finally, social idealism would become diffused even among the unchurched masses.

THE ORGANIZATION OF RELIGIOUS SOCIAL EDUCATION

If social studies receive adequate recognition in the curriculum of our public schools, and if our teachers also, as all teachers should be, can be inspired with social idealism, then the problem of week-day religious instruction in our schools will be practically solved. Dogmatic religious instruction in our public schools is, in any case, out of the question. But if social studies are taught in our public schools with an outlook upon social service, if they are taught with the humanitarian accent, as they should be to conform to the spirit of social science, they will show the need of a religion of humanity and prepare the student for the Christian ideal of life. The instruction in church and Sunday School classes on Sunday accordingly would then really only supplement and complete the instruction given in the public schools on week days. But the church must

lead the way in this matter, and should help to create a public opinion which shall demand that the education in our public schools be, first of all, education for enlightened Christian citizenship.

The study of social conditions, of actual problems in real human living, must first be made the backbone of the curriculum of our Sunday Schools, then, before we can expect it will become the backbone of the curriculum of our public schools. The Bible should no longer be taught, even in the elementary grades of the Sunday Schools, with little or no mention about present social conditions in our civilization in contrast with Christian ideals. That so much of this has been done in the past is probably one reason why the religion of so many church members fails to function when they come into practical contact with the problems of our world, such as the labor problem, the negro problem, the divorce problem, and the problems of international relations. ✓

Now, if the study of actual social conditions in contrast with Christian ideals is to be introduced into our Sunday school instruction, then good books and good teachers must be employed. The books should not be too shallow, too light, or else they will discredit the whole scheme of combining religious with social education. They should be carefully scientific in their presentation of social facts and they should be written with a Christian background. In the advanced classes, the more adequate text-books in sociology that take the Christian viewpoint should be studied in connection with the ideals and teachings of the gospels. There is no more reason why books of this sort should not be used in our Sunday schools and in our classes in practical religion than books on religion and theology. Their introduction with proper teachers would serve, I believe, to vitalize and renew interest in the work of the

church and the Sunday school, not only for the children but for the adults also.

But if this is to be done, it must be said at once, of course, that trained teachers will be needed in our Sunday school classes instead of the untrained amateurs that we have today. As long as we leave moral and religious education in the hands of teachers who have no special competency except their good intentions we cannot expect to make much progress. Every church of any size should employ a trained man to direct its religious education. But the employment of such a man would not, of course, at once solve the problem of getting trained teachers for all classes. Such a director of religious education might, however, train a staff of volunteers who would be competent to carry out plans under his direction. It would be unfortunate, in my opinion, if any large proportion of the teachers in our Sunday schools ever became paid teachers. The church must encourage and rely upon the volunteer efforts of its members. Therein consists its strength. In almost every community, however, there are a sufficient number of college graduates who have had some training in the social sciences whose services might be enlisted for Sunday school work. Indeed, if the Christian agencies in our colleges were doing their work rightly, they would be constantly training Christian young men and women for such volunteer work in religious education in connection with their home churches and Sunday schools. The problem of securing teachers with some knowledge of social conditions and principles, as well as of Christian ideals, is therefore not insoluble. If attention were concentrated upon it, it might, I think, be solved within a single decade; and if our Sunday schools had a suitable staff of trained teachers with a suitable curriculum directed towards Christian character and practical Christian living, they, or rather

the churches in which they existed, would become a system of ideal formative groups which would envelop and mould the spiritual growth of all their members. In brief, churches which had fully developed their own social and religious education would become model societies, with a membership fit to leaven the rest of the life of mankind.

THE WORK OF SOCIAL EVANGELISM

We must always remember, however, that the work of the church for the moral and religious education of individuals is only a part of its work, and in a sense only incidental to its great work of providing mankind with spiritual leadership. Beyond its work for the religious and moral education of individuals is its work of evangelism. These two functions are not opposed; they supplement each other. There is no foundation and hence no stability and security for the evangelistic work of the church without religious and moral education. But there is a place for the emotional appeal when it follows the instruction of the intelligence and when its results are gathered together, organized, and expressed in collective behavior. After all, the greatest work of the church is to be "the spiritual power" in every community. As such, it is charged with the creation of public conscience on all public questions and the direction of the moral forces of the community toward the achievement of social righteousness. The only secure basis, however, upon which to build up public conscience is through the proper social education of the young; that is, their education in a Christian direction. It is thus that we must proceed to make a Christian world. As Kidd says,¹⁰ "The idealisms of mind and spirit conveyed to the young of each generation under the influence of the social

¹⁰ *The Science of Power*, p. 128.

passion, are absolutely limitless in their effects. The power which is represented thereby is capable of creating a new world in the lifetime of a generation. It is capable of sweeping away in a single generation any existing order of the world."

Kidd has perhaps exaggerated what is possible in practice. In my opinion, he only meant to say that this is possible in theory. But we must agree that the final end and aim of all religious and moral education is to kindle the emotions in a socially idealistic direction. Collective emotion has too often in the past been based upon ignorance and directed to wrong social ends. Even so, it has accomplished wonders. But there is no reason in the nature of things why the great force of collective emotions should not be directed by the highest degree of social intelligence and to the noblest social ends. Then we may admit with Kidd that miracles of social justice and idealism might be possible. Then even the highest social morale could be transmitted to our youth. Each generation would then take up the vision and wisdom of its predecessors and be sure to hand them on with something added to them.

But first we must secure this high degree of social intelligence, and the church has a supreme duty in this regard. It cannot be expected that our youth will discriminate noble from base social ends without the development of social intelligence in a high degree. The truth is that *all religious and moral education must be directed in our state of development to teaching our youth to discriminate carefully the Christian elements in our civilization from the non-Christian*. When the power of moral discrimination has been developed, then we will have some basis for the evangelistic appeal. First must come, of course, the appeal for right personal life and right personal character. No one can help much in straightening out the tangles in this

world's affairs until he has straightened out the tangles in his own life. Beyond this individualistic evangelism, however, lies the final and crowning work of the church in its social evangelism—that is, in its appeal to its members to carry their religious principles into the practical life and affairs of the world and to make, in Biblical phraseology, “the Kingdoms of this world into the Kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ.”

The work of the pulpit is, therefore, supplementary to the work of the Sunday school or the church school. It is the crowning work of the church, to be sure; but it can have no adequate foundation upon which to build unless the church maintains at its maximum efficiency its work in religious and moral education. Even the appeals of the pulpit for Christian living by individuals and for Christian policies and practices by communities and nations need to be supplemented, in order to take hold and sink in, by the after consideration of these appeals by the congregation in some form of discussion group.¹¹ In other words, for effective work the church must always rely upon some means of educating individuals that will evoke their individual intelligence and will.

I have not proposed anything novel in the way of religious and moral education. The wisest religious and moral teachers have always perceived that the education which they tried to impart was essentially a social education, and have proceeded upon the basis of social facts. In a sense, the ministry of Jesus was not simply one of religious teaching, but also a liberal and enlightening social education. Jesus, to be sure, did not have text-books on social conditions, collections of statistics, or even recorded history at his command. But he turned to the study and observation of the human life about him. That he must

¹¹ See *The Reconstruction of Religion*, p. 300.

have studied social facts with a penetrating insight is shown by his grasp of the principles of human living which have surely never been surpassed. That his gospel was a social gospel as well as a personal one seems to me not to admit of doubt. If we have Jesus' spirit and follow in his footsteps, we shall undoubtedly be willing to use all available material to demonstrate religious and moral truth to men. We shall not hesitate to combine religious instruction with a liberal and enlightening social education, even as Jesus did.

QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION

Is the Christian church willing to adopt and utilize the results of social science to make a Christian world?

SUGGESTED READINGS

- BROWN, The Church in America, Chap. XIV.
COE, A Social Theory of Religious Education, Chap. IX.
ELLWOOD, The Reconstruction of Religion, Chap. XI.
KIDD, The Science of Power, Chap. X.

VIII

THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP

Human groups shape themselves in their thinking and acting to the pattern or example furnished by some leader. Man, as we have seen, because he is social is essentially an imitative animal. He follows leaders. Collective behavior of every sort when tracked to its source is almost always a case of "follow the leader." We may set it down as a rule or law that the method used by human groups to adapt themselves to new situations, especially when they are complex and difficult, is to copy the action-patterns proposed or illustrated by a relatively few individuals who are the leaders of the group. Hence it follows that nothing great in the way of progress is or ever will be achieved in human society without leadership.¹ The only thing that can be socially achieved without leadership is action upon a purely instinctive or habitual plane, and that does not mean progress in civilization. Civilization, as I said at the beginning, is made up of acquired habits, and the more complex it becomes, the more intelligence and deliberate will, or effort, enter into its development. Hence all the higher work of civilization is the result of pioneering minds who go on ahead and blaze the trail to further collective achievements. But even these pioneering minds are not wholly the spontaneous products of nature. On the con-

¹ See the author's *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 158-161, and 217-220.

trary, they are chiefly the products of social training, social opportunity, and social stimulation.

FINDING AND TRAINING SPIRITUAL LEADERS

It has recently been said by a college president that leaders are born and not made, and that the colleges of this country can do little to increase the number of men fitted for leadership, especially in social matters. The educational institutions of the country, however, have adopted policies the reverse of this doctrine when it comes to leadership in such matters as agriculture, engineering, commerce, and even medicine. Now if society can produce through taking thought and adopting deliberate policies leaders along these materialistic lines, why can it not devise similar measures to discover and train competent leaders in social and spiritual matters? It may be admitted that the amount of leadership material in any given society is limited; and it may even be admitted that the drafting of superior individuals for leadership into these other lines will lessen the number of individuals available for leadership in spiritual matters. The late Professor Lester F. Ward showed,² however, that the amount of leadership material in populations is much larger than is popularly supposed, and that the main problem before civilization is to find this talent and to train it. According to Ward's contention neither the materialistic nor the spiritual interests of civilization would need to suffer if we found and utilized all of the available talent for leadership which is latent in human beings. There is abundant material for competent leadership of our civilization in every phase of its developing life, if we would only take the trouble to render it available. Both the psychologist and sociologist

² Applied Sociology, Part II.

would say that the "*natural* resources" which are in men have not yet been explored and their development has been scarcely begun in comparison with the resources of physical nature.

Now let us recall again that all the worth-while achievements of civilization require leadership. We acknowledge and act upon this conviction in the material realm. It should not be less evident in the spiritual realm. Masterful leadership is necessary for the success of any great social movement. There is no use of discussing the practicability of religious principles and ideals until this truth becomes a clear conviction in the minds of all who are concerned with religion. Not until these principles and ideals are embodied in the personalities of leaders who are accepted by the masses is there any chance for their success. Men are not motivated by abstract ideals. It is loyalty to concrete personalities which sways them. This is especially true in social and religious matters where deep enthusiasm is indispensable for worth-while achievements.

The peculiar need of our world at the present time, as I see it, is adequate spiritual leadership. Never has our modern world so conspicuously lacked leadership as at the present hour—especially spiritual leadership. The mass of men are confused and bewildered by the conflicting traditions and ideals embodied in the cultural complex which constitutes our civilization. Part of these traditions and ideals, as we have seen, are barbarous in origin, still remain barbarous or represent a very low plane of civilization; while the higher social ideals and attitudes are accepted by comparatively few. It is no wonder that under such circumstances the masses do not know, without leadership, which way to turn, and it is under these circumstances that spiritual leadership becomes the great need of our age. But at this very time, when spiritual leadership is most

needed, we find the greater number of our young men of ability going into materialistic lines of achievement by choice. That is one main reason why we lack leadership in social lines. Personally, I believe that the time has come for us to press home the claims of spiritual interests more clearly upon all of our students and especially upon those who are fitted to lead. It may be true, as Ward contended, that there is ample material of good ability to train for leadership in both spiritual and materialistic lines and that we need only to put forth greater effort to discover it. One thing is certain, however, that the pressing need of more and better trained social and spiritual leaders in our civilization must be emphasized and that we must set ourselves at work in a do-or-die spirit to find and train such leaders; for only a new-found Christian leadership can save our civilization from going on the rocks.

THE WORK OF THE UNIVERSITY AND THE CHURCH

Now the two institutions which are particularly charged with furnishing spiritual leadership to civilization are the university and the church. Historically, these have been joined in the work of providing and training spiritual leaders. It is only recently that they have become disassociated and neglectful to some extent of their partnership functions in the matter of providing society with spiritual leadership. But unless I am mistaken, if our civilization is to survive, the university and the church must seek again a close alliance in the work of the spiritual leadership of civilization and in the finding and training of leaders. The universities have become too fond of the gods of the market place, and are too much in subjection to the existing order. As Mr. Branford and Professor Geddes say in their remarkable work,³ "The Coming Polity": "In

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 246.

current opinion, the University stands as the most conservative of institutions. But that popular estimate merely reflects a temporary arrestment of university development. It is informed by no adequate knowledge of universities in their historic evolution. Consequently, it ignores certain deep-seated tendencies. But develop these tendencies and you restore to the University its proper rôle of leadership, not only in the things of the mind, but also in their practical applications. If, therefore, the university can be aroused to a sense of its human mission and inspired by civic vision, it will become again the cutting edge of progress."

These very words might, of course, be applied to the Christian church also. Indeed, Messrs. Branford and Geddes point out the identity of interest of the University and the church. Not only have they been historically linked, but they are linked also in practical spiritual interests. Our modern universities need to awaken not only to the call which society is sending out to them for spiritual leadership, but also to the identity of their interests with those of churches that stand for rational social religion. However, when all is said, it is the church especially that must furnish spiritual leadership to our civilization. If spiritual leadership does not come from the church, it is safe to say that it will not come from the university, the school, the press, or even the home. The church is the repository of the great spiritual traditions, values, and ideals of our civilization. If it does not develop and propagate them, no other institution in the same social *milieu* in the same age will. When the church forgets or fails in its work of spiritual leadership in the community and in the world at large, it has forgotten and failed in its main function. For the church cannot create a Christian world, a Christian society, or even aggressive Christian

character and neglect its function of producing the spiritual leadership required to do these things.

Yet according to practically all critical observers, the church is failing to furnish the spiritual leadership needed by our civilization. Says Mr. William T. Ellis in commenting on the year 1922, "Dearth of religious leadership grows more marked. Potential prophets become organization secretaries. This fleeing for refuge to organization and yet more organization . . . is a curious characteristic of the religious life of the present day. . . . Solicitude for governmental action along various moral and philanthropic lines seems to be supplanting the sense of God and of the spiritual realities which is the ministry's real gift to mankind." At the very least, a vital church will emphasize personal leadership above mere organization, the prophetic spirit more than institutional administration. Upon the church as a whole rests the heavy responsibility of spiritual progress in our human world; and this responsibility can not be met by the methods in present use. *Unless every church turns round and becomes a recruiting station to enlist the strongest and finest young men and women it can reach for spiritual leadership it cannot meet this responsibility.*

It is the Christian church, in particular, then, which is called to the work of spiritual leadership. It may secure such allies as the university, the school, the press, and the home; but if it is true to its calling, it will recognize that the main responsibility for the spiritual leadership of civilization rests upon it, and in particular in all religious and moral matters. While the duty and responsibility of spiritual leadership rests upon the church as a whole, it is not inconsistent to add that a special body of trained and consecrated leaders needs to be developed within it. This is in accordance with the general principles of the psychology

and sociology of leadership which we have previously pointed out. And it is upon this special, select group of leaders within the church that its power in society at large ultimately depends. If the church could train only one-tenth of its present membership even, for intelligent, aggressive religious and moral leadership in all human affairs, it would soon become and exercise the greatest controlling power in our world. Now, as I have just implied, I do not think that the duty and responsibility of religious leadership should rest with the clergy alone. On the contrary, the very success of the church in its general social leadership demands that lay leaders be found and trained also for their full share in the work. What we have said in the previous lecture regarding religious and moral education implies that every church must be equipped with a trained staff of considerable size to carry on its work. Upon the minister of the church as a leader of leaders will, of course, rest a peculiar responsibility, and what I am about to say concerning the qualifications, training, and character of religious leaders especially applies to the ministry. But it is a fatal error to think that the office of religious leadership can be left wholly in the hands of the ministry. Nothing is more needed in religious work today than the development and encouragement of an educated and consecrated lay leadership. What I am about to say, therefore, applies to all who are engaged in religious work of any sort.

A religious leadership which is adequate to meet the present crisis in religion and in our social life needs to be more carefully trained than the leadership in any other line of human endeavor. To secure such competency in leadership some proper scheme of education must be devised to prepare all those who undertake any form of religious work fully for their responsibilities. The business of such

a leadership will be fourfold. First, it must create an ideal, but a scientifically valid, objective for the religious life; secondly, it must perfect a scientific method by which this objective may be realized in human society; thirdly, it must develop ideal religious motives in the mass of the people; fourthly, it must provide means for an ideal social and religious nurture within the capacity of all in order that Christian character may be developed in the masses. Many of these problems have been already discussed in previous chapters, and especially in the chapter on Religious Education. There remains something to be said, however, about the personal qualities which are needed for effective religious leadership.

What, then, are the qualifications for religious leadership? What traits should training for religious leadership seek to develop?

QUALITIES NEEDED IN RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP

First of all, the most necessary quality for religious leadership today is certainly *social intelligence*. Intelligence is always necessary for leadership, but the intelligence which the religious worker needs today above all is a social intelligence. He must know the nature, the condition, the needs, and the possibilities of men in society. He must know what makes and mars moral and religious character in men. If human personality is largely a product of social forces and situations, as science has surely demonstrated that it is, then the religious leader needs to know both the social helps and the social impediments to the development of character. It is inevitably the duty of the religious leader, moreover, to help guide public opinion rightly upon the great moral questions which confront communities, nations, and civilization; and this cannot be

done by the religious leader without social knowledge and social intelligence. The religious leader needs to know not only about the temperance movement, but about every other movement which is affecting the destinies of human souls. He must know, as Professor Coe says in effect, to what extent a given social order succeeds in producing, or fails to produce, Christian men and women. Obviously, scientific knowledge of the whole range of social conditions, laws, and principles is needed to pass intelligent judgment on any given social order or to work intelligently for an environment which will provide an ideal Christian nurture for all individuals. Obviously, therefore, schools for the training of religious workers, if they wish their graduates to be effective agents in the creation of a Christian world, must give a great deal of time and attention to the social sciences studied from the standpoint of affording guidance for religious and ecclesiastical work of every sort.

It must come to be recognized generally that the effective religious worker is always a social worker, and needs fundamental social training quite as much as any other social worker. Those who hold executive positions in religious work are essentially social engineers.⁴ They need, especially, to understand the structure of human nature and the condition of the present world which they are seeking to remake. They need knowledge of the nature and possibilities of man. They need to exercise good judgment in handling men and situations. They need to understand thoroughly, accordingly, all social situations and all social classes. All this is, of course, possible only through the acquisition of a highly trained social intelligence. But it should be emphasized that high social intelligence is a result of training and not simply of natural gifts. "Natural" religious impulses will not go far under the complex condi-

⁴Compare Earp, *The Social Engineer*, especially pp. xviii-xxiii.

tions of our modern world. As I have already argued in discussing religious education, social knowledge and social values obtained through the study of social facts and principles are necessary for the right direction of religious impulses under modern conditions. All that was said in regard to the importance of combining social education with religious and moral education applies with double force to the education of religious leaders. The religious leader especially needs a definite, constructive philosophy of the social life. If our world is perishing for lack of spiritual leadership, then the religious leadership that will fill that need must possess the highest social intelligence, and this cannot be secured without careful training of all would-be religious leaders in the social sciences.

The religious leader, moreover, must have that practical social knowledge which will teach him how to embody his ideals in institutions and organizations. Men are successful in doing great work in our human world only as their personal ideas and attitudes become organized into large movements. Concepts and ideals must be institutionalized in order to live on a large scale. Even good will must be organized if it is to be effective in our world. The religious leader must know how to institutionalize the concepts and patterns for action which he sets before men. To this end, of course, the history of religious and moral ideas, of religious institutions, and the methods by which those ideas have become actualized in the lives of men must be understood; and they must be understood not as abstract past and gone things, but as illustrating the great forces now at work in social and cultural evolution which are ever rebuilding our human world.

Sympathy and love for mankind in the mass is obviously the second quality which is needed for religious leadership. Sympathy is necessary quite as much as intelligence for

any sort of leadership. It is difficult, indeed, to say which is most needed for successful religious leadership, a broad mind or an outreaching heart. Nor should the mistake be made, however, of supposing that this quality of sympathy is not in large degree a result of training. Grant that we cannot sympathize with people if we cannot put ourselves in their place in imagination. This simply means that sympathy depends upon the development and training of *an efficient social imagination*. This efficient social imagination, of which I have already spoken at length, is the key to the development of an intelligent social sympathy, and it manifestly depends upon an understanding of men and of the conditions under which they live which can be acquired. It is also one of the keys to effective social and religious leadership. If we cannot feel as other men feel and have a fellow feeling for them, we cannot possibly lead them; at any rate, we cannot lead them aright. We have previously shown how love in the sense of unselfish devotion to the welfare of others must motivate all idealistic social actions. The leader in religious work especially has need of this love for his fellowmen if he is to get them to go with him the upward way to higher and better living. Social sympathy is, therefore, the key to motivation in religious work, just as it is in all other social work. Moreover, I would say that religious work demands a much higher degree of social sympathy than any other form of social work. It calls for social sympathy of such an intensity that it blends with that sacrificial love of which I have already spoken, and to which I shall return later. It is sufficient at this point simply to emphasize the fact that the sympathy and love needed by the religious leader must be of the sort which is ready for costly self-sacrifice.

If the religious leader has an all-inclusive love of men—a passionate devotion to their welfare—he will have no

difficulty in cooperating with all others who are enlisted in the service of mankind. He will not let minor differences stand in the way of such cooperation. His love for men will help him to rise above pettiness and the selfish defence of his own ideas; it will make him put the welfare of humanity above the triumph of his own views. Hence, an intense social sympathy bordering on sacrificial love is the first thing needed after social intelligence to overcome the present divisions in the Christian church and give it a united spiritual leadership. *It is the lack of social intelligence on the one hand, and of a real, passionate, redeeming love for men on the other which still keeps the church a divided church,* when our world so sorely needs a united spiritual leadership.

The third quality which is needed by the religious leader is *moral courage*. This is implied in what has just been said about the necessity of a readiness on the part of the religious leader to sacrifice himself. I believe that it is just here that the religious and moral leadership of our world at the present time peculiarly fails. Religious leaders have become too timid. They seem afraid to show that divine recklessness which was shown by their Master in order to save the world. We should remember that if Christ had been wholly discreet, he would not have died upon the Cross, and his sacrificial death would not be today a redeeming force in our world. We cannot be overly discreet and be worth-while Christians.

As a people, we show unmistakable signs of a lack of moral courage in dealing with the great evils of our time. If religious leaders would, however, show more moral courage, the masses would readily enough fall into line.⁵ Remember that man is essentially imitative, as I have said,

⁵Of course, moral courage is not less needed by educational and political leaders than by religious leaders, and at the present time seems even more lacking.

and that this is especially true when some new step needs to be taken. Of course, it hardly needs to be added that moral courage is not incompatible with good judgment and social intelligence. But while we need to know what we can do and what we cannot do in a social way, we shall never be able to achieve the known socially best without the highest degree of moral courage. A resolute will, a resolute purpose is needed to accomplish anything great and worth while in our civilization. The religious leader must always remember that the "mores," no matter how morally lax they may be, are set against change, and that patience and courage are needed to bring about changes. The religious leader must develop an inability to become discouraged. He must keep in mind that for two thousand years Christian civilization has only been making slow gains, at times suffering hard setbacks, and that if the people who have believed in a better human world had not had stout hearts and resolute purposes, they would have fainted and failed. As a religious leader, he must learn to be patient, to have moral courage, and a resolute purpose and firm will to face the evils of this world.

There is surely no need for our present religious leaders to become discouraged. The present crisis is, after all, nothing comparable with the crisis which confronted the early Christian church. Then the whole world was openly arrayed against the Christian ideal. On the one hand was the degenerate, pagan civilization of Greece and Rome; on the other, the crude, pagan barbarism of northern Europe. But the early leaders of the church were undaunted. They were sure that "one with God is a majority," and with unequalled courage and heroism, they set out to win for the Christian ideal both the degenerate Greco-Roman and the barbarian world; and they succeeded in good measure.

✓ But such moral courage is impossible unless the religious leader possesses in a supreme degree another quality, which is *faith*. The religious leader must have a sense of God and of co-partnership with God. He needs a supreme faith in God and in the possibilities of human life. Without such ■ faith he is bound to become discouraged. Personally, I believe that such faith ought to be an understanding faith. It ought to be sincere and intellectually honest. It must not be built merely upon authority and tradition, but rest upon an understanding of the working of God's purpose in human history and in individual lives. The religious leader must see with his mind how all human history points to the Kingdom of God as the end of human development. He must see with his understanding that that Kingdom cannot be constructed in one generation. He must have the mental grasp to see that ours is just one generation in the vast procession of generations; that our work is necessarily a limited work and part of a greater work, which must be carried on through an innumerable succession of generations. So to work, so to take our place and do our part well, requires unalterable faith that neither God nor man is going to fail. Such faith may spring from vision and from love; but it may also receive re-enforcements from the understanding and the intelligence. The religious leader needs to lay hold of all the things in human experience which will help him to perfect his faith.

✓ A fifth quality which is needed by the religious leader is *moral enthusiasm*. Enthusiasm, which in the original Greek meant "God is us," springs from vision, from faith, and from love. It is perhaps hard to define, yet there is no quality which is more contagious and more needed by the leaders of men. Sir J. R. Seeley said that the characteristic quality of Jesus was his enthusiasm of humanity. Cer-

tainly the religious leader of our day needs this quality of the enthusiasm of humanity in a superlative degree.

But the quality which the religious leader needs finally and above all, I believe at the present time, is *complete consecration*. A religious leader may possess social intelligence, social sympathy, moral courage, unalterable faith, enthusiasm for humanity, and yet if he lacks the element of consecration his leadership will certainly prove inadequate under the conditions of our world. I do not know how to define "consecration," except to say that it is the quality which especially characterized the saints and martyrs of the early church. It is a summoning and gathering together of all the energies which go to make up the religious life and *focusing them upon the one purpose of bringing in the Kingdom of God among men*. We are told, of course, that the day for this has gone by, that there are no saints and martyrs any longer, and they would be quite out of place in the religious life of the present. Yet it seems to me that until the religious leaders of the church undergo something of that complete consecration of life which the best of the saints and martyrs of the church showed in early Christian history, in medieval times, and again in the time of the Protestant Reformation, there is little chance of Christianity winning out in our world. The church, to be sure, as a whole, needs a more consecrated life, but it especially needs a more consecrated leadership, *a leadership which fears only God and not men, and which is ready to give all, if need be, in his service*.

THE NEED OF HEROISM IN RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP

It is with great reluctance, I confess, that I have come to this conclusion. Once I believed that the scientist working in his study could dig out the truth, and that that truth

would conquer and make the world right through its own inherent might; but now I see that that truth must be clothed in flesh and blood and find expression in the sacrifice of self and in other heroic action to establish itself. Truth does not work apart from the human will; it must work in and through us, and until it wins some of us to consecrate ourselves thoroughly to its service we cannot expect it to win the world. Our world is still too tightly held by error and by wrong for truth and right to win out easily. *Mere intelligence can never save our world.* There is just one way in which the transition can be effected from our semi-pagan civilization to a true Christian civilization, and that is for members of the Christian church, one here and one there at first and then the many following, *to consecrate themselves without any limitation or reservation whatsoever, to the forwarding of the Christian cause.* When the Christian church develops a fully consecrated leadership and itself assumes the spiritual leadership of mankind, the Christian cause will win out among men,⁶ but not till then.

The qualities which made the saint and the martyr of the past are not dead in men; they only need to be re-awakened. The Great War showed that mankind had lost none of its capacities for heroism. If national loyalty can call forth such splendid sacrifice on the part of the best and noblest young men, surely the church, which stands for an infinitely nobler idea than the nation, ought to be able to command equal loyalty and secure equal sacrifices in her behalf.

⁶ Compare the statement of James (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 283): "If positive well-wishing could attain so supreme a degree of excitement, those who were swayed by it might well seem superhuman beings. Their life would be morally discrete from the lives of other men, and there is no saying what the effects might be; they might conceivably transform the world."

Can it be that "the patriotism of the Cross" means less to the members of the church as Christians than national patriotism means to them as citizens? Not only in the excitement of military life, moreover, but in the commonest of peaceful pursuits, men today are still displaying heroic qualities of sacrifice for unselfish ends. *In science a man is supposed to be without fear in the proclamation of the truth.* Science already has a long list of martyrs, and medical science in particular exhibits with pride the devotion of innumerable martyrs in its cause. We do not hesitate to speak of the need of the spirit of martyrdom for the service of country or of science. Why should we hesitate longer to speak of its need in the service of the Christian cause? Are we afraid of being called fanatics?

To be sure, we acknowledge that the martyr spirit is still needed in the foreign mission field and to some extent in the home mission field; but we do not seem to think that it is needed in any large measure in the ordinary church and community; that it should be encouraged in every individual Christian life. Yet I am persuaded that nothing else is adequate to meet and overcome the evils from which our world is suffering. All who are thoughtful among us surely acknowledge that the world is suffering today above everything else from the lack of adequate spiritual leadership. Adequate spiritual leadership, however, is impossible in a world still largely dominated by expediency, self-interest, and other pagan standards, without the spirit of sacrificial love in the highest degree, that is to say the spirit of consecration "without limitation or reservation." *As long as prudence rather than the exalted mood of Christ dominates religious leaders, the church can do nothing great. Religious leadership for our time demands as much consecration, fearlessness and readiness to sacrifice OF US as it ever demanded OF ANY MEN.*

Unless the spirit of martyrdom shown by the early church can be revived, the church cannot capture the moral imagination of mankind. The church has not, then, seen the last of the need for saints and martyrs. It must rather call upon its entire membership to show forth this spirit, and it must especially demand of its leadership a consecration worthy to be compared with the most supreme example of its past history. One reason why the church is not securing the strongest young men for its service at the present time is because *it does not appeal enough to the heroic within them*; yet surely there never was an age in which the need of moral heroism was more apparent than in the present. *Sacrificial love must be the motive appealed to if we would recruit the right sort of leadership for the church.*

Mr. Victor Branford in his inspiring study of "St. Columba" shows the part, from the standpoint of sociology, which the saintly leader might play in modern society. He explains by sound sociological principles why we might expect the saintly spiritual leader to exert just as much social effect in our time as he did in medieval times. He says: "The prestige of the prophet, at once loved and venerated, gives him a power of suggestion capable of realising, in the conduct of his disciples and their successors, certain ideals. . . . The love which the saint evokes is creative of souls in the pattern of his ideal. The designation of the aged Columba as 'Commander of Souls' (*arimarum dux*) describes his type with literal accuracy." Surely the whole history of the Christian church illustrates the truth of these statements.

THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP OF THE CHURCH

I do not mean to say, of course, that the modern church ought to cultivate and imitate in the sense of duplicate the

practices of its early saints and martyrs. The saints and martyrs needed today will undoubtedly be of a different type in many respects. They will exhibit not less consecration of individual life, but they will show at the same time a broader intelligence, a wider sympathy, and a clearer understanding. For the open mind, clear thinking, and breadth of sympathy are not inconsistent with heroic qualities and with the power of self-sacrifice for a great cause. The modern saint needs to combine the scientific and the religious spirit. The times have changed and he needs to be different from the medieval saint,⁷ but faith and love and unfaltering courage must still give him an unlimited power of self-sacrifice. He will sacrifice himself, no doubt, more intelligently than did some of the saints and martyrs of the past, but he will sacrifice himself not less willingly. He will see the great work which the church is called upon to do is not a work which can be accomplished by ease and soft-living, or even by "business methods"; that it is a work which always has demanded and always will demand, until its cause is triumphant, the utmost heroism and sacrifice on the part of those who undertake to lead it.

Nor do I mean, of course, that the church has not today many leaders who illustrate in their lives in the highest degree the spirit of the saint and the martyr. The church, even at its lowest ebb, has never altogether lacked a consecrated leadership; otherwise it would never have survived at all. Today its life is still rich with lives which show the utmost personal consecration, though too fre-

⁷The leaders of the Protestant Reformation at their best perhaps more nearly represent this type of religious leadership needed at the present time—in the "New Reformation"; but as Branford points out, the best of the medieval saints illustrate the qualities needed for religious leadership in a high degree. The contemptuous attitude now often shown toward these men is quite unintelligent.

quently in an "other-worldly" sense; but there is need of a still larger proportion of its members showing consecration "without limitation or reservation" to the cause of a Christian world. And, to me, when I consider the vast number of church members who are morally timid, irresolute, controlled by expediency or self-interest, in contrast with those who have risen above such things, *the number of the completely consecrated seems pitifully small*. We must surely, therefore, confess that while the church today still has its saints and martyrs, the spirit of the saint and martyr is now altogether too rare among us considering the stupendous tasks which confront the church. The church is called upon to lead in all spiritual matters, and it should furnish the world its moral leaders and heroes along every line.

Perhaps most of us are not exactly the stuff out of which saints and martyrs or even heroes of any sort are easily made. If we ever become such it will only be because the stimulus of some great organization is behind us, like the church or the state, which demands that we rise to the high level of heroic action. Men are capable of the bravest and most self-sacrificing deeds when the spirit of their group calls upon them for this bravery and self-sacrifice; but usually not otherwise. It is group *morale* which makes men capable of heroic deeds. Therefore, the church in its teaching and in its preaching must constantly sound the call again among its members for moral heroism, and one man here and another woman there will respond who will have the making of the kind of modern saints and martyrs which humanity needs to lift it out of barbarism into a truly Christian civilization. If the church fails to do this, it will lose the moral and spiritual leadership of humanity; for saints and martyrs humanity must have, if it is to march forward to ultimate triumph over its foes.

TYPE OF LEADERSHIP NOW NEEDED

Personally, I believe that the church will not fail. The Christian church is not dead; it is living; the spirit of moral heroism is only slumbering within it, waiting to be awakened by the clarion call of men sent from God to rouse it to action. I am persuaded to believe this when I remember the saintly men with whom I have had contact within the church who have touched and enriched my own life. They are many in number, but I would mention especially two as examples of the type of saint which I believe the modern world needs. Both were teachers, though both had seen active service in the ministry. One was Professor Charles Richmond Henderson of the University of Chicago. I think all of his students would testify to his saintly character and absolute consecration. The students used to call him "a walking gospel." The other was Professor Walter Rauschenbusch. I think Professor Rauschenbusch represents especially well the ideal of what the modern saint should be. He was socially intelligent, open-minded, a tireless searcher after truth, perfectly fearless in its proclamation, aggressive in righteousness, courageous for even unpopular causes if he believed them to be right; yet he was so gentle, so kindly, so helpful and considerate of all with whom he came into contact, that no one could know him without loving him. He was never bitter, never contentious, never unkind in anything that he said or did; yet he fought unswervingly and unweariedly to right every wrong, to correct every injustice, and to lift up all who were oppressed. His life seems to me to have shown what a spirit of consecration to the Christian cause "without limitation or reservation" can achieve in the modern world both in the way of personal character and in

the way of promoting the redemption of the social life of mankind.

It is surely unnecessary for me to say that the qualities shown by these two men were, as they themselves would have been the first to say, simply the reflection of the qualities shown by Jesus Christ. Their lives were imitations of his life in our modern world. There are countless others; but few that show so clearly how the spirit of Jesus can furnish the dynamic power for a leadership which will transform our modern world. Jesus is, of course, the illustration of a perfect leader for all who enter upon religious work. His insight, his intelligence, his love, his courage, his faith, his enthusiasm, his consecration, and his readiness to sacrifice seem altogether beyond us perhaps until someone like Professor Rauschenbusch shows us that these qualities of leadership are still realizable in a superlative degree in our modern life. While we must ultimately turn to the life of Jesus to learn most regarding the spiritual leadership which our world needs, such a life as that of Professor Rauschenbusch surely can show us practically how the qualities displayed by Jesus can be realized in our day, not simply in one life, but in the lives of innumerable Christians. The church, at the present time, needs, and there is no prohibitive reason why it should not have, thousands of men and women who will duplicate the qualities which Professor Rauschenbusch showed. If those qualities are duplicated in her ministry, it will make, I believe, her spiritual power irresistible; for they were the qualities which made the saints and heroes of the past and which have built up the Christian church to the point where it is today—the mightiest power for good, if it will but use its power, among men.

I would say, therefore, to you in conclusion, using the

memorable words of Dr. Raymond Fosdick to a Wellesley College graduating class: "There is here in your group the possibility of visions and creative leadership such as the world needs now more than at any time in its history. So I welcome you to the grim struggle that awaits you. You are joining the ranks of a gallant army—the army of the Kingdom of the Spirit. It has fought in many ages on many a field and has many times been vanquished. Just now it is desperately hard pressed. Its ranks are torn and its flags are going down. It is being attacked by an enemy far more powerful and determined than any with which it has previously fought. It badly needs the reinforcement which you are bringing. If you can come with more intelligence, more resourcefulness, and more devotion than previous generations have shown, the day may be saved."

And I would add that there is no need of your generation failing in enlightened spiritual leadership, as my generation has failed, because of its ignorant antagonisms and its senseless opposition of faith and knowledge, of religion and science. The way is not closed, but open, to a renaissance of the true Christian spirit in our world. Science has not made the progress of true Christianity or the religion of Jesus more difficult. It has infinitely aided that progress by giving us knowledge which both confirms Christian ideals and at the same time shows us how we may realize them. We need only a synthesis of this knowledge and of the Christian spirit—the spirit of Jesus. But that synthesis must be a living one—it must be in the lives of the men and the women who lead the Christian cause.

QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION

Can the Christian church furnish again, as it did of old, the saints and martyrs needed to redeem our world?

SUGGESTED READINGS

BRANFORD, St. Columba: A Study of Social Inheritance.

BROWN, The Church in America, Chap. XV.

BRANFORD AND GEDDES, The Coming Polity, Part III, Chap. I.

KIDD, The Science of Power, Chap. X.

APPENDIX

CENTRAL PRINCIPLES OF "THE FELLOWSHIP FOR A CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ORDER"

II

We believe that the deepest human fellowship has its necessary basis in fellowship with God as He is revealed in Jesus.

III

We believe that according to the life and teaching of Jesus, the supreme task of mankind is the creation of a social order, the Kingdom of God on earth, wherein the maximum opportunity shall be afforded for the development and enrichment of every human personality; in which the supreme motive shall be love; wherein men shall co-operate in service for the common good and brotherhood shall be a reality in all of the daily relationships of life.

IV

We must, therefore, endeavor to transform such unchristian attitudes and practices as now hinder fellowship: extravagant luxury for some, while many live in poverty and want; excessive concentration of power and privilege as a result of vast wealth in the hands of a few; monopoly of natural resources for private gain; autocratic control of industry by any group; production for individual profit and power rather than for social use and service; arrogance

and antagonism of classes, nations and races; war, the final denial of brotherhood.

V

We believe that in the spirit and principles of Jesus is found the way of overcoming these evils, and that within the Christian Church there should be a unity of purpose and endeavor for the achieving of a Christian social order. By means of fellowship in thought and prayer we come to understand the point of view of those who differ from us, make possible new discoveries of truth, and aid one another in the solution of common problems. We believe that social changes should be effected through educational and spiritual processes, especially by an open-minded examination of existing evils and suggested solutions, full discussion and varied experimentation. We pledge ourselves to vigorous activity in seeking by these means a solution of the social problems which we face.

NOTE: The Fellowship for a Christian Social Order was organized by a number of leaders in religious work in 1921. Persons desiring further information concerning this movement should write the secretary, Rev. Kirby Page, 311 Division Avenue, Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey.

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"Suggested readings" at end of each chapter

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